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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction is limited to an appeal of Judge Medley's February
2001 denial of the issues raised in Bennett's May 2000 motion, but does not extend to
the dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction as reflected in the Minute
Entry of January 7, 2000, or the Rule 54(b) judgments of February 11, 2000 and
February 28, 2000. No notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of the February
2000 judgments.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I
Did Bennett timely appeal the district court's dismissal of his claims against Post
Kirby for lack of personal jurisdiction?
The standard of review is for correctness. See DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins.
Co., 828 P.2d 520, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
ISSUE II
Did the district court err when it dismissed Bennett's claims against Post Kirby
because of lack of personal jurisdiction over those defendants?
The standard of review is for correctness. See Phone Directories Co., Inc. v.
Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 12, 8 P.3d 256.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES
Utah R. App. P. 4(a) ("the notice of appeal... shall be filed ... within 30 days after the
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from").
U.S. Const. Amend, XIV § 1 (due process clause).

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Post Kirby is a California law firm. In 1990, Post Kirby was approached in
California by Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough ("Jones Waldo") to act as local and
co-counsel in a securities class action lawsuit pending in federal court in California. Post
Kirby performed its duties exclusively in California, except for routine communications
and visits with persons in Utah incidental to the California litigation. The California
litigation was settled with court approval. However, Bennett, who had been a named
plaintiff for that class, opted-out of the class (i.e., excluded himself from the class), and
did not participate in that settlement. Bennett now claims that Post Kirby allegedly
committed legal malpractice, breached fiduciary and contractual duties to Bennett, and
made misrepresentations to the court in California in connection with the settlement.
After the California litigation was settled, Jones Waldo learned that Bennett
intended to sue it for malpractice and assert claims that it viewed as a collateral attack on
the California class action settlement. After hearings in the California federal court,
which had approved the class settlement, Post Kirby obtained (at Jones Waldo's request)
a permanent "Bar Order" barring any collateral attack on the California class action
settlement. The Bar Order was ultimately affirmed as valid, but given a narrower
interpretation, by the Ninth Circuit, which permitted Bennett to raise certain claims in
this action. Bennett claims that Post Kirby committed abuse of process and intentionally
inflicted emotional distress by obtaining the California Bar Order, and allegedly made
misrepresentations to the California court in connection with the Bar Order litigation.

2

Statement of Relevant Facts
This statement of fact reviews the allegations of the Fourth Amended Complaint
(hereinafter "Compl.") and the Affidavit of Michael L. Kirby (hereinafter "Kirby Aff.").
Parties
1.

Defendant Post Kirby is a San Diego, California law firm. (R. 1431 (Kirby

Aff. *f 4).) Defendant Michael L. Kirby is a founder of Post Kirby and the sole
shareholder of Defendant Michael L. Kirby A.P.C. - a partner in Post Kirby. (R. 1432
(Kirby Aff. ^f 5).) Post Kirby has no offices in Utah, and none of its attorneys has ever
been licensed to practice law in Utah. Post Kirby neither advertises nor solicits clients in
Utah. (IcLf 6.)
2.

Plaintiff Bennett is a Utah resident. (R. 1045 (Compl. If 6).) Since 1991,

Bennett has been an attorney. (R. 1431 (Kirby Aff. ^ 4).)
Utah Gen-Probe Lawsuit
3.

In 1989, Bennett was a minority shareholder in Gen-Probe, Inc. ("Gen-

Probe"), a company located in Southern California. (R. 1046 (Compl. f 11).)
4.

On December 5, 1989, Bennett sued Gen-Probe and its officers and

directors in United States District Court for the District of Utah (hereinafter the "Utah
Gen-Probe Litigation"). (R. 1050 (Compl. ^ 30).) Bennett sought to enjoin the purchase
of Gen-Probe by a Japanese company because, inter alia, the purchase price was
allegedly inadequate. (R. 1047-51 (Compl.ffi[20-26, 30, 34).) Bennett also asserted
derivative claims on behalf of Gen-Probe against its officers and directors, and damage
claims on behalf of a proposed class of the minority shareholders of Gen-Probe.

3

(R. 1051-52 (Compl.ffl[30-31, 36-37).) Bennett's father, Wallace Bennett, initially
appeared as plaintiffs counsel in the Utah Gen-Probe Litigation.1 (R. 1050 (Compl. ^
30).)
5.

By Retainer Agreement, dated April 18, 1990, Bennett (and others) retained

Jones Waldo as lead counsel in the Utah Gen-Probe Litigation. (R. 1053 (Compl.ffl[39,
41-46, ex. 1); see also Appellant's App. 3.) The Retainer Agreement permitted Jones
Waldo to "retain associate counsel. . . provided associate counsel [was] retained at
[Jones Waldo's] sole expense," and Jones Waldo expressly therein associated Bennett's
father as counsel in the Utah matter. (Appellant's App. 3 at f 6.)
California Gen-Probe Litigation
6.

On August 24, 1990, the Utah Gen-Probe Litigation was transferred to the

United States District Court for the Southern District of California (hereinafter the
"California Court"). (R. 1055 (Compl. % 50).) The Gen-Probe litigation after the transfer
to California shall be referred to as the "California Gen-Probe Litigation."
7.

As a result of the transfer of the Gen-Probe case, Jones Waldo was required

by California local rule to associate California counsel. (R. 1055 (Compl. ^f 52).) Jones
Waldo contacted Post Kirby in California to act as co-counsel in the California GenProbe Litigation. (R. 1434 (Kirby Aff. Tf 14).)
8.

By letter dated October 24, 1990, Post Kirby agreed to act as "co-counsel"

in a "joint representation" with Jones Waldo of a "class" in the California Gen-Probe

1

Bennett's father withdrew as counsel in approximately August 1991.

4

Litigation (hereinafter the "Post Kirby Retention Letter"). (R. 1055, 1113 (Compl. Tf 53,
ex. 2); see also Appellant's App. 4.) Post Kirby never signed nor agreed to become a
party to the Retainer Agreement.2 (R. 1435 (Kirby Aff. f 16).) Bennett himself
recognized that Post Kirby was not a party to the Retainer Agreement when he wrote to
Jones Waldo in May 1992:
The Firm of Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat was retained as associate
counsel by Jones Waldo after the case began. The Kirby firm has no direct
retainer relationship with any named plaintiff; it is Kit Burton and Jones
Waldo who bear primary responsibility to us.
(R. 1116 (Compl., ex. 3 n.l (italics added, underlining in original)); see also R. 383
(Second Am. Compl. ^ 2 ("Law Firm [Jones Waldo] was the sole contracting party on
the lawyer's side in the Retainer Agreement")(emphasis added)).)
9.

Post Kirby performed its work in the California Gen-Probe Litigation

exclusively in California, except for routine communications, meetings, or depositions in
Utah ancillary to the prosecution of the California action. (R. 1435-36 (Kirby Aff. fflf 1718).) The ancillary Utah contacts allegedly consisted of the following:

2

Bennett claims that the Retainer Agreement contemplated a "derivative action" against
Gen-Probe and that the transformation of that litigation into a "class action" was
"contrary to paragraph 14 of the Retainer Agreement." (Appellant's Br. at 11 n. 11.)
However, Post Kirby never agreed to represent the plaintiffs in a derivative action, but
was hired solely as co-counsel in a "class action." This alleged inconsistency between
the scope of Post Kirby's representation in the October 1990 letter and the Retainer
Agreement highlights that Post Kirby never agreed to be a party to or bound by the
Retainer Agreement.

5

(1)

Three visits to Utah to review documents and work on the Fourth Amended
Complaint to be filed in the California Gen-Probe Litigation3 (October 17,
1990, November 12-13, 1990, and January 15-17, 1991);

(2)

Three visits to Utah for depositions and related witness preparation in the
California Gen-Probe Litigation4 (July 25, 1999, July 29-31, 1991, and
August 25-27, 1991);

(3)

Three visits to Utah regarding settlement of the California Gen-Probe
Litigation5 (December 11, 1991, February 11-14, 1992, and May 11, 1992);
and

(4)

Written correspondence or telephone conversations between Post Kirby in
California and others (primarily Jones Waldo) in Utah.

(R. 1671-72; see also R. 1599-1630 (Post Kirby timesheets).)

3

Bennett claims that he was injured by the non-inclusion of derivative claims against
Gen-Probe in the Fourth Amended Complaint, which was prepared with the assistance of
Post Kirby during these Utah visits. (Appellant's Br. at 11, 47.) However, as noted
above, Post Kirby was retained (and agreed to represent the plaintiffs) only for a class
action so that any derivative claims found in prior complaints would have been beyond
and outside the scope of Post Kirby's representation of the plaintiffs.
4

Bennett has claimed that during one of these visits at his deposition in Utah, he was
allegedly coached by Jones Waldo to essentially lie during his deposition (which he did)
as to his potential liability for costs, and Post Kirby "tacitly ... encourag[ed] him to
follow [that] coaching" (although Bennett did not specifically raise this allegation in his
appellate brief). (R. 1673.) This issue dealt with the responsibility for any of defendants'
costs assessed against the class representatives personally at the end of the case if the
class were unsuccessful, whereas the Retainer Agreement only provided that Jones
Waldo would advance or pay the plaintiffs' costs or expenses during the litigation. As
will be noted hereafter the Utah State Bar (the "Bar") specifically investigated this
allegation and held that Jones Waldo did not suborn any perjury. (R. 1209-13, 1231-32.)
The Bar also noted that Jones Waldo ultimately agreed to cover such costs on September
9, 1991, several months after the depositions, but prior to the settlement in this case.
(R. 1209-12.) Bennett claims no injury from this coaching.
3

Bennett has claimed that during the February 14 visit, the lawyers negligently
"encouraged" Bennett to opt out of the settlement. (R. 1673.)

6

10.

During the California Gen-Probe Litigation, the parties held three

settlement conferences presided over by Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter of the
California Court. (See, e.g., R. 1732.) In December 1991, a proposed class settlement
was reached and announced in California. (R. 1061-62 (Compl.fflf71-72).)
11.

Bennett actively opposed the proposed settlement claiming that Post Kirby

and Jones Waldo inadequately investigated the claims. (R. 1116-22.) On August 13,
1992, Bennett "opted out" of, and objected to, the proposed settlement through filings
with the California Court. (R. 1048,1068 (Compl.fflf94, 102); see also R. 1132 (opt-out
letter).)
12.

On August 17, 1992, Jones Waldo informed Bennett that his decision to opt

out of the proposed class settlement terminated the attorney-client relationship with
Bennett. (R. 1068 (Compl. TJ104).) Post Kirby also informed Bennett of its withdrawal
of any representation on his behalf. (R. 1442 (Kirby Aff. If 40).)
13.

Despite Bennett's criticisms, none of the other named plaintiffs opted out of

the settlement. On August 26, 1992, the California Court held a "Good Faith Settlement
Hearing" wherein it approved the class settlement, and subsequently entered a Final
Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice.6 (R. 1442 (Kirby Aff. If 41); R. 1170 (Compl. ffl[

6

Magistrate Porter (who had presided over the settlement conferences) conducted the
good faith settlement hearing. Magistrate Porter found that the "settlement is fair and
reasonable," "there has been no collusion," "the attorneys have been very up front and
honest with their clients and with each other," sufficient damage discovery had been
conducted, "the attorneys involved in this case . . . were the finest attorneys [she had]
seen, the most ethical attorneys [she had] seen, and certainly experienced in this area,"
"the attorneys appeared very concerned about each and all of the class members and class
as a whole," the attorneys "were most professional in the face of what [she] believed to
7

111-12); see also Appellant's App. 13 (final judgment).) The California Court also
entered an Order Approving Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs wherein Post Kirby was
awarded its out-of-pocket costs and 12.15% of the settlement as attorneys fees.7
(R. 1486-92.)
14.

The California Court retained jurisdiction over "any application . . . for a

bar order." (R. 1482-83.)
Bar Order Litigation
15.

In mid-1994,8 Jones Waldo learned that Bennett intended to sue it on behalf

of the entire class for alleged legal malpractice because the settlement was allegedly
unfair and improper. (R. 1070 (Compl.ffif113-17); see also R. 327.)

be difficult issues, difficult clients,. .. and insurance carriers," she could not "imagine
any member of this class criticizing any of the attorneys in this action," and the
"attorneys did represent their clients appropriately and ethically and acted exemplary
throughout the settlement negotiations." (R. 1465-67.) She concluded by stating that
based on confidential information learned from both parties during the settlement
negotiations, she believed "that this is an outstanding settlement, and I believe that it is a
reasonable settlement for both sides of this litigation, and I congratulate all of you."
(R. 1467-69 (emphasis added).)
7

Both the Retainer Agreement and Post Kirby's Retention Letter recognized that
attorneys fees would be determined by the California Court for any recovery on behalf of
a class (rather than on the basis of any agreement between the parties). (Appellant's App.
3 Tf 2; id. at 1.) The California Court awared thirty percent of the settlement (after
deduction of costs) as attorneys fees, which award was divided among counsel as
follows: Jones Waldo (49.5%), Post Kirby (40.5%), and Bennett's father (10%).
(R. 1486-92.)

8

On February 1, 1993, Bennett filed a complaint with the Utah Bar against Jones Waldo
(but for obvious reasons not against Post Kirby) raising the very issues alleged in his
subsequent malpractice complaints. (See R. 299.) The Bar appointed a special
investigator, who spent a year reviewing voluminous submissions by Bennett and
independently interviewed the other class representatives, issued a lengthy written
8

16.

In July 1994, at Jones Waldo's request and before the filing of any

litigation, Post Kirby obtained from the California Court (pursuant to the jurisdiction
retained in the settlement) a "Temporary Bar Order" against litigation collaterally
attacking the finality of the class settlement. (R. 1071 (Compl.ffif118-19); R. 1493; see
also Post Kirby App. 1 (temporary bar order).) Bennett alleges that Kirby made
misrepresentations9 to the California Court to obtain that order. (R. 1071, 1074, 1085-86
(Compl. Tit 119, 136, 182, 184).)
17.

By order of the California Court, Bennett was served in Utah with the

temporary bar order, which permitted Bennett to opposed any permanent bar order in
California. (R. 1072 (Compl. ^ 121); Post Kirby App. 1 f 4.)
18.

On September 6, 1994, after giving Bennett an opportunity to appear, the

Chief Judge of the California Court, Judge Judith N. Keep, entered a "Permanent Bar

opinion rejecting each of Bennett's Complaints. (R. 1206-33.) That opinion offers an
independent evaluation of the events complained of by Bennett, including the dropping of
the derivative claims, the alleged subordination of perjury regarding payment of costs,
and counsel's conduct during settlement. On the key settlement issues, the Bar found
that, "[i]n short, this appears to be a case where a small minority of class representatives
[e.g., Bennett] have attempted to block a reasonable settlement in order to satisfy their
own 'special desires.'" (R. 1224-25.) The Bar also found that "Bennett freely admits
that he was not coerced or intimidated by his lawyers" and none of the other class
representatives substantiated Bennett's allegations of coercion or intimidation during
settlement. (R. 1229-31.)
9

Bennett raised his claims of misrepresentation directly with the California Court, which
court rejected Bennett's argument. (R. 867 at 3-5; see also R., 1549-50 at 9-10 (1/11/96
transcript); id. at 1556-57 (court's findings); (R. 162-64 (1/11/96 transcript).) In any
event, Bennett is collaterally estopped from alleging that the Bar Order was obtained by
deceit in the California court given his unsuccessful appeal of that order in the Ninth
Circuit.

9

Order." (R. 1520-22 (Kirby Aff, ex. 6); see also Post Kirby App. 2 (permanent bar
order).) The Temporary Bar Order and Permanent Bar Order may be collectively
referred to as the "Bar Order." The Bar Orders restrained Bennett from "initiating or
maintaining any lawsuit against [Jones Waldo]... or any other class counsel which in
any way involves" the "fairness of the class action settlement," the "competency of class
counsel and counsel's legal services on behalf of the class," the "award of fees and costs
to class counsel," and the "award of additional compensation to any of the named
Plaintiffs" in the class action. (Post Kirby App. 1 ^f 2.) However, the Bar Order
expressly did "not bar or restrain David D. Bennett from pursuing solely his own
individual claims as a former Gen-Probe shareholder, except to the extent such claims
have been previously adjudicated by this Court." (Id. ^ 2; see also R. 1521-22; R. 1073
(Compl. Tf 129); R.1508-19 (transcript of 9/6/94); R. 1530-32 (transcript of 5/1/95); R.
1568 (transcript of 1/11/96).) Thus, the Bar Order merely sought to protect the integrity
of the orders of the California court, rather than bar Bennett from pursuing any
appropriate individual malpractice claims.
19.

Bennett appealed the Bar Order to the Ninth Circuit (hereinafter "Bennett's

California Bar-Order Appeal"). (R. 1073 (Compl. f 131).)
20.

While Bennett's California Bar-Order Appeal was pending, Bennett filed

this action in Utah court against Jones Waldo (but not Post Kirby) on December 30,
1994, and an amended complaint on January 20, 1995 (the "Utah Malpractice Lawsuit").
(R. 1073 (Compl. f 131); see also R. 163-68 (Bennett's "Notice of Orders Authorizing

10

Complaint" attaching a copy of the Bar Order and the transcript of the California Court's
rulings with respect thereto).) (R. 163-68.)
21.

Bennett voluntarily submitted a copy of his complaints to the California

Court to determine whether they complied with the Bar Order. (R. 249.) In response,
Jones Waldo, using Post Kirby as counsel, moved the California Court to enforce the Bar
Order and award civil contempt sanctions against Bennett. (R. 263 (Jones Waldo was
listed as the moving party on R. 267); see also R. 1447 (Kirby Aff. f 55).) During the
hearing on that motion in California, Bennett's counsel agreed to file a second amended
complaint in the Utah Malpractice Lawsuit. (R. 377-79, 1535-36 (5/1/95 transcript).)
22.

On August 1, 1995, Bennett filed his second amended complaint in the

Utah Malpractice Lawsuit. (R. 381-527; see also R. 361-80 (Bennett's Notice of Filing
Date for Second Amended Complaint attaching the California Court order).) Again at
Jones Waldo's request, Post Kirby filed another motion for contempt in California Court.
(R. 1448 (Kirby Aff. | 57).) At a hearing on January 11, 1996, Bennett was found in
contempt of the Bar Order. The California Court ordered that a transcript of its ruling be
forwarded to Judge Medley to correct misrepresentations made by Bennett to Judge
Medley concerning the California Court's prior ruling, ordered Bennett to comply with
the Bar Orders, and further imposed monetary sanctions on Bennett. (R. 1538 (1/11/96
transcript) at 7, 15, 21, 25); R. 1076 (Compl.ffl[141-44).)
23.

Bennett appealed his contempt citation ("Bennett's California Contempt

Appeal"). (R. 1076 (Compl. f 145); R. 1448 (Kirby Aff. f 58).)
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24.

Bennett filed a third amended complaint in the Utah Malpractice Lawsuit

against Jones Waldo, by omitting "under protest" the offending allegations. (R. 528-82.)
25.

On August 10, 1996, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bar Order in the

Bennett's California Bar-Order Appeal. (R. 1581-84 (Kirby Aff, ex. 9); see also Post
Kirby App. 3 (opinion).) The Ninth Circuit "narrowly construed" the Bar Order,
however, so that the "Utah court may examine the adequacy of the class settlement, but
only insofar as that settlement sheds light on appellee law firm's representation of
Bennett." (Id.) Bennett unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.
26.

In June 1997, the Ninth Circuit reversed the contempt citation in the

Bennett's California Contempt Appeal based on its narrow construction of the Bar Order.
(R.1077 (Compl. Tj 147); R. 1584 (Kirby Aff, ex. 10); Appellant's App. 5, 9 (opinion)).)
Fourth Amended Complaint
27.

On July 7, 1998, Bennett filed his 204-paragraph Fourth Amended

Complaint in the Utah Malpractice Lawsuit, adding Post Kirby as a defendant for the first
time. Bennett alleges the following causes of action:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Bennett alleges that Post Kirby breached the
Retainer Agreement by allegedly abandoning injunctive, derivative and insider-trading
claims in the California Gen-Probe Litigation, settling the case early rather than
"look[ing] towards 'trial of the Lawsuit/" and litigating the Bar Order in California
rather than Utah court. (R. 1080-81 (Compl. ^ 159, 161, 164).) Bennett seeks damages
for the "true value of [his] Gen-Probe shares," his "out-of-pocket expenses" in the
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California Gen-Probe Litigation, and his attorneys5 fees and costs in litigating the Bar
Order in California courts. (R. 1095 (Compl. at 53).)
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Bennett alleges that Post Kirby breached
fiduciary duties and committed legal malpractice by allegedly pressuring an unfavorable
settlement of the class action without an "independent financial evaluation" of the claims,
despite Bennett's objections and without his consent. (R. 1080-84 (Compl. TflJ 160-71,
173, 176).) Bennett seeks the same damages as in his breach of contract claim, and
forfeiture of Post Kirby's "entire fee" in the California Gen-Probe case. (R. 1096
(Compl. at 54).)
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: Bennett alleges that the Bar Orders were an abuse
of process and an intentional infliction of emotional distress,. (R. 1085-89 (Compl. ^
180-97).) Bennett seeks the cost of his "mental health counseling," his emotional
anxiety, damage to reputation, etc., allegedly caused by the Bar Order litigation, and his
fees and expenses in litigating the Bar Order in California. (R. 1096-97 (Compl. at 5455).)
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Bennett claims that Post Kirby committed deceit
and collusion in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-31 by misrepresenting facts to the
California Court in the California Gen-Probe Litigation and Bar Order proceedings,
(R. 1090-94 (Compl.fflf199d, j , k, m, o, 200a, b, c)), misrepresenting facts to Bennett
during the California Gen-Probe Litigation, (R. 1090-91 (Compl. f 199a-I)), and
allegedly colluding with Gen-Probe's counsel regarding the class settlement, (R. 1093
(Compl. % 199p)). Bennett again seeks the same damages as in his breach of contract
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claim, and emotional distress and other damages from Post Kirby's alleged abuse of
process in the Bar Order litigation, all of which he asks to be trebled. (R. 1096-97.)
Course and Disposition of Proceedings after the Joinder of Post Kirby
28.

On September 4, 1998, Post Kirby moved to dismiss the complaint for

lack of personal jurisdiction. (R. 1382-1587 (moving papers); R. 1588-1754
(opposition papers); R. 1821-37 (reply papers).) Post Kirby argued that it did not have
"minimum contacts" with the State of Utah for either set of Bennett's claims, and that
the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Judge Medley heard argument on
Post Kirby's motion to dismiss on October 25, 1999. (See R. 1844, 2147 (transcript).)
29.

On January 7, 2000, Judge Medley issued a minute entry granting Post

Kirby's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on all grounds argued by
Post Kirby, and directed Post Kirby to prepare an order. (R. 1857-58.)
30.

Post Kirby prepared and served on Bennett a proposed Rule 54(b)

Judgment on all Claims Against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP,
Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby Individually. (R. 1923.) Bennett
objected to the minute entry and proposed order on January 28, 2000. (R. 1859-74.)
Post Kirby responded on February 7, 2000, together with a courtesy copy of the
proposed judgment. (R. 1875-81.) Post Kirby argued that Bennett's "objections are
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not well founded," and "[consequently, this Court should sign the accompanying
proposed judgment."10 (R. 1875.)
31.

On February 11, 2000, Judge Medley signed and entered the proposed

judgment, but no notice of entry was provided to either party. (R. 1884-85, 1924; Post
Kirby App. 4.) Judge Medley has confirmed that he reviewed Bennett's objections
prior to signing the judgment, and intended his signature to reflect his rejection of those
objections. (Post Kirby App. 5 at 15 (transcript of 10/2/00); R. 2148 at 2 (transcript of
10/6/00).)
32.

On February 16, 2000, Bennett filed a "Reply of Plaintiff in Support of

his Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and Proposed Order" wherein he expressly
argued that his objections were "not a Rule 59, U.R.Civ.P.. motion." (R. 1886-93.)
33.

On February 17, 2000, Post Kirby filed a notice to submit stating that,

"Now that the issue of the proposed judgment and objections thereto is fully at issue,
the Post Kirby Defendants submit the proposed judgment to the Court for signature,"
and also filed another courtesy copy of the proposed judgment.
34.

(R. 1894-97.)

On February 28, 2000, Judge Medley, forgetting that he had already

signed a judgment, again signed and entered the proposed judgment, but no notice of
entry was provided to either party. (R. 1896-97; see also Post Kirby App. 5 at 15-16

10

Post Kirby noted that much of Bennett's objection was in fact a request for
reconsideration or new trial. Post Kirby asked the court that, inasmuch as Bennett "has
now had his chance to ask the Court for reconsideration," Post Kirby should not have to
respond to another further motions under Rule 59. (R. 1880.)
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(transcript of 10/2/00); Post Kirby App. 6 (2/28/00 judgment).) Judge Medley again
confirmed that he reviewed Bennett's objections prior to signing the judgment, and
intended his signature to reflect his rejection of those objections. (R. 2148 at 2-3; see
also Post Kirby App. 5 at 15-16.)
35.

On May 9, 2000, Post Kirby first learned of the entry of the judgments,

and promptly served by hand and facsimile a "Notice of Entry of Judgment" on May
10, 2000.11 (R. 1898-1903, 1924.)
36.

On May 26,2000, Bennett filed a Motion to the Court under Rule 60 to

Strike a February [28], 2000 Ruling; and to Decide upon a Timely Filed Rule 59
Motion" (the "May 2000 Motion"), arguing that the February 11th judgment was the
operative judgment, the February 28th judgment (but not the February 11th judgment)
should be stricken under Rule 60 as a clerical mistake and under Rule 58A for Post
Kirby's alleged failure to provide timely notice of judgment, and that his February 16th
reply brief in support of his objections to the proposed judgment should be construed as
a Rule 59 motion upon which the Court had yet to rule.12 (R. 1904-20.) Post Kirby

11

The notice was served within the 90-day period in Rule 60(b) for relief from
judgments.
12

Bennett did not seek relief from either judgment under Rule 60(b)(l)-(3) due to mistake
or excusable neglect. The only time that Bennett cited those provisions was in
connection with his argument that the February 28th judgment should be stricken as a
ministerial error (point 1), or to argue that Post Kirby's allegedly untimely notice
prevented Bennett from seeking relief under those sections (point 4). (R. 1910, 1915,
1948, 1950.)
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opposed Bennett's motion, arguing that his objections were not a motion for new trial
under Rule 59 and, in any event, the district court's entry of the judgments disposed of
those objections by necessary implication. (R. 1921-36; see also R. 1947-53 (Bennett's
reply papers).)
37.

On June 9, 2000, Bennett filed a "Notice of Appeal of Final Order"

("Bennett's First Utah Appeal"). (R. 1937-42.) Bennett's notice stated that he was
appealing from the February 28th judgment, and that the appeal was timely because the
"appeal falls within 30 days of the notice date." (R. 1938-39.) Although Bennett argued
that a Rule 59 motion was in fact pending, he expressly stated in his Docketing
Statement that his appeal was filed solely under the alternative assumption that there
was no pending Rule 59 motion. (Post Kirby App. 7 (docketing statement).)
38.

Post Kirby moved for summary disposition of Blennett's First Utah Appeal

because it was untimely. (Post Kirby App. 8 (motion papers without exhibits).) Post
Kirby did not ask this Court to decide the issue raised in Bemiett's May 2000 Motion as
to whether or not a Rule 59 was in fact still pending. The resolution of the Rule 59
issue was unnecessary to establish the untimeliness of Bennett's First Utah Appeal.
39.

On July 25, 2000, apparently recognizing that his "notice date" basis for

appeal was frivolous, Bennett filed a "Motion to Remand and Vacate Briefing
Schedule" "for the purpose of allowing [the] lower c o u r t . . . to decide an outstanding
motion relevant to this appeal" ("Remand Motion"). (Post Kirby App. 9 (remand
papers).) This motion represented an abandonment of the basis for appellate
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jurisdiction that Bennett claimed in his Docketing Statement, which was that the time
for appeal ran from the date on which he received notice of the entry of the February
Judgments. Bennett now exclusively contended that there was an undecided Rule 59
motion, and asked this Court to remand the matter so that the district court could decide
the pending May 2000 Motion. Neither party asked this Court to resolve the issue of
whether there was in fact a pending Rule 59 motion, and the briefing did not contain
argument on the merits of that issue.
40.

On October 2, 2000, Judge Medley heard argument on Bennett's May

Motion. (R. 1966-67; see also Post Kirby App. 5 (transacript of 10/2/00).) During
that argument, Judge Medley explained the circumstances surrounding his entry of the
February 2000 judgments:
This is what I believe happened in this situation: When that first notice to
submit for decision was submitted to me and when I had before me the objection
and response thereto, I clearly reviewed the objection and the - and the response
and - the February 11th decision.
Shortly thereafter, a subsequent notice to submit was given to me and I
reviewed once again all of the documents I had in front of me but quite frankly,
there was - there would have been, oh, a little over a two-week passage of time
between . . . . I simply did not recall, unfortunately, that I had signed the
February 11th judgment; but the point I'm getting at is, two things occurred here,
I did not recall I signed the February 11th judgment; but clearly, I reviewed the
objections and made a determination that the objections were not - did not have
merit in my - in my opinion.
The second thing that I traditionally do and I didn't do in this particular
situation and I just can't explain it, quite frankly, is that ordinarily, I would have
written on the judgment, interlineation, that the objections were denied. I did
not do that in this particular case, but I can assure you as certain as I am sitting
in this chair for right now, when I signed those judgments, I passed judgment on
the issues - on the merits of the issues raised within those objections.
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(Post Kirby App. 4 at 15-16 (emphasis added).) On October 6, 2000, Judge Medley
denied Bennett's motion in its entirety ("October Ruling"), finding that the court had
already disposed of any possible Rule 59 motion back in February. (R. 2148 at 2-3.)
41.

On October 25, 2000, this Court dismissed Bennett's First Utah Appeal

("Appeal Dismissal Order"). (R. 1991-93.) This Court stated:
Defendants' motion to dismiss this appeal is granted. Plaintiff's notice of
appeal, filed while a rule 59 motion was pending at the district court, was
premature, and this court lacks jurisdiction. Swenson Assocs. Architects v.
State, 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994).
(IdL)

42.

Bennett then filed a series of documents with the district court arguing

that the this Court's Appeal Dismissal Order "effectively" overruled the district court's
October Ruling. (R. 2003-10, 2016-2102; see also R. 2103-2117 (Post Kirby's
opposition); R. 2128-33 (Bennett's reply papers).)
43.

On February 23, 2001, this Court also dismissed a related appeal against

Jones Waldo. (Appellant's App. 11.) The Court stated:
This appeal is dismissed on the court's own motion on the ground there has been
no final judgment entered, and this court lacks jurisdiction. The order
dismissing the law firm of Jones Waldo was not certified as a final judgment
under rule 54(b) Utah R. Civ. P. Because the judgment dismissing the law firm
of Post Kirby has never been finalized, there is no final judgment in this case.
This appeal is dismissed without prejudice.
44.

On February 21, 2001, Judge Medley heard all outstanding motions and

issues. (Post Kirby App. 10 (2/21/01 transcript).) The district court then entered an
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order dated February 28, 2001 ("February 2001 Order"). (Appellant's App. 2.) The
district court stated:
This Order resolves the purported Rule 59 Motion. To the extent, if any,
plaintiffs Objections or Reply [filed in January and February 2000 and which
Bennett claimed were his Rule 59 motion], they have been previously considered
and rejected on their merits as set forth in the Court's February Judgments.
(Id. t 1 at 2 (emphasis added).) The district court further correctly refused to apply the
Mandate Rule based on this Court's October 25, 2000 Order:
After review of the Supreme Court's October 25, 2000, and February 23, 2001,
Orders and circumstances issued thereunder this Court finds and concludes that
the Supreme Court did not consider the merits of any Rule 59 Motion, therefore,
the Mandate Rule does not apply.
(Id. 1 2 at 3.) Thus, Judge Medley held that the February 11 and 28, 2000 judgments
rejected in fact and by necessary implication any Rule 59 relief of Bennett so that no
timely Rule 59 motions were pending thereafter.
45.

Bennett filed this appeal on March 27, 2001. Although Bennett appeals

the February 28, 2001 order, which denied Bennett's May 2000 Motion, Bennett's brief
does not address the district court's ruling on that motion, but rather merely argues the
personal jurisdiction issues decided by the district court back in January 2000.
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ARGUMENT
I.

BENNETT DID NOT TIMELY APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT'S
RULING ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Bennett did not file an appeal within thirty days of the entry of either the February

II, 2000 or February 28, 2000 Rule 54(b) judgments. Bennett argues he timely filed a
Rule 59 motion, which was not denied by Judge Medley until almost a year later on
February 21, 2001. Bennett is wrong because, first, there was no pending rule 59 motion
after February 28, 2000, at the latest, and, second, this Court's dismissal of Bennett's
prior appeals did not effectively overrule Judge Medley's decisions on that point.
A.

There Was No Pending Rule 59 Motion After February 28, 2000.

Bennett argues that his objections were actually a motion for new trial, which
motion the district court did not decide until February 2001, so that his current appeal
was timely with respect to that order. Plaintiffs argument fails to for two reasons.
1.

Bennett Filed No Rule 59 Motion

Bennett's objections to the proposed judgment (filed January 28, 2000, and
February 16, 2000) cannot be construed as a Rule 59 request because Plaintiff expressly
disclaimed any reliance on that rule. He stated in that briefing:
Plaintiffs Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and Proposed Order is not a
Rule 59, U.KCiv.P. motion."
(R. 1892 (emphasis in original).) Thus, Plaintiff expressly denied any possible
characterization of the motion as one under Rule 59.
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2.

The District Court Denied any Rule 59 Motion No Later Than
February 28, 2000

Even if Bennett's objections to the proposed order could be characterized as
seeking Rule 59 relief, such relief was denied by Judge Medley no later than February 28,
2000, over a year before Bennett's current appeal was filed. Judge Medley has expressly
confirmed that he intended the February 2000 judgments to reflect a denial of Bennett's
objections.
Alternatively, those judgments rejected Bennett's objection by necessary
implication. While "[t]he mere entry of a final judgment inconsistent with but silent
regarding a post-trial pre-judgment motion does not dispose of the motion by necessary
implication," such is not the case where "the surrounding circumstances indicate that the
trial court considered and rejected the motion." Regan v. Blount, 978 P.2d 1051, 1054
(Utah 1999); see also Kurth v. Wiarda, 981 P.2d 417 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In this case,
the circumstances indicate such a rejection.
Both the February 11 and 28 judgments were clearly inconsistent with the relief
requested by Bennett because his so-called Rule 59 motion was in fact an objection to the
proposed form of judgment ultimately signed by the district court. Moreover, the
circumstances surrounding the entry of both judgments indicate that the district court had
considered and rejected Bennett's objections. The initial proposed judgment was served
and filed simultaneously with Post Kirby's response to Bennett's objections, which
response requested that the proposed judgment be signed and entered as a
"[c]onsequen[ce]" Bennett's objections "not [being] well founded." (R. 1875 at 1.).
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Similarly, on February 17, 2000, after the close of all briefing on Bennett's objections, Post
Kirby filed a notice to submit Plaintiffs objections to decision and another copy of his proposed
judgment, which notice requested the Court's signature nf the proposed judgment as a rejection
of Plaintiff s objections. (R. 1894-95 at 1-2 ("Now that the issue of the proposed judgment and
objections thereto is fully at issue, the Post Kirby Defendants submit the proposed judgment to
the Court for signature.").) Under these circumstances, Post Kirby's submission of the proposed
judgment and simultaneous filing supports Post Kirby's belief that the Court had
considered and indicated its rejection of Plaintiff s objections by signing the judgment.
Morgan v. Morgan, 875 P.2d 563, 564 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (the court "implicitly
denied plaintiffs objections" to a proposed order by signing the proposed order after the
filing of objections, even though the order did not expressly rule on the objections).
Consequently, this case was at issue for appeal no later than February 28, 2000, so that
Bennett's notices of appeal were all untimely.
B.

This Court Did Not Overrule the District Court's October Decision

Bennett has argued that this Court "effectively overrule[d] the District Court's
recent October 6, 2000, tentative ruling" and that "the 'law of the case5 is now that the
District Court must now rule upon plaintiffs 'rule 59 motion' filed on February 16,
2000." (R. 2004.) In February 2001, however, Judge Medley ruled that the Utah
Supreme Court's October 25 Order is nothing more than a statement that, based on
Bennett's characterization of the procedural posture of the case, his appeal was untimely
and the circumstances surrounding that order indicate that the Rule 59 issue was not
before this court. (Appellant's App. 2 1 2 at 3 ("After a review of the Supreme Court's
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October 25, 2000 and February 23, 2001 orders and circumstances issued thereunder, this
Court finds and concludes that the Supreme Court did not consider the merits of any Rule
59 Motion, therefore the Mandate Rule does not apply).)
The "mandate rule" requires a lower court to follow legal pronouncements of an
appellate court on remand, and the letter and spirit of such pronouncements are
determined "taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it
embraces." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995) (emphasis
added). However, the mandate rule applies only to issues actually decided and not to
dictum or statements made by a court in passing. 18 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal
Practice § 134.20[3] at 134-45 (3d ed. 2000). The circumstances surrounding the
October 25th Order indicate that this Court did not pass upon the merits of whether Judge
Medley had in fact or by necessary implication denied Bennett's objections by entry of
the February 2000 judgments. Rather, that order was merely recognition that, even under
Bennett's characterization of the facts, his appeal was untimely.
First, the Rule 59 issue was not substantively raised in Post Kirby's briefing to this
Court. The reason was that resolution of the Rule 59 issue was not necessary to the
dismissal of Bennett's First Utah Appeal. This Court did not need to reach this issue to
grant Post Kirby's motion to dismiss.
Second, neither party asked the Utah Supreme Court to make any determination
regarding the May 2000 Motion then pending before the district court. Both parties
recognized (and informed the Court) that Judge Medley should rule in the first instance
on whether a Rule 59 motion was still pending.
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Third, there is no indication that this Court actually considered the substantive
arguments raised in the briefing and oral arguments before the district court. The Order
does not acknowledge or dispose of the underlying issues relevant to the substance of the
Rule 59 issue, such as Bennett's express disclaimer of reliance on Rule 59 in the
document he now contends was a Rule 59 motion or the denial of a Rule 59 motion by
necessary implication, or cite any case authority relied on by either party before the
district court on the merits such as DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), relied on by Bennett, or Morgan v. Morgan, 975 P.2d 563 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994), relied on by Post Kirby.
Fourth, the procedural posture of Bennett's First Utah Appeal indicates that the
Rule 59 issue was not a consideration in the disposition of that appeal. Originally,
Bennett claimed that his appeal was filed only based on the premise that the district court
had already in fact ruled on any Rule 59 motion. However, as Post Kirby pointed out in
its motion to dismiss, that argument was frivolous based on the express language in Rule
5 8A. Consequently, in mid-appeal, Bennett tacitly abandoned any attempt to justify his
appeal on those grounds (and made no mention of that ground in any subsequent brief).
Rather, Bennett flipped-flopped to the opposite and contradictory factual assumption, i.e.,
that there was an unresolved Rule 59 motion, but that the Court should only "remand,"
rather than "dismiss" the appeal. Thus, the only issue confronted by the Court was
whether it should "remand" the case (as argued by Bennett) or "dismiss" the case (as
suggested by Post Kirby). Unfortunately for Bennett, he gave the Court no legal basis for
a remand rather than dismissal in light of his position as to the relevancy of any pending
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Rule 59 motion to his appeal. Given Bennett's new position on appeal that there was a
pending Rule 59 motion, the Utah Supreme Court had no choice but to dismiss the appeal
(as supported by the Court's citation of a generic case on this point rather than a more
specific case applicable to the substance of the Rule 59 issue.
Thus, the October 25 Order should not, therefore, be construed to have overruled
Judge Medley's October 6, 2000 determination that any Rule 59 motion had been
resolved in February 2000.13
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BENNETT'S CLAIMS
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The district court properly dismissed Bennett's claims against Post Kirby

regarding its prosecution of the California Gen-Probe Lawsuit and the California Bar
Order for lack of a prima facie showing personal jurisdiction, in particular any showing
of sufficient minimum contacts with Utah consistent with due process.
A.

BENNETT MUST MAKE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF
SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNDER UTAH LAW FOR
EACH CLAIM

Prior to trial or an evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction, Bennett must make
a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction.14 Anderson v. American Soc'y of

13

Bennett's appeal of Judge Medley's denial of Bennett's May 2000 motion actually only
raises the issues in the May 2000 motion, rather than Judge Medley's February 2000
ruling on personal jurisdiction. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000
UT App. 110,1ffll8-19, 24-25, 2 P.3d 451. In his argument, Bennett skips the May 2000
issues and goes directly to personal jurisdiction. (Bennett Br. at 43-48).
14

In his brief, Bennett raises no issue as to any possible general jurisdiction against Post
Kirby.
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Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990); see also Phones
Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ^[2, 8 P.3d 256. At this stage of the litigation,
Bennett's allegations are taken as true unless controverted by affidavit. Anderson, 807
P.2d at 827. If controverted by affidavit, Bennett cannot simply rely on his complaint for
his prima facie showing of jurisdiction; however, any disputes in the documentary record
are resolved in Bennett's favor. Id.
Bennett must show specific personal jurisdiction for each defendant on each
separate cause of action. See Baldwin v. Easterling, 754 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1988)
("Jurisdiction over a nonresident for one claim of a plaintiff does not generally confer
jurisdiction over the nonresident for other claims that plaintiff may have55); Far West
Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1076 n.4 (10th Cir. 1995) ("contacts of multiple
parties cannot be aggregated to reach the personal jurisdiction standard55). In the present
case, this means that Bennett must independently establish personal jurisdiction on his
malpractice-related claims and the bar order-related claims, respectively.
Utah courts use a three-part test for specific personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant:
(1) the defendant's acts or contacts must implicate Utah under the Utah long-arm
statute; (2) a "nexus55 must exist between the plaintiffs claims and the defendant's
acts or contacts; and (3) application of the Utah long-arm statute must satisfy the
requirements of federal due process.
Phone Directories, 2000 UT 64 at f 12 (quoting Harnischfeger Eng'rs, Inc. v. Uniflo
Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 612-13 (D. Utah 1995)). However, this Court can go
directly to the "due process analysis first because any set of circumstances that satisfies
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due process will also satisfy the long-arm statute." SII MegaDiamond, Inc. v. American
Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998).
To satisfy due process, Bennett must show that Post Kirby had "minimum
contacts" with Utah. Id. at 435. This Court explained this requirement as follows:
It is well established that jurisdiction must result from "minimum contacts
with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."5" Consequently,
defendant must have "'purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.5" Specific personal jurisdiction "may be asserted . .. 'only on claims arising
out of defendant's forum-state activity,5'5 and the connection between the
defendant and the forum state must be such that the defendant "'should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.555 Finally, "the determination of whether
Utah can justify asserting jurisdiction over defendants hinges on the balancing of
the fairness to the parties and the interests of the State in assuming jurisdiction.55
Id. (citations omitted). As Bennett apparently conceded below, whether the claim sounds
in contract or tort, courts look to those contacts that are the "focal point" of either the
contractual relationship or the tort and its harm. (R. 1768.) See also Far West, 46 F.3d at
1075, 1080 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1985)). Consequently, courts
take a "realistic approach" in analyzing the "entire relationship of the parties" to
determine whether a defendant has "purposefully established minimum contacts within
the forum." Id. at 1075 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79
(1985) (emphasis added).
Bennett has not made a prima facie showing of minimum contacts with regard to
either the California Gen-Probe Lawsuit or the California Bar Order Litigation.

28

B.

POST KIRBY DID NOT HAVE MINIMUM CONTACTS WITH
UTAH REGARDING THE CALIFORNIA MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS

In his briefing (on appeal and below), Bennett appears to raise four arguments for
the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Post Kirby on claims arising out of the
California Gen-Probe Litigation: (1) Post Kirby knowingly agreed to represent Utah
clients, (R. 1049 (Compl. ]f 4)), (2) Post Kirby allegedly committed "[n]umerous legal
malpractices" in Utah, (Appellant's Br. at 46-47; R.), (3) Post Kirby allegedly injured
Bennett in Utah, (id. at 44, 46), and (4) Post Kirby allegedly formed a "Utah joint
venture" with Jones Waldo in representing him, (id at 47).
Utah appellate courts have not addressed specific personal jurisdiction in the state
of the client's residence over out-of-state litigation counsel on malpractice claims arising
out of out-of-state litigation. However, other courts have found that, in the absence of
special circumstances (not found in the present case), out-of-state counsel is not generally
subject to personal jurisdiction in courts at the client's residence for conduct relating to
out-of-state litigation. Post Kirby will first review some of the leading cases on point
from other jurisdictions prior to addressing Bennett's specific arguments as to his
malpractice claims.
1.

Local Litigation Counsel Is Not Normally Subject to Jurisdiction
in Courts of the Client's Residence for Malpractice Claims

A number of courts have refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
counsel regarding malpractice in out-of-state litigation in the forum of the client's
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residence.15 See generally Cape v. von Maur, 932 F. Supp. 124, 128 (D. Md. 1996)
("case law overflows on the point that providing out-of-state legal representation is not
enough to subject an out-of-state lawyer o law firm to the personal jurisdiction of the
state in which a client resides"). In particular, three decisions from federal courts of
appeal demonstrate that personal jurisdiction over out-of-state litigation counsel is not
generally exercised unless there is an ongoing attorney-client relationship or some other
special availment of the law of the state of the client's residence.
15

See FDIC v. Malmo, 939 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1991) (no jurisdiction in Missouri over
Tennessee counsel for breach of fiduciary duty regarding California litigation, despite
allegation that the "effects of defendant's misconduct... were intended to, and did occur
in Missouri"); Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1986) (no jurisdiction in Wisconsin
over Michigan lawyer for malpractice claims related to dismissal of Michigan litigation,
despite counsel's alleged misstatements to the client in Wisconsin as to case status);
Kowlaski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7 (1 st Cir. 1986) (no
jurisdiction in New Hampshire over Massachusetts law firm regarding negligence in
Massachusetts litigation); Bryant v. Weintraub, Genshlea, Hardy, Erich & Brown, 844 F.
Supp. 640, 642 (D. Or. 1994) (no jurisdiction in Oregon over California counsel for
malpractice in California litigation because the malpractice injury arose from the alleged
malpractice in California), affd, 42 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
v. Servidone Construction Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1496, 1505 (D. Minn. 1991) (no
jurisdiction in Minnesota over New York counsel in Washington D.C. litigation - "an
attorney-client relationship, regardless of who initiates it, is insufficient in and of itself to
support personal jurisdiction"); McGann v. Wilson, 701 A.2d 873 (Md. Ct. App. 1977)
(no jurisdiction in Maryland over Virginia counsel for malpractice claims by Maryland
resident arising out of undue pressure to settle Virginia litigation - local counsel "could
not have expected to be hauled into a Maryland court to answer a claim for malpractice
concerning a settlement of a personal injury case where the injury, the trial, and the
settlement occurred in Virginia"); DeVenzeio v. Rucker, Clarkson & McCashin, 918 P.2d
723 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (no jurisdiction in New Mexico over California counsel for
malpractice claims related to California and Arizona litigation, despite alleged "deceitful,
fraudulent misrepresentations in letters and telephone calls to [the clients] in New
Mexico"); Weiss v. Greenburg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel & Wolff, 446
N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (no jurisdiction in New York over Florida counsel
for malpractice claims in foreclosure litigation in Florida, despite counsel visits and
communications to New York).
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In Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1987), a South Dakota
company brought suit in South Dakota against its New York counsel for malpractice
allegedly committed in Maryland litigation. However, the Eighth Circuit held that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction in South Dakota over New York counsel would offend
due process despite counsel's representation of and/or communications and visits with
the South Dakota client:
While we do not dispute Austad's claim that an attorney-client relationship
existed between Austad and Pennie & Edmonds, we do not believe that Pennie &
Edmonds had sufficient contacts with South Dakota to confer personal
jurisdiction. Pennie & Edmonds does not maintain an office in South Dakota nor
do any of its attorneys reside there or maintain a license to practice law there.
Pennie & Edmonds has never advertised or solicited business in South Dakota.
Further, Pennie & Edmonds did not actively seek out Austad as a client. Rather,
the representation of Austad by Pennie & Edmonds was arranged through Richard
Goldstein, president of a New York corporation which was a regular client of the
law firm. Finally, the actions giving rise to this lawsuit took place in Maryland,
not in South Dakota. In short, Pennie & Edmonds' only "substantial connection"
with South Dakota was its representation of a South Dakota corporation in
connection with litigation taking place wholly outside of South Dakota. Based on
these facts, we do not believe a showing has been made that Pennie & Edmonds
purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of South
Dakota.
Id. at 226-27.
The First Circuit likewise found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over outof-state litigation counsel would offend due process in Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381
(1 st Cir. 1995). That case involved a claim by New Hampshire clients against their
Florida counsel for negligent settlement of a Florida lawsuit. The First Circuit rejected
the plaintiffs' argument (also made by Bennett in this case) that "the act of knowingly
agreeing to represent an out-of-state client is plainly sufficient55 to establish personal
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jurisdiction." Id. at 1391. Rather, the First Circuit held that the "mere existence of an
attorney-client relationship, unaccompanied by other sufficient contacts with the forum,
does not confer personal jurisdiction over the nonresident in the forum state; more is
required." Id. The First Circuit likewise rejected plaintiffs' argument (also made by
Bennett in the present case) that the negligence occurred in New Hampshire when their
counsel wrote and called them to recommend settlement, and that the injury or effect of
the malpractice was felt in New Hampshire where they resided.16 The court noted that it
would "be illogical to conclude that those isolated recommendations constituted the
negligent conduct that caused the Florida injury" because the negligence actually
consisted of the attorneys allegedly inadequate investigation, "which informed their
judgment about the amount and propriety of the proposed settlement," which
investigation would have occurred where the lawsuit was pending or the attorneys
resided. Id. The court found that the settlement recommendations were merely

16

Below, Bennett attempted to distinguish the negligent settlement recommendation in
Sawtelle from the present case because it was not made during a personal visit of counsel
in the forum state. (R. 1674-75.) However, the First Circuit's decision did not turn on a
distinction between personal visits versus mail/telephone communications with the client
in the forum state. Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1386 ("Although Farrell never personally met the
plaintiffs, he sent at least fifteen letters to them in New Hampshire and spoke to them by
telephone on numerous occasions during the representation"). In fact, the First Circuit
discussed and relied on decisions by other courts where personal visits by counsel to the
forum state did not necessarily create sufficient minimum contacts. Id. at 1391
("telephone calls, mailings, and three visits by lawyer were not enough) (discussing inter
alia Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1990)). Rather, the important
factor was that the contacts (whether personal, telephonic, or by mail) were "ancillary" to
the allegedly negligent prosecution and settlement of litigation in another state. As will
be discussed below, Post Kirby's Utah contacts were likewise "ancillary" to the
California Gen-Probe Litigation.
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"ancillary to the allegedly negligent non-forum activities." Id. at 1390-91. Further, the
court rejected the argument that the "injury" occurred at the clients' residence because
that was where the "effects" of the negligence were allegedly felt. The court noted that
the "injury suffered by the Sawtelles as a result of the alleged negligent activities - the
loss of their right to an adequate recovery on the wrongful death claim which had "been
filed in Florida - occurred in Florida when the state court approved the recommended
settlement and terminated the pending lawsuit." 17 Id. at 1390 n. 5.
Further in Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit
recognized that the representation of a California resident in Florida litigation would not
normally confer jurisdiction over the Florida counsel:
Out-of-state legal representation does not establish purposeful availment of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, where the law firm is solicited
in its own state and takes no affirmative action to promote business within the
forum state.
Id. at 1363. The court held that the normal incidents of such representation, including
counsel's visits to and communications with its client in the forum state, would not
demonstrate that the law firm was "availing itself of any significant [forum] privilege by
coming into the state to talk to its client." Id. Such visits would be "little more than a

17

Sawtelle also distinguished cases where the attorney had an ongoing attorney-client
relationships over multiple matters. Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1392 (citing Trinity Indus., Inc.
v. Myers & Assocs., Ltd., 41 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 1995) (40 matters over 8 years); and
Waterval v. District Court, 620 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1980) (multiple matters over two years)).
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convenience to the client, who would otherwise have had to travel to [counsel's
offices]."18 Id.
These cases demonstrate that, in the absence of some other special availment of
forum law, local counsel in out-of-state litigation does not purposefully establish
minimum contacts with its client's residence for legal malpractice claims arising from the
underlying litigation. The routine contacts "ancillary" to the litigation between client and
counsel in the forum state are not qualitatively significant for due process purposes.
2.

Post Kirby Did Not Purposefully Establish Utah Contacts in Its
Representation of Bennett in California

Application of the above legal principles to the facts in this case shows that Post
Kirby did not "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
[Utah], thus invoking the benefits and protection of [Utah's] laws." SII, 969 P.2d at 435.
Post Kirby's representation of Bennett in the California Gen-Probe Litigation did not
entail any ongoing relationship or other special circumstances that would demonstrate
that Post Kirby purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Utah law.

18

Below, Bennett argued that the number of contacts in Sher (where the court ultimately
sustained jurisdiction) were "far fewer" than Post Kirby's visits and communications to
Utah in this case. (R.. 1675-75.) However, personal jurisdiction turns on the "quality
and nature" of the contacts rather than merely on the "quantity" of contacts. See
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1992). As
set forth in Sher, with the exception of a California trust deed, the alleged contacts were
qualitatively insignificant because they were incidental to out-of-state litigation and
merely a "convenience" to the client. Sher, 911 F.2d at 1363. in Sher the Ninth Circuit
exercised jurisdiction, however, because the Florida counsel had required a California
trust deed to secure payment for its services, which constituted a purposeful availment of
California law because the law firm "was looking to the laws of California to secure its
right to payment." Id. No such fact is present in this case.
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a.

Post Kirby's Decision to Represent a Class that Included
Utah Members, such as Bennett, Did Not Create
Jurisdiction in this Case

Bennett has claimed that Post Kirby's decision to represent him constitutes a
purposeful availment of Utah law. (R. 1044 (Compl. 14).) However, as described
above, the "mere existence of an attorney-client relationship, unaccompanied by other
sufficient contacts with the forum, does not confer personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident in the forum state; more is required."19 See, e.g., Sawtelle,70 F.3d at 1392;
see also Austad, 823 F.2d at 226; Weiss, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 449. This rule is consistent
with Utah precedent that the mere contracting with a Utah resident does not necessarily
create jurisdiction in Utah courts. See Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1988);
accord Far West, 46 F.3d at 1075-80.
Post Kirby did not solicit its representation of Bennett in Utah or elsewhere.
Rather, Jones Waldo approached Post Kirby in California to act as local and co-counsel
in the California litigation. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1392; Austad, 823 F.2d at 226; cf
Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. Frandsen, 884 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Utah 1994)
("Although the fact that a defendant initiates a business transaction is not dispositive, it
tends to confirm the purposeful direction of the defendant's activities toward the forum

19

Bennett cites no cases on point in his appellate brief. The only decision to the contrary
cited by Bennett below was Brown v. Watson, 255 Cal. Rptr. 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
(R. 1679-81.) That decision was specifically criticized by the Ninth Circuit in Sher, 911
F.2d at 1363 n.2, is inconsistent with Utah decisions rejecting that causing an "effect" in
the state is sufficient, Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boat & Motors, Inc., 494 P.2d 532,
533 (Utah 1972); accord Far West, 46 F.3d at 1079-80, and decisions from other
jurisdictions on point, see, e.g., Austad, 823 F.2d at 226; Weiss, 446 N.Y.S. 2d at 449.
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state."). Post Kirby does not maintain offices in Utah, does not solicit clients or advertise
in Utah, and has no attorneys licensed to practice in Utah. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1385;
Austad, 823 F.2d at 224; DeVenzeio, 918 P.2d at 724. Unlike Jones Waldo, Post Kirby
was not a party to the Retainer Agreement and did not consent to or seek resolution of
attorney-client disputes in Utah courts or under Utah law. McGann, 701 A.2d at 877.
Post Kirby's representation of Bennett was limited to a single lawsuit in
California. Cf Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1988) (the absence of any
"substantial connections, continuing relationships, and obligations" with forum residents
supported finding of due process violation). The services to be rendered by Post Kirby
would be primarily performed in California. See Kowalski, 787 F.2d at 10 ("It seems
obvious that if there were a contract, it would be performed wholly in [the state where the
litigation was pending]"). Moreover, Post Kirby's compensation for its legal services
was to be awarded solely by the California Court, rather than through any availment of
Utah law. Cf Sher, 911 F.2d at 1363-64 (trust deed in forum justified a finding of
specific personal jurisdiction).
b.

Post Kirby's Visits to and Communications with Bennett
in Utah Did Not Establish Minimum Contacts in this Case

Bennett claims that Utah courts have jurisdiction over Post Kirby because it
visited Utah ten times for the California Gen-Probe Litigation, and committed legal
malpractice during some of those visits (i.e., preparation of Fourth Amended Complaint
dropping derivative claims, and negligent advice regarding the proposed class
settlement). (Appellant's Br. at 46-47.) However, such contacts cannot be viewed as a
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purposeful availment of the protections and benefits of Utah law by Post Kirby, but rather
were merely the performance of Post Kirby's duties under California law in the
California Gen-Probe Litigation. As noted above, personal jurisdiction turns on the
"quality" rather than the "quantity" of contacts with the State. See, e.g., Arguello v.
Industrial Woodworking mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1992). PostKirby's
Utah visits or communications during the Gen-Probe Litigation are not qualitatively
significant because they were ancillary to and in furtherance of the California litigation.
Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1390 ("The communications sent into New Hampshire were
ancillary to the allegedly negligent non-forum activities55); see also Austad, 823 F.2d at
226; Biederman v. Sechnader, Harrison, Siegal & Lewis, 765 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (D.
Kan. 1991); DeVenzeio, 918 P.2d at 726. Such contacts were "little more than a
convenience to the client, who would otherwise have had to travel to55 California. See
Sher,911F.2datl363.
Bennett attempts to bolster the significance of such Utah visits by arguing that the
alleged malpractice occurred during those visits. Specifically, Bennett claims that Post
Kirby came to Utah in January 1991 to prepare the Fourth Amended Complaint, which
negligently abandoned the derivative claims. However, Bennett never explains how Post
Kirby could be held responsible for abandoning derivative claims where Post Kirby was
retained solely to prosecute a class action rather than derivative litigation. In any event,
any alleged malpractice related to the Fourth Amended Complaint actually occurred in
California when the complaint was filed and not in Utah. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1390
n.5; Cote, 796 F.2d at 984; Kowalski, 787 F.2d at 7. Moreover, the Utah visit was merely
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a convenience to the client (and could have likewise taken place in California). See Sher,
911 F.2d at 1363 (visits to client's residence insignificant because "little more than a
convenience to the client"); Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1390-91 (communications ancillary to
non-forum litigation not significant).
Bennett also argues that Post Kirby allegedly advised him negligently regarding
settlement during a Utah visit in February 1992. (Appellant's Br. at 46-47.) However,
the First Circuit rejected a similar claim of personal jurisdiction based on communication
of a negligent recommendation of settlement to the client's residence. Sawtelle, 70 F.3d
at 1390-91. Any alleged malpractice in the settlement culminated when the settlement
was submitted for approval to (and actually approved by) the California Court, and
Bennett informed the California Court that he was electing to opt out of the settlement.
Id.
As both parties argued below, the key issue in personal jurisdiction is the "focal
point" of the parties' relationship. This principle is illustrated by the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Far West, where the plaintiff resided in Utah, but the focal point of the
parties' relationship was a Nevada geothermal project. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants' breach of contract and intentional interference with contract injured the
plaintiff at its residence in Utah. The Tenth Circuit instead looked to the "focal point of
the tort and its harm" and the parties' "relationship" to determine if the defendant had
"purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum's laws." Id. at 1079, 1080. Since
the "focal point" of the tort, harm, and contractual relationship was Nevada, Utah courts
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did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendants for claims related to that
relationship. Id. at 1080.
In the present case, the "focal point" of the Post Kirby-Bennett relationship was
California, where Post Kirby was retained, the litigation was undertaken, and Bennett
was allegedly injured when he opted out of the proposed class settlement. Bennett's
residence in Utah played merely a "fortuitous role in the parties' past dealing." Id. Post
Kirby did not purposefully avail itself of the protections and benefits of Utah law when it
was contacted in California and actually represented a class in California litigation.
c.

Bennett's Alleged Injury Occurred in California

Bennett also alleges that he was injured in the State of Utah. (Appellant's Br. at
44, 46; R. 1044 (Compl. % 4).) To the contrary, although Bennett may feel the "effects"
of his alleged injury wherever he chooses to reside, Bennett's alleged injury was
sustained in California. It was in California that Bennett was allegedly denied his rightful
recovery in the California Gen-Probe Litigation by allegedly being forced to opt out of
the litigation rather than accept what he claims was an unreasonably low settlement. See
Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1390 (the client's "injury occurred when the suit was dismissed");
see also Cote, 796 F.2d at 984; Kowalski, 787 F.2d at 11; Twine v. Levy, 746 F. Supp.
1202, 1206 (E.D. N.Y. 1990); DeVenzeio, 918 P.2d at 728. The state where the "effects"
of the injury are felt, such as the residence of the plaintiff, is not the location of the injury
for the purposes of personal jurisdiction. See Sawtelle, 70 F.2d at 1390; Malmo, 939
F.2d at 537.
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These principles are consistent with Utah jurisprudence. See Hydroswift Corp. v.
Louie's Boats & Motors, Inc., 494 P.2d 532, 533 (Utah 1972) (jurisdiction could not be
predicated upon the fact that the financial injury for an out-of-state tortious act was felt in
Utah because that was where the plaintiff resided); cf Far West, 46 F.3d at 1080
(suffering the "financial effects" of torts in Utah at plaintiffs domicile does not establish
personal jurisdiction in Utah). Thus, Bennett's injury, if any, from the alleged
malpractice, arose from and occurred in the California litigation regardless of his place of
residence.
d.

The Joint Venture Allegation Does Not Create Personal
Jurisdiction in Utah

Bennett further claims that Post Kirby allegedly formed a Utah joint venture with
Jones Waldo in the representation of Utah clients. (Appellant's Br. at 9 n.3, 44-48.)
Bennett relies on International Leasing, Inc. v. Anderson, 410 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir.
1969), for the position that personal jurisdiction is established over individual partners
where "the individual partners availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business
activities in Kansas and invoked the benefits and protections of its laws" u[t]hough the
instrumentality of the partnership." Bennett's argument is wrong for three reasons.
First, Post Kirby did not form a "joint venture" with Jones Waldo. Bennett cites
no authority that class action co-counsel are joint venturers for personal jurisdiction
purposes. In any events, even under the authority cited by Bennett in other contexts, no
joint venture was formed in this matter because Post Kirby did not have joint and equal
control with Jones Waldo over the litigation. In Duggins v. Guardianship of Washington,
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632 So.2d 420 (Miss. 1993), relied on by Bennett, (Appellant's Br. at 9 n.3), the cocounsel had an "argument that each attorney would have an equal stake in the outcome of
the case and there would be joint control of the case," which formed the basis of the
finding of a joint venture for joint and severability. Id. at 426, 428; see also Armor v.
Lantz, 535 S.E. 2d 737, 745-46 (W. Va. 2000) ("equal control" of litigation is important
in finding a joint venture between co-counsel). In the present case, Post Kirby's October
24, 1990 letter, wherein Post Kirby agreed to act as co-counsel, clearly specifies that
Jones Waldo would remain "lead counsel" and "continue to have the ultimate decision
making authority."20 (Appellant's App. 4 at 1.) Thus, Bennett cannot demonstrate that a
"joint venture" had been formed.
Second, even if a joint venture had been formed, it would have been a California
joint venture for the purpose of carrying out activities in California. In International
Leasing, relied on by Bennett, the Tenth Circuit found jurisdiction over the partnership
and partners because the partnership had "purposefully availed themselves of the
privilege of conducting business activities in Kansas," through the rental of equipment
from plaintiff in Kansas for use in Kansas oil and gas leases. International Leasing, 410

That letter merely gave Post Kirby the right to "consult[]" with Jones Waldo before
Jones Waldo made the decisions. (Appellant's App. 4.) In fact, that letter contemplates
that the parties might be compensated out of any common fund by the court on a loadstar
(or hourly) basis, rather than a percentage contingency-fee basis, which likewise
undermines Bennett's claim of a joint venture. Id. ("Inasmuch as this is a class action,
we have agreed that each firm will keep track of all attorneys' fees incurred, and costs
and disbursements, which would be submitted to the Court upon any settlement for
approval as to attorneys' fees"). See, e.g., Harlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029
(9l Cir. 1998) (court can award fees on either loadstar or percentage basis in class
actions).
41

F.2d at 305. In the present case, any joint venture would have been formed solely to
prosecute litigation in California (and not in Utah). Thus, the "focal point" of the
activities of the alleged joint venture would have been California.
Third, in any event, the mere existence of a California joint venture should not
subject each alleged joint venturer to personal jurisdiction based on the acts of the other
joint venturer. See Sher, 911 F.2d at 1376. As the Ninth Circuit stated (interpreting
California joint venture law):
The contacts of the partners may establish jurisdiction over the
partnership. This is so because each partner acts as an agent of the
partnership when carrying on the business of the partnership in the
usual way. However, while each partner is generally an agent of the
partnership for the purpose of business, he is not ordinarily an agent
of his partners. Thus, a partner's actions may be imputed to the
partnership for the purposes of establishing minimum contacts, but
ordinarily may not be imputed to the other partners.
Id. at 1376.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE BAR
ORDER-RELATED CLAIMS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION

Bennett claims that Post Kirby allegedly committed abuse of process, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and "deceit" when it obtained and enforced the Bar Order
in California court. Inasmuch Post Kirby no longer had any professional relationship
with Bennett at the time of the Bar Order, Bennett premises jurisdiction on the assertion
that he was injured in Utah by the Bar Order litigation. (R. 1044 (Compl. f 4).)
As described above, a plaintiff must still establish that a "defendant has
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum's laws," even in the intentional tort
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context. Far West, 46 F.3d at 1079; see also id. at 1077-79 (reviewing Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783 (1983)). Purposeful availment turns on the "focal point" of the "tort and its
harm" and the "relationship" of the parties. Id. at 1080.
Bennett has argued that service of the Bar Order in Utah permits the assertion of
personal jurisdiction against Post Kirby. However, the service of legal process arising
from California litigation on a Utah resident does not establish purposeful availment of
Utah law, even if the process is claimed to be an abuse of process. On this point, the
Tenth Circuit in Far West cited with favor the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Wallace
v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1985). In Wallace, an Indiana plaintiff sued three
California lawyers in Indiana for malicious prosecution arising out of California
litigation. The plaintiff argued that the minimum contacts requirement was satisfied
because "the defendants served interrogatories, requested the production of documents,
and caused the plaintiff to respond to five complaints in Indiana where the plaintiff
resides." Id. at 394. The Seventh Circuit noted, however, that "the defendants filed these
motions on behalf of their clients in a California court pursuant to a California lawsuit,
and it would be unreasonable to require the defendants to appear in Indiana to defend this
suit on the basis of such attenuated contacts." Id. The central inquiry was again an
examination of the "focal point" of the tort and the harm. Id. at 394, 395.
In the present case, with respect to the Bar Order Litigation, the "focal point" of
the parties' conduct and relationship was again in California. The Bar Order Litigation
was instituted and prosecuted in California federal court. Post Kirby's alleged
misrepresentations were to the California federal court. Although served with the
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temporary Bar Order in Utah, Bennett appeared and defended the litigation entirely in
California. When Bennett allegedly violated the Bar Order, Post Kirby sought
enforcement in a California - not Utah - court. Violation of the Bar Order, wherever it
might occur, was and would be punished by sanctions in California. The Bar Order
remains a valid order of the California federal court and is binding on Bennett regardless
of where he elected to bring his suit:
Bennett's alleged "emotional" and "reputational" injury from the Bar Order
Litigation was also centered in and arose out of California. He claims (1) distress from
being "wrongfully issued a contempt citation" in California federal court; (2) anxiety
concerning damage to his "personal and professional reputation and career" from the
contempt citation and the court's "excoriat[ion]" of Bennett in public in her courtroom;
(3) "fear of incarceration" in California; (4) "fear of the financial consequences of the Bar
Order and contempt proceedings" in California; and (5) "financial pressure of being
required to pay costs and attorneys fees" in "defending against... the injunction and
contempt citation" in California. (R. 1076, 1088 (Compl.fflf141, 193).)
Moreover, the very nature of bar orders demonstrates that the "focal point" of that
litigation was in California. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bar Order because a court
has the power to protect the "finality" of its own judgments. Thus, Post Kirby had asked
the California Court, and that court agreed, to enter an order to protect finality of the
California class action judgment. Violation of that order was punishable by contempt in
the California Court. The Bar Order would have the same effect and consequences
regardless of where Bennett elected to file suit. The incidental effect of the Bar Order
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Litigation on Utah is merely a "fortuitous" event tied to Bennett's decision to file in Utah.
Cf, Far West, 46 F.3d at 1080. The focal point of the Bar Order Litigation was and had
to be California and the California judgment. Such contacts are insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction in this case.
D.

THE EXERCISE OF SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
POST KIRBY WOULD BE UNREASONABLE

Bennett must also make a prima facie showing that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would be reasonable and fair. Where, as in this case, Bennett has failed to
make a prima facie showing of minimum contacts, the court need not evaluate the
reasonableness of the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1394. If
Bennett has made a weak showing of minimum, he must make an "'especially strong
showing of reasonableness'" to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. (quoting
Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1 st Cir. 1994)). This test
requires a court to balance "'the fairness to the parties and the interests of the State in
assuming jurisdiction.'" SII MegaDiamond, 354 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28 (citation omitted).
The relevant factors include:
[T]he burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief. [The Court] must also 'weigh in its
determination "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."
Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).
In the present case, Bennett cannot make an "especially strong" showing of
reasonableness. Litigation in an out-of-state forum would increase costs and
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inconvenience on Post Kirby. Moreover, where, as in this case, the claims arise out of
litigation in another state, Utah has a "far less compelling interest" in the litigation than
otherwise would be the case. Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395. By contrast, California has a
significant interest in this litigation, which involves a California law firm, the practice of
law in California, and orders of courts sitting in California. Bennett can obtain complete
and efficient relief against Post Kirby in California, especially because California law
will govern the claims against Post Kirby. Consequently, Bennett cannot overcome his
nonexistent or weak showing of minimum contacts in Utah, and thus this Court lacks
personal jurisdiction over Post Kirby.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Based on the foregoing, Post Kirby requests this Court to do the following:
(1)

Dismiss this appeal as untimely with respect to Post Kirby; or

(2)

Affirm the rulings of the district court dismissing Bennett's malpractice

and bar-order claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.
DATED this 29th day of November, 2001.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

James S. Jardine
Rick B Hoggard
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees
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1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone No. (801) 521-3200
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs (except David D. Bennett)

11
12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

13

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

14
15
16
17
18
19

DAVID D. BENNETT, JAMES W.
BENNETT, LORRAINE J. ENGSTROM,
MO-VEST, LTD., HAROLD SANBEK,
ARDEN LUBECK, and FRANKLIN
REED BENNETT, SARA LIU, and
ALICE LIU, individually, and
on behalf of Gen-Probe
Incorporated stockholders
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

THOMAS H. BOLOGNA, THOMAS H.
ADAMS, HOWARD C. BIRNDORF,
MALIN BURNHAM, BROOK H. BYERS,
DAVID F. HALE, CHARLES M.
HARTMAN, LEWIS H. SARETT, and
DAVID E. KOHNE, GEN-PROBE
INCORPORATED, a Delaware

Case No. 90-1183-C (LgBj.^>%g)
TEMPORARY BAR ORDER; ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE AND SETTING
HEARING

1
2
3
4

corporation; CHUGAI
ACQUISITION USA INC., a
Delaware corporation; CHUGAI
HOLDING USA INC., a Delaware
corporation; and CHUGAI
PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD., a
Japanese corporation,

5

Defendants.

6
7

Having duly considered the ex parte papers submitted in

8

support of the Temporary Bar Order and for good cause appearing

9

therefor,

10

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

11

1.

That David D. Bennett and his agents or attorneys

12

shall be, pending a hearing on this matter, enjoined and

13

restrained from initiating or maintaining any lawsuit against

14

Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough and its attorneys (including

15

Christopher L. Burton and Sidney G. Baucom) or any other class

16

counsel which in any way involves:

17

a.

18

The sufficiency or fairness of the class action
settlement in the above-entitled action;

19

b.

The competency of class counsel and counsel's

20

legal services on behalf of the class in the

21

above-entitled action;

22

c.

23

from the class action settlement fund;

24

d.

25
26
27

The award of fees and costs to class counsel

The award of additional compensation to any of
named Plaintiffs.

2.

This Order does not bar or restrain David D. Bennett

from pursuing solely his own individual claims as a former Gen-

28
PKNS\oowra w?

- 2

1

Probe shareholder, except to the extent such claims have been

2

previously adjudicated by this Court.

3

3.

A hearing shall be held at /Q*AO

J^.m.

on July n ,

4

1994 in this Court, at 940 Front Street, San Diego, California

5

to show cause why this Order shall not be made permanent.

6
7
8
9

4.

David D. Bennett may file (and shall personally

serve) any opposition papers by 4:00 p.m. on July 7, 1994.
5.

If David D. Bennett wishes a continuance of the

hearing on the Order to Show Cause, with the Temporary Bar

10

Order remaining in effect, the Court is willing to grant such a

11

continuance.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
9

1

WP||

DATED:
Honorable Louisa S. Porter
United States Magistrate Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

•ol

DAVID D. BENNETT, JAMES W.
BENNETT, LORRAINE J. ENGSTROM,
:2| MO-VEST. LTD., HAROLD SANBECK,
ARDEN LUBECK, and FRANKLIN REED
'31 BENNETT. SARA LIU, and ALICE LIU,
individually, and on behalf of Gen-Probe
•4 Incorporated stockholders similarly
situated,
'1

Case No. 90-1183K(POR)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
PERMANENT BAR ORDER

Plaintiffs,

71

v.
THOMAS H. BOLOGNA, THOMAS H.

'31 ADAMS, HOWARD C. BIRNDORF,

MALIN BURNHAM, BROOK H. BYERS,
DAVID F. HALE, CHARLES M.
HARTMAN, LEWIS H. SARETT, and
201 DAVID E. KOHNE, GEN-PROBE
INCORPORATED, a Delaware
21 corporation; CHUGAI ACQUISITION
USA INC., a Delaware corporation;
22 CHUGAI HOLDING USA INC., a
Delaware corporation; and CHUGAI
23 i PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD., a
Japanese corporation,
24 j
25 j

261
27

Defendants.
The motion of class counsel - Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough and Post
Kirby Noonan & Sweat - for permanent bar order against David D. Bennett, came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Judith N. Keep, United States Chief District

Judge presiding, on Tuesday, September 6, 1994. Class counsel were represented by
Michael L. Kirby of Post Kirby Noonan & Sweat. Christopher L. Burton, Sidney G.
Baucom and James W. Peters of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough were also
present in Court. David D. Bennett was represented by David L Sanders and R. Priya
Seshachari. David D. Bennett was also present in Court. The Court, having
considered the memoranda and declarations submitted by both sides and having heard
oral argument, for good cause showing, issued an oral ruling which is incorporated
herein by reference.
For the reasons stated in the oral ruling, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
motion of class counsel for a permanent bar order is granted, to the effect that
temporary bar order, issued by the Honorable Louisa S. Porter in this case on July 5,
1994. now becomes permanent.
IT IS SO ORDERED. J
DATED: c t t t

£j)L\Cl'>t

JUDITH N. KEEP.Yttfcf Judge
United States DistrbtlCourt
cc:

Michael L. Kirby
Post Kirby Noonan & Sweat
600 West Broadway, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101-3355
Christopher L Burton
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
David L. Sanders
Law Offices of David L Sanders
400 East, 425 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
R. Priya Seshachari
Taft Securities Litigation, Inc.
79 "A" Street, Suite 106
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
2
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87F.3d 1317 (Table)
Unpublished Disposition
(Cite as: 87 F.3d 1317, 1996 WL 328792 (9th Cir.
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides
that dispositions other than opinions or orders
designated for publication are not precedential and
should not be cited except when relevant under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or
collateral estoppel.
(The decision of the Court is referenced in a
"Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions"
appearing in the Federal Reporter.)
David D. BENNETT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GEN-PROBE, INC.; Thomas H. Bologna, et al,
Defendants,
and
Law Firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough, Appellee.
No. 95-55306.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted April 10, 1996.
Decided June 14, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, D.C. No.
CV-90-01183-JNK; Judith N. Keep, District Judge
Presiding.
S.D.Cal.
AFFIRMED.
Before: SCHROEDER, LEAVY, Circuit Judges
and TRIMBLE [FN*] District Court Judge.
FN* Honorable James T. Trimble, Jr., United
States District Judge for the Western District of
Louisiana, sitting by designation.
MEMORANDUM [FN**]
FN** This disposition is not appropriate for
publication and may not be cited to or by the courts
of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R.
36-3.
**1 Plaintiff-appellant, David D. Bennett is a

.)))
former named plaintiff in Bennett v. Bologna, a
securities fraud class action that was settled after
Bennett opted out. Bennett appeals the district
court's issuance of a permanent bar order obtained
by counsel for the plaintiff class.
The class counsel who obtained the bar order argue
initially on appeal that this court lacks jurisdiction to
review the bar order because Bennett did not file a
timely notice of appeal. Browder v. Director, 434
U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (timely notice of appeal both
mandatory and jurisdictional). Bennett's notice of
appeal was, however, timely filed with respect to
the district court's denial of Bennett's motion,
argued pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
59(e) and 60, "to set aside order, and alternatively,
... to alter or amend order." Because the district
court's denial of Bennett's motion addresses the
merits of Bennett's arguments, this court reaches the
merits of Bennett's appeal.
On the merits of his appeal, Bennett contends that
since no federal court has jurisdiction to hear the
underlying state malpractice and breach of contract
claims he is seeking to litigate in Utah, the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the
bar order. The district court has jurisdiction,
however, to enter orders to preserve and protect the
"fruits and advantages" of its judgment. See Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934);
Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce,
Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1524 (9th Cir.1983) ("[a]
district court retains jurisdiction to enforce the
judgments it enters" and may reinforce res judicata
or collateral estoppel via injunction). Thus, the
district court had jurisdiction to enter a bar order to
protect the finality of its class action judgment. The
issue is whether this bar order serves such a
purpose. The district court may not prevent a Utah
court from litigating malpractice and breach of
contract issues relating to appellee law firm's
representation of Bennett, because such litigation
does not endanger or affect the "fruits and
advantages" of the district court's judgment settling
the underlying class action. Further, in adjudicating
Bennett's malpractice and breach of contract claims,
a Utah court may examine the adequacy of the class
settlement, but only insofar as that settlement sheds
light on appellee law firm's representation of
Bennett. The district court was entitled to protect

Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

87 F.3d 1317 (Table)
(Cite as: 87 F.3d 1317, 1996 WL 328792, **1 (9th Cii .(Cal.)))
the district court's own judgment, and thereby
ensure its finality so that the class members would
still receive the same settlement; the class defendant
would remain obligated to pay the same settlement,
and Bennett would remain a non party with no right
to any share of that settlement. Cf. Samuel C.
Ennis & Co., Inc. v. Woodmar Realty Co., 542
F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir.1976) (injunction proper where
state action, if successful, would nullify the federal
bankruptcy court's order of distribution).
**2 The bar order contains a disclaimer that it does
not "restrain David D. Bennett from pursuing solely
his individual claims...." This should not be
construed to limit Bennett to pursuit of his individual
claims against the original class action defendant and
to preclude any challenge to counsel's handling of

Page 117

the class action. The district court's order must be
construed narrowly to prevent any collateral attack
upon the class action judgment and its finality as
between the parties to that judgment. We hold,
however, that the bar order cannot be construed to
prevent Bennett from litigating issues in his
malpractice and breach of contract actions that relate
to class counsels' handling of the class action, so
long as such litigation does not undermine the
finality of class action judgment. The order, as so
construed, is therefore AFFIRMED.
Any further appellate proceedings in this matter,
including any appeals from a contempt order, shall
be referred to this panel.
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Third Judicial District
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SALT LAKE COUNTY

8y.

James S. Jardine (1647A)
Rick B. Hoggard (5088A)
Arthur B. Berger (6490A)
RAY, QU1NNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

Deputy Cleric

Attorneys for Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat,
Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID D. BENNETT
Plaintiff,
v.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH et al.,
Defendants.

RULE 54(b) JUDGMENT
ON ALL CLAIMS AGAINST
DEFENDANTS POST, KIRBY, NOONAN
& SWEAT, LLP, MICHAEL L. KIRBY
A.P.C., AND MICHAEL L. KIRBY
INDIVIDUALLY
Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Civil No. 940908220

The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan &
Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, came on for oral argument
before the Court on October 25, 1999. James S. Jardine and Rick B. Hoggard of Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker appeared on behalf of these defendants, R. Priya Seshachari of Taft Securities Litigation, P.C,
and James N. Barber appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Having considered the argument of counsel
and the memoranda and supporting material submitted by each party, the Court notified the parties by

1

Minute Entry dated January 7, 2000, that it had granted the motion to dismiss based upon all of the
analytical points and authorities set forth in defendants' memoranda.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT,
1.

The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Post, Kirby,

Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, is granted on all
claims asserted against them.
2.

All claims asserted against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L.

Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, in the Fourth Amended Complaint are dismissed
because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over those parties.
3.

The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay of entry of judgment on the claims

against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby,
individually, because the jurisdictional basis for dismissal of the claims against these defendants is
wholly separate from the substantive claims asserted against the other defendants, and from the issues
raised by the other defendants' pending motions to dismiss those claims.
4.

The Court directs entry of this Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure.
DATED this ' (

^^
day of _

, 2000.

1
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Page 1
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT IAKE CITY

1

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PROCEEDINGS

2

-0O0-

3

DAVID BENNETT,

THE COURT: The record should reflect that this is

4 Case No. 940908220.
Case No. 940908220

Plaintiff,

5

Let's start by having counsel identify themselves

MOTIONS

6 for the record.
(Videotape Proceedings)

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 6
MCDONOUGH, et al. ,

7

MR. BARBER: James N. Barber for the plaintiff,

8 David Bennett.

Defendants.

9

-oOo-

MR. MOQUIN: Dan Moquin for plaintiff, David

10 Bennett.

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2nd day of
October, 2000, commencing at the hour of 2:00 p.m., the

11

MS. SANGER: Priya Seshachari-Sanger for

above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the

12 plaintiff, David Bennett.

HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY, sitting as Judge in the

13

above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that

14 defendants.

the following videotape proceedings were had.

15

A P P E A R A N C E S
JAMES N. BARBER
Attorney at Law
50 West Broadway, #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
DANIEL G. MOQUIN
Attorney at Law
443 East 2400 South
South Salt Lake, Utah

MR. STEPHENS: Brent Stephens for the Jones, Waldo

16 defendants.

-oOo-

For the Plaintiff:

MR. HOGGARD: Rick Hoggard for the Post, Kirby

84115

17

THE COURT: Mr. Barber, you may go forward.

18

MR. BARBER: Thank you.

19

Your Honor, I have marked copies of the—some of

20 the primary cases we intend to refer to. May I hand them—
21

THE COURT: You may.

22

MR. BARBER-. Your Honor, this is a motion for the

23 Court to rule on what we believe was a Rule 59 motion filed
24 in this—February of this year, after the entry of the first
25 judgment in this case, but before the entry of the second

Page 28571
Page 4
A P P E A R A N C E S (Continuing)
1 and to rule on a 60(b) motion in connection with the second
2 judgment that was—was entered.
PRIYA SESHACHARI-SANGER

3

Attorney at Law
Wells Fargo Bank
Seventh Floor
MACA0149-074
San Francisco, California

4 these motions is the time that was involved in the factual

We believe that relevant to the disposition of

5 things that occurred here by reason of which we have—
6 plaintiff has been so courteous as to prepare a time line
7 that I think will put this into context quickly.
8

THE COURT.- And let me say, ITve—I have reviewed

9 that time line in—in detail, at least up to the May 10th

For the Defendants:
RICK B. HOGGARD
Attorney at Law
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 841450385

10 date anyway.
11

MR. BARBER: A l l right.

12

THE COURT: So, I'm—I'm familiar, I believe, with

13 what you1 re going to tell me in this regard.
14

MR. BARBER: Well, not much occurred after May

15 10th, except that it's a critical day because that's when
16 the plaintiff finally found out that judgments had been
17 entered in identical form on February 11th and February 28th
18 of 2000 and which led us for the first time to conclude that

R. BRENT STEPHENS

Attorney at Law
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
* * *

19 we needed to get something moving in order to protect our
20 position.
21

Also important is the fact that plaintiff filed a

22 Rule 5—60 motion alluding to the February 28th judgment
23 within 90 days of the entry of that judgment and at the same
24 time, asked the Court to rule on what we believe is a Rule
25 59 motion and then we went ahead and filed a notice of

Alan P. Smith, CSR (801) 266-0320

Page 1 - Page '

Page 7

Page 5
1 appeal which was 29 days after—not after the judgments had

1 entered and that—or that our notice of objections to the

2 been entered, but after we learned of their entry.

2 January 7th minute entry had been considered by the Court

3

3 and ruled upon in any way at all, we would, of course,

The difficulty being now that unless the Court

4 provides us some relief here, of course, that notice of

4 designated the pleading otherwise and not included in it the

5 appeal is going to be outside the limits imposed by the

5 language that the Court is alluding to.

6 Rules of Appellate Procedure and our appeal will be barred.

6

7 And that's why this is a critical motion.

7 isn't what you call a pleading that designates what it is,

8

But the case law makes it pretty clear that it

8 but actually what it is. And we believe that that pleading

We believe that as a result of a series of

9 is—has to be deemed to be a Rule 59 motion because it does

9 circumstances, the real issue here is one of fundamental
10 fairness and due process which of course, the rules of

10 things that would be found in such a motion.

11 procedures and the rules of judicial administration are

11

12 designed to embody and define for the benefit, both of the

12 Fidelity, which—which contains this language—and in that

In connection with that, we talk about DeBry vs.

13 Court and—and practitioners before it. And we believe that

13 case, if it's possible to get in a worse position than we

14 given the purpose of those rules, the relief that we've

14 are, Bob DeBry got himself in it because in that case,

15 sought will be warranted.

15 before the Court of Appeals, he was actually arguing that a

16

16 pleading that designated much like ours, objections to the

Our motion on its face asks for, number one,

17 striking of the February 28th judgment which was identical

17 form of a judgment and a request for changes in the findings

18 to the February 11th judgment essentially as a ministerial

18 was not in fact a Rule 59 or a 52(b) motion.

19 error because it is essentially surplusage to the February

19

20 11th judgment that was entered.

20 even though the proponent of the pleading in the lower court

21

21 was the one who was arguing for it to not be treated as a 59

The alternative, and we believe there are grounds

But—and the Court of Appeals rejected that claim

22 for this, is of course for the Court to set them both aside

22 motion. But the court said, regardless of how it is

23 for the reasons that we'll talk about in a moment.

23 captioned, a motion filed within ten days of entry of a

24

24 judgment—and here's the critical language—that questions

We then seek a ruling which is critical to the

25 relief we seek that a pleading designated Plaintiffs Reply

25 the correctness of the court's findings and conclusions, is

Page 6

Page 8

1 to Defendants' Response to the Objections to the Minute

1 properly treated as a post-judgment motion under either

2 Entry entered on January 7th, by which the Court announced

2 Rules 59(b) or 59(e)~52(b) or 59(e). The substance of a

3 its intention to grant the judgment in favor of the

3 motion, not its caption, is controlling.

4 defendant dismissing the Jones—I mean the Kirby defendants

4

5 from the case was entered, that that should be treated as a

5 case, DeBry's motion in substance requested the trial court

And then he says—the court says, in the instant

6 Rule 59 motion to amend or alter the judgment because it

6 to amend and make additional findings of fact and

7 was, even though we didn't know it then, in fact filed five

7 conclusions of law, a request recognized by Rule 52(b). And

8 or six days after that February 11th judgment was entered

8 furthermore, DeBry's motion was timely inasmuch as it was

9 but within the ten-day period prescribed by the rules.
10

It was—it was—

11

THE COURT: Can I ask you a question about that?

12

MR. BARBER. Sure.

13

THE COURT: I know I'm going to hear this from the

14 other side, but I struggle with how, Mr. Barber, with all

9 filed five days after the entry of the judgment.
10

I believe that a similar holding is found in Reed

111 vs. Steinfeld, which we've cited in our brief, 915 P.2d 1073
12 at Page 1077 where the court, once again in describing the
113 substance of the pleadings, says, in the instant case, the
114 Reeds claim and we agree—

15 due respect, you can stand before me today and in the moving

15

16 papers, basically take the position that it's not—that what

16 in that?

17 you're filing is not a Rule 59 request for relief. And then

17

18 stand before me today and orally assert that it is now a

18 1077.

THE COURT: rm sorry. What paragraph are you on
MR. BARBER: It's Footnote 2 through 5 on Page

19 request for Rule 59 ruling.

19

THE COURT: Go ahead.

20

20

MR. BARBER: In the instant case, the Reeds claim

MR. BARBER: Well, I think, your Honor, that the

21 answer to that is pretty straightforward and has been dealt

21 and we agree that Steinfeld's November 8 objections to the

22 with in the case law. What we call or believe—of course,

22 proposed findings, conclusions and judgment is—is in

23 the error, our error arises from the fact that when we filed

23 substance a Rule 59 motion inasmuch as it asks the court to

24 that, we didn't know that the judgment had been entered.

24 alter its findings and amend its conclusions and the
25 Had we been advised that the February 11th judgment had been 25 judgment.

Alan P. Smith, CSR (801) 266-0320

Page 5 - Page 8

Page 11

Page 9
1

1 question that had that reply been filed after the entry of

In this motion, Steinfeld objected to the trial

2 the judgment so that we knew that and had designated a 59(e)

2 court's calculation of damages, of the naming of a
3 prevailing party in an underlying action—in the underlying

3 motion that it would be treated as such because it has the

4 action. He asserts the trial court incorrectly determined

4 substance required of that kind of a motion.

5 the issue of substantial completion and whether Steinfeld's

5

6 lien had been wrongly filed.

6 case, where essentially all of the parties were operating in

7

Steinfeld1 s motion does more than merely—than

We believe that under the circumstances of this

7 ignorance of the fact, the Court can—can and ought to treat

8 merely the object to—I don't understand that language—
9 Steinfeld's motion does more than merely the object—I guess

8 the motion as such, notwithstanding that on the basis of—of
9 an incorrect understanding of the facts, the language the

10 that's a typo—to Reed's proposed findings and judgment. It

10 Court alluded to was included in the—in the response.

11 urges the court to amend its filings and to alter its legal

11

12 conclusions and the judgment. Thus, the time for filing the

12 that, but I think it is a correct—a—a—a construction that

13 notice of appeal was tolled until January 3rd.

13 complies with the law, with the case law that defines what a

14

14 post-judgment motion really is and the fact that our motion

Finally, there is similar language found in

So, I think that's the best we can do, address

15 Ashley—excuse me, in Riggen vs. Bloundt, Footnote 8—well,

15 clearly complies with those definitions which are found in

16 that isn't where it is at all.

16 the cases that I've cited to the Court.

17

17

It's at the top of Page 1054, three lines down.

Does the Court have further questions about that?

18 Appellate's motion filed several days before the entry of

18
THE COURT: Well, I—I probably will have another
19 the amended order and judgment, challenged by the motion and 19 question for you but I'll wait until you—you essentially—
20 that's more than—not more than ten days after the entry of
20
MR. BARBER: rll look forward to it with bated
21 the judgment, is timely under the rules.
21 breath.
22

That wasn't the exact language I was talking

22

Thank you, your Honor.
Of course, the impact of the decision that we've

23 about. I'm talking about language on Page 1053 under

23

24 Footnote 5, 4 and 5, Footnote 4, Paragraph 5 it says there.

24 just been discussing is critical to us because if the Court

25 It says, the motion improperly labeled as—as one for

25 isn't able to fashion the relief that we seek here or some

Page 10

Page 12

1

reconsideration that is in fact a motion for a new trial

1 other similar relief that essentially delays the

2.

extends the tune for appeals under Rule 4(b )

2 effectiveness of one or both of the judgments, then we are

J

And then it cites a case stating that regardless

3 going to be denied our right to appeal.

4

of its caption, a motion filed within ten days of entry of

4

J

the—of the judgment that questions the correctness of the

5 to be protected unless the plaintiff is negligent in what

0

court's findings and conclusions is properly treated as a

6 he's done. We don't believe the facts establish that kind

/

post judgment motion under either Rule 52(b) or 59(e)

7 of negligence in any way, shape or form. And that the fact

O
y

Now, your Honor, we believe that our objections to
the January 7th minute entry which we did not know had

That, of course, is a fundamental right that ought

8 that because of a series of circumstances, both the parties
9 operated in ignorance of the fact is a justification for the

10

already been reduced and entered in the judgment but that Ln

10 Court to take a somewhat extraordinary position in this

11

fact had been, came at the conclusion where we filed the

11 case, though one that is supported by the case law.

12

objections, the defendant responded replied to that series

12

13

of objections and then we filed a reply to the response

13 either grant the relief as we have specifically outlined it

14

Fortunately, the reply was filed after the

We believe that what the Court ought to do is to

14 in our motion or I think the Court could easily deem our

XJ

judgment was entered, but it is clearly a an objection to

15 Rule 59 motion sufficient to have applied to both of the

1 U

the underlying minute entry and thus, the judgment as well,

16 judgments that are issued here and rule that until this

17

that questions the court's conclusions which we believe of

17 Court rules on that motion, the judgments, for purposes of

1 O

course were in error The conclusion that the minimum

18 filing the notice of appeal are stayed and have no effect.

19

contacts as between the KiTby defendants and Mr Bennett

19

20

were sufficient under our long arm statute and

20 think it would be more painful and perhaps more difficult,

21

Constitutional constraint* to vest jurisdiction over the

21 but could still be done, is to deem the February 28th

22

Kirby defendants in this court.

22 judgment the operative judgment here instead of the

23

That ruling, implicit in the judgment and -which is

The other thing the Court could do, I suppose, I

23 redundant February 11th judgment and grant our Rule 60(b)

24

actually the basis of the judgment, is something that we ask

24 motion, which is timely filed as to that judgment by setting

25

the Court to reconsider and set aside There can be no

25 it aside for any other reason justifying relief from the
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1 judgment, which is part of Rule 60(b) or as clerical

1 practical problem which I normally hear from the other side,

2 mistake

2 but I want to hear what your response is, especially in

3

3 light of the type of relief that you're requesting This is

There are two grounds that would permit that to

4 happen, either one of them would be of assistance to us

4 what I believe happened in this situation When that first

5 because then we could proceed to appeal the substance of the

5 notice to submit for decision was submitted to me and when I

6 judgments having timely filed our Rule 60(b) motion Either

6 had before me the objection and response thereto, I clearly

7 way, it is not the form of relief that is so critical to Mr

7 reviewed the objection and the—and the response and—and

8 Bennett, your Honor, but the fact that some relief accord—

8 the February 11th decision

9 be accorded that permits him his right to appeal

9

10

There are really three or four legal issues The

Shortly thereafter, a subsequent notice to submit

10 was given to me and I reviewed once again all of the

11 first one, we've discussed in some measure and that is,

11 documents I had in front of me but quite frankly, there was-

12 should our objections to the January 7th minute entry,

12 -there would have been, oh, a little over a two-week passage

13 coupled with the reply to plaintiffs response to that, too,

13 of time between, I think the February 11th—

14 which was filed after the entry of the February 11th

14

MR BARBER Yeah—

15 judgment be deemed a Rule 59(a) or a Rule—a Rule 52(b) or a

15

THE COURT

and the—

16 Rule 59 motion

16

MR BARBER

17 days

17

THE COURT I simply did not recall,

117

We think for the reasons I've already indicated

18 that we—that the Court clearly ought to do that, once again

18 unfortunately, that I had signed the February 11th judgment,

19 reiterating that it is the substance of the motion, not its

19 but the point I'm getting at is, two things occurred here, I

20 form or what we say it is under a mistaken bebef in the

20 did not recall I signed the February 11th judgment, but

21 circumstances of the case, which was essentially misleading

21 clearly, I reviewed the objections and made a determination

22 to us That should not govern The substance of that

22 that the objections were not—did not have merit in my—in

23 motion should govern and we believe that it's adequate under

23 my opinion

24 those rules for the reasons that I've quoted from the cases

24

25

25 didn't do in this particular situation and I just can't

THE COURT Mr Barber, and this may be an aside,

The second thing that I traditionally do and I

Page 14

Page 16

1 it may not be all that significant m resolving these

1 explain it, quite frankly, is that ordinarily, I would have

2 issues, but isn't it—isn't it accurate also to conclude

2 written on the judgment, interlineation, that the objections

3 that what occurred here—and I'm going to add in a moment

3 were denied I did not do that in this particular case, but

4 what I think occurred from my perspective, but in filing

4 I can assure you as certain as I am sitting in this chair

5 what you did file, isn't it fair to say that basically what

5 for right now, when I signed those judgments, I passed

6 you are attempting to do is to file an objection, argue the

j 6 judgment on the issues—on the merits of the issues raised

7 full panoply and the full landscape of the—the objections

7 within those objections

8 that you thought were the appropriate way upon which this

8

9 Court should rule, have that bite of the apple, and then if

Now, in light of that, how would you fashion your

9 request for relief?

10 in fact you lost that, then to have the same Rule 59 type

10

11 request for relief bite out of the apple, a second time all

11 changes it, your Honor, be—for these reasons, and—and you

MR BARBER Well, I—I don't really think it

12 over again In practicality and with intellectual honesty,

12 know, I have full confidence that this Court would not have

13 isn't that what you are doing on behalf of your client or am

13 entered that judgment without looking at the objections that

14 I missing something here*?

14 had been filed

15

15

MR BARBER Well, I~I guess the short answer is,

16 Sure

THE COURT There's no way, as—as contentious and

16 as btigated as this case has been, that's—

17

THE COURT Okay

17

18

MR BARBER We—we wanted to call to the Court's

18 inappropriate and I don't think you'd have done it, so I

MR BARBER It simply would have been

19 attention before the judgment was entered, the fact that we

19 have no—

20 thought it was wrong And—and so, even though we don't

20

THE COURT And—and—and in fact, didn't do it on

21 have that ammal under the rules, I think that the motion to

21 this particular case, but go ahead

22 reconsider the objections to the minute entry were in fact

22

23 an invitation for the Court to re-think that issue and

23 that doesn't cure the problems that the failure that the

24 change its mind, if it deemed it appropriate

24 Court alludes to has created for us

25

25

THE COURT Here's—here's the practical—other
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1 one of two things, it seems to me, and—and—and in some

1

MR BARBER Sure

2 measure, we're misled by the fact that when the Court made

2

THE COURT

3 the January 7th minute entry indicating that it was going to

3 objections I'm not—

4 grant judgment to the Kirby defendants, it wrote a written

4

5 minute entry, it placed it in the record and the record will

5 if you consider them, you rejected them when you read the

6 disclose that the clerk was instructed to file and send to

6 judgment There's no problem with that

7 us a copy of the minute entry, to give us notice that that

7

8 had been done

8 get the notice that you'd done any of it That's our

9

9 problem You know, if—if you had either entered a minute

So, we assumed that that's the Court's modus

that I passed judgment on the

MR BARBER Well, a child of three can see that

But the—the difficulty we have is that we didn't

10 operandi

10 entry saying your objections are overruled or had the Court

11

11 or counsel sent us a copy of the February 11th judgment, we

THE COURT Well, that's because that's a

12 document, that is a document originating with the Court,

12 would have simply filed a Rule 59 motion or a notice of

13 the—the Court originally created that document

13 appeal That would have been simple

14

MR BARBER Sure And I can understand that

14

15

THE COURT Another—another scenario is when

15 are you, that I have some statutory or—or other authority

THE COURT But you're not taking the position,

16 documents are presented for my signature, especially when I

16 requiring me to do that, are you*?

17 know that I've reviewed objections, if m fact, the

17

18 judgment, for example, itself, does not contain a mailing

18 us notice when you rule on motions and I think that's your

MR BARBER NO NO I think you ought to give

19 certificate, I'm just suggesting this to you and I'm not

19 habit and I think that we relied on that habit and—and

20 making this as an excuse, but because of the volumes we deal

20 you're entitled to depend on counsel to give us notice of

21 w i t h -

21 the judgment Unfortunately, he can't do it either, if he

22

MR BARBER Oh, SUTC

22 doesn't know about it

23

THE COURT

23

that—that's an issue that can get

So, we're sitting out here in our offices not

24 by me, clearly

24 knowing, either of us, that the Court has ruled and so we

25

25 sit there and take no action for three months, well,

MR BARBER Sure

Page 18 I
1

THE COURT Because there is some reliance, when

Page 20
1 unfortunately, it was 89 days and then counsel finally gets

2 necessary, there's reliance upon counsel to provide that

2 together and finds out that the judgment's entered and he

3 type of notice

3 gave us notice of it immediately, by which time, the 60(b)

4

4 motion on the 28th of February judgment is almost passed,

MR BARBER Well, of course, and we have a rule

5 that requires that Rule 58(a) says that when a judgment's

5 the 60(b) period on the February 11th judgment has passed

6 entered, plaintiff s counsel is obligated—or the

6 and the statutory 30-day period for filing a notice of

7 defendant's counsel is obligated to notify us of it,

7 appeal has passed And so we are junsdictionaUy deprived

8 unfortunately—and—and we concede, though having argued and

8 of our right to appeal

9 prayed otherwise, that—that that does not delay the

9

Now, this business about implicit overruling, you

10 effectiveness of the judgment, that failure But what we do

10 know, when the Court, as I indicated, it didn't take much to

11 have is synergistic errors that contribute to the fact that

11 figure out you'd rejected those—those motions when you—

12 defendant—that plaintiff has been denied due process, in a

12 when you granted the judgment and would have no objection

13 sense because, number one, the Court didn't make a minute

13 about that if we had known that you had either rejected them

14 entry that it had ruled on the objections prior to entering

14 or entered the judgment, which we didn't But we don't

15 the February 11th judgment—

15 believe that—that a—merely signing that judgment is a—is

16

16 an implicit overruling of the order because, I think it's

THE COURT Because I—also let me note because I

17 thought that comparing the objections and the judgment was

17 the Morgan case that counsel has cited about that, okay, I'm

18 so blatantly obvious that I thought any reasonable person

18 sorry, it's Reagan, Reagan vs Bloundt

19 would construe that the objections had been overruled in

19

20 light of my sig—signing the judgment

20 footnote It's—and—and the Court of Appeals holds—it

21

21 says that a motion made prior to the entry of a judgment

MR BARBER Well, sure, and there's a case about

In that case, the matter is dealt with in a

22 that, your Honor, you know, and I guess we might as well

22 that is not disposed of either expressly or by necessary—

23 discuss it now It's that—

23 necessary impbcation by the judgment suspends a running of

24

24 the time for taking an appeal until the court disposes of

THE COURT I just didn't think it was—I didn't

25 think it was fairly debatable after I signed the judgment-
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The mere entry of a final judgment inconsistent

Page 23
1 plaintiffs proposed order under Rule 4-504-2 of the Code of

2 with but silent regarding a post-trial pre-judgment motion

2 Judicial Administration which provides that such objections

3 does not dispose of the motion by necessary implication

3 be submitted within five days after service of the proposed

4 unless the surrounding circumstances indicate that the trial

4 order. After the five-day period expired, the trial court

5 court considered and rejected the motion.

5 signed the plaintiffs proposed order without expressly

6

Now, I don't have any doubt that you considered

6 ruling on defendant's objections.
7

7 and rejected the motion, but I don't think that the

The objections were before the trial court;

8 circumstances that were available to counsel and I about the

8 therefore, we believe the court implicitly denied

9 fact that you had done that necessarily indicate that you

9 plaintiffs objections. In any event, the time for—of

10 did because we didn't know you'd entered the judgment. If

10 filing of a notice of appeal begins to run when the judgment

11 we had notice of the judgment, then we could have said,

11 is entered.

12 well, dollars to donuts, Judge Medley has rejected those—

12

13 those objections, but where we don't get the judgment, we

13 me, that—that because they were there and because you

14 have no way of knowing that.

14 considered they should be deemed impliedly to have been

15

15 overruled.

And so absent information that either of those

And that's essentially what the Court just said to

16 actions had been taken, we sat there and let critical time

16

There's a problem, however, with recitation of

17 periods under the rules expire and that's the problem. We

17 this case as authority for that. Number one, there is no

18 once again have a combination of circumstances. The Court's

18 description in that footnote or elsewhere in the case of the

19 action, of course, had you interlineated the action, he—or-

19 nature of the objections that were filed to the entry of the

20 -or the judgment to say—and then I would have expected you

20 judgment. And therefore, we cannot know whether that is—

21 to do, I've seen that lots of times. The Court will say,

21 was a—were objections that are just to the form of the

22 you know, based on the—the trial or the cause or the

22 judgment or otherwise or whether they were objections which,

23 hearing and good cause appearing and the court having

23 after filed—if filed after the judgment had been entered,

24 considered and rejected the objections thereto filed by the

24 would have been deemed Rule 52 or 59 motions.

25 plaintiff, judgment is entered as follows. That—that would

25

In this case, we are adamant that our—that the

Page 22

Page 24

1 have been normal and ordinary; but in this case, even that

1 nature of our objections were such as to challenge the

2 wouldn't have helped, your Honor, because we didn't get the

2 judgment of the Court and both the legal and factual

3 judgment and so I have no way to respond to it.

3 conclusions that were expressed by the entry of the

4

4 judgment.

The reason I think that this Reagan vs. Bloundt

5 case isn't dispositive of that implicit overruling issue is

5

6 that Reagan vs. Bloundt—I think this is the case, I read—

6 Court didn't include findings of fact or conclusions of law,

7 I've read the cite out of there and I don't think that's the
8 one I'm looking for. The one I'm looking for is in Morgan
9 vs. Morgan. And this is down in a footnote.
10

In that case, the trial court issued a minute

11 entry granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment,

And of course, we are also concerned that the

I 7 which we think are required as a precondition to an
8 effective judgment or certainly one that can be appealed.
9

But in—in the—based on the failure of the Morgan

10 vs. Morgan case, to give us facts that indicate that the
11 objections that that case was alluding to, were of the sort

12 dismissing both parties' claims and adjudicating plaintiff

12 that would otherwise have been dealt with as Rule 59 or 52

13 as the sole owner of the site. Defendant filed an objection

13 motions, makes the Court in—the case inapposite and it is

14 to plaintiff s proposed order to which plaintiff filed a

14 not authority for the proposition that the plaintiffs claim

15 response.

15 here.

16

16

Though the trial court did not express rule on

Your Honor, the—the—unfortunately, the issues

17 defendant's objection, it did sign plaintiff's proposed

17 are kind of complicated because you can seek to many kinds

18 order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff.

18 of relief, but the answer is clear to us and that is, that

19

In a—in a footnote, Footnote 1 to this statement

19 as a result of a—a series of circumstances, certainly the

20 of the facts, the court—the Court of Appeals says, As a

20 failure of notice under Rule 59(a), which we concede isn't

21 threshold matter, defendant argues that the summary judgment

21 the fault of the defendant's counsel, because he didn't know

22 was not a final order because her objection thereto were

22 about the judgment either; but the silence of the Court in

23 (sic) not expressly ruled upon. And in some measure, that's

23 advising counsel that things were happening that triggered

24 our argument here.

24 time demands of us under the rules of procedure, coupled

25

25 with the fact that he didn't know about it either and

Defendant submitted timely objections to
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1 therefore, couldn't do his duty under the rules, would make

1 Rule 59 motion? And Mr Barber's argument may be a bttle

2 it inappropriate for this Court to fail to grant a relief

2 bit different if the—if the facts were a little bit

3 which would give us an opportunity to file a timely notice

3 different None of the cases cited by Mr Barber deal with

4 of appeal

4 the situation where the plaintiff affirmatively disclaims

5

5 reliance on Rule 59 or 52 on the objection

As I indicated, there are a number of ways that

6 we—that that could be done We've suggested one of them

6

And the Court is correct in assuming and it's kind

7 The Court can elect others I think maybe the easiest way

7 of ironic that if it had been—if the Court had denied the

8 would simply be to say, yes, it is a Rule 59 motion, vis-a-

8 motion and that notice had been given to the plaintiff, the
9 plaintiff then would have turned around and probably filed

9 vis the February 11th judgment, the second judgment is
10 essentially surplusage and should be stricken and—and

10 another Rule 52 or 59 motion, which would not have been

11 therefore, no judgment should be deemed to have been entered

11 effective because he'd already done it once and the rule

12 for purposes of triggering our obligation to file a notice

12 doesn't allow him to do it twice, and he would have lost his

13 of appeal until now, when the Court, after having listened

13 right to appeal if he had done what he intended to do in the

14 to the arguments at this hearing, makes an order denying

14 first place

15 that motion and letting us know that it's done that

15

16

16 which distinguishes these other cases This isn't a

That's the optimum result as far as I can tell and

And so it's the factor of affirmative disclaimer

17 one of the varieties of that relief that we have sought, I

17 situation where you say, oh, I just miss-cited the rule or I

18 think would be appropriate to prevent what we bebeve would

18 put on the wrong caption You affirmatively disclaimed

19 be fundamentally unfair imposition upon the plaintiff here,

19 reliance on the rule that would give you the rebef from the

20 which would be deprive him of his right to appeal

20 judgment that's required

21

21

We think the case—the—the—you know, of course,

The second issue is, has the court ruled on the

22 any time you appeal, you don't think the court was

22 Rule 59 motion, if it were m fact a Rule 59 motion And

23 necessarily right m the judgment, but we think that there

23 the Court has indicated that it has in fact considered and

24 are close circumstances in this case that—that suggest

24 ruled upon that and that's a kind of unusual circumstance

25 that—that an appellate court would revisit those issues and

25 'cause in most of these cases which deal with denial by

!

Page 26

Page 28

1 we bebeve we really ought to have the opportunity to

1 necessary implication, it's the Court of Appeals who's

2 present them there

2 trying to look back and decide for itself, did the court

3

Court have other questions'?

3 actually rule on it? And here, the Court has said it has

4

THE COURT I don't, Mr Barber

4 done so

5

MR BARBER Thank you

5

6

MR HOGGARD Your Honor, the facts in this matter

7 are really not in dispute and have been fully described by

Although the necessary impbcation rule still is

6 applicable because in a sense, the plaintiff has to also
j 7 know that the Court ruled upon the motion and so you still

8 Mr Barber and based upon the comments of the Court, it does

8 look at the surrounding circumstances, did the surrounding

9 seem fairly clear that the Court had before it, the

9 circumstances indicate that the Court did have before it the

10 objections and the response and did in fact consider those

10 objections, did m fact rule and deny on those when it

11 objections and responses to the form of the order and denied

11 entered into the order And that's the test The mere

12 them and intended to deny them on the entry of the February

12 entry of the order doesn't necessarily by itself do that,

13 11th judgment, in which case, the subsequent judgment would

13 you have to look at the surrounding circumstances

14 be superfluous as ruled by Mr Barber

14

15

15 and said that's the general rule and that's the case that

The question is, does he have a right under Rule

Now, Mr Barber has cited the Reagan case to you

16 58, 59 or 60 to get relief from that judgment and the

16 ought to be followed The facts in that case are

17 primary issue that's been argued is the Rule 59 and that has

17 significantly different than this one In that case, a

18 two steps, the analysis, and he must satisfy both steps

18 judgment was entered and then the prevaibng party, a few

19

19 days later, submitted an amended judgment and order The

Step one, his objections must be considered to be

20 a Rule 59 motion If not, it doesn't toll the period of

20 losing party then filed an objection and the court signed

21 appeal

21 the amended judgment before any further briefing was

22

And then number two, that motion still must be

22 completed on the objection

23 pending, because if it's been resolved, he didn't file his

23

24 appeal within 30 days of the resolution of that motion

24 there's no evidence that the court was even aware of the—of

25

25 the proposed—of the objections, because the fibng of the

So, the first step is, was—was his objection a
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1 indicates the Court had the objections and the briefing on

1 objections and the filing of the order were done wholly

| 2 the objections before.

2 separated. It could have been just as easy that the
3 proposed order had gotten to the court but the filing of the

3

4 objections had not and there was no further briefing that

4 considered an unresolved Rule 59 motion, so the plaintiff

5 would have called that to the attention of the court.

5 must look at other avenues for relief, Rule 58 or Rule 60.

6

6

By contrast, the Morgan v. Morgan decision is very

So, under those circumstances, this cannot be

I

Now, the plaintiff has asserted Rule 58, but I

7 applicable because there, they do describe what was going

7 believe that in the reply and in this argument, they've

8 on. The court entered a minute entry granting summary

8 conceded that Rule 58(a) doesn't give them the relief they

9 judgment. The proposed order was prepared and submitted to

9 want because it doesn't affect the time for appeal.

10 the other side. The other side filed objections. The

10

11 prevailing party filed a response to the objections and it

11 plaintiff has conceded in its reply brief, twice, in fact,

12 was after all the briefing was done that the party—after

12 that the timing periods under Rule 60(b) had apparently

So that the issue has to be Rule 60; however, the

13 the response was filed, that the court went in and then

13 expired and that's why they were focusing on this new trial

14 signed the proposed order, which is exactly what happened

14 argument.

15 here.

15

16

And the court said, the appellate court, looking

For example, in the reply memo on Page 2, after

16 stating that they're seeking the equitable relief because

117 back, said, well, it's clear that since the response was

17 the entry of those judgments deprived him of his right under

18 before the court and the only way the proposed order got to

18 Rule 60 to move for relief from the judgments, on the last

19 the court is in connection with the objection process, that

19 line it says, By the time the notice of the judgments was

20 it is clear that it had it before it and that it was ruled

20 received on or about May 10th, 2000, the time limits

21 upon and disposed of.

21 contained in those provisions appear to have expired.

22

22

Mr. Barber tries to distinguish the case by

And then the same statement is made again on Page

23 arguing, well, we don't know if it—what the nature of the

23 4. During that intervening period, time constraints for

24 objections were. That's unimportant. Because the argument

24 seeking relief from the judgments under Rule 59 and 60 of

25 was that whatever the nature of the objections, they made

25 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and statutory rights to

Page 30
1 the order non-final, therefore, it tolled the period of
2 appeal. So, it was the type of objection that would have

Page 32,
1 appeal the judgments appear to have expired.
I2

And the issue of whether or not they got notice

3 rendered the order to be non-final, such as a Rule 52 or

3 under Rule 58 doesn't apply where there's a specific time

4 Rule 59, it doesn't matter what it was. All that's

4 limit such as the 90-day limit under Rule 60(b). It's not

5 important is that the circumstances must indicate that the

5 an equitable circumstance that allows the Court to ignore

6 court had notice of the motions and was in fact denying

6 the expiration of those time periods.

7 them.

7

8

And in this case, the facts were even stronger

9 than in Morgan, because the only way the Court got the

So, overall, it wasn't a Rule 59 motion. If it

8 was, the Court—clearly the circumstances should have
9 indicated to them that the Court, by signing the judgment,

10 proposed judgments was in connection with the briefing on

10 had denied the motion, and under Utah case law, the Morgan

11 the order, or on the objections. The first time a proposed

11 case, the appellate court looking back, even without the

12 judgment was sent—given to the Court was when it was

12 Court's statement here, would reach the same result because

13 attached to, as conceded here, attached to the response,

13 the proposed judgment came in connection with the briefing

14 proposed Kirby's response to the objections.

14 process on the—on the objections.

15

15

And the response said, Because the objections are

Next, the Rule 58(a) doesn't help them because the

16 ill-founded, the Court, as a consequence, should sign the

16 rule expressly says that doesn't affect the time for appeal.

17 order which is accompanying hereto. So, the order was

17 And they've disclaimed the timeliness of any Rule 60(b)

18 submitted to the Court only with the response to the

18 motion—60(b)(1), which is what this would have to be.

19 objections.

19

20

20 extent that Post, Kirby's counsel bears the responsibility,

And then the second order was submitted with the

This is an unfortunate circumstance and to the

21 express notice to submit for decision, which again said,

21 we apologize to the Court. There is some confusion, but the

22 since the issue's fully been briefed, here's the order, you

22 problem here is that the rules—they're saying, denied due

23 ought to sign it. So, the only way the Court got the order

23 process and there are two answers to that. Number one, in

24 was in connection with the briefing of the objections. And

24 the Lincoln Benefit case, cited by the—Post, Kirby in its

25 so the mere fact that the Court got the proposed judgment

25 brief, the court rejected that argument where, when they did
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1 get notice, the losing party did get notice of the entry of

1 claim that they do not need to file a Rule 59, they said it

2 judgment, if they still could have filed a timely Rule 60

2 wasn't a—a Rule 59. That the key is, if it's to occur, if

3 motion, their due process rights haven't been violated.

3 you have a pleading that challenges the underlying facts and

|

4

4 conclusions of law within ten days, it's a Rule 59 motion

|

5 that's why it was faxed and hand-delivered, the notice of

5 and it's a harsh motion on—on the plaintiffs in these—

|

6 judgment was faxed and hand-delivered to counsel, was to

6 these three cases.

7 give them whatever—give them the most time they could have

7

8 to file a Rule 60(b) motion, to give them their rights.

8 court, looking back, has to say on the record, looking at

9

And under their—they didn't get much time, but

And secondly, the fundamental issue cited in the

The court, looking back, the court, the appeals

9 the record, that the judge dealt with the—with the—with

10 cases relied upon by Mr. Barber, is that regardless of what

10 the motion. Now, we do not—we do not doubt that the judge

11 the court did, regardless of what Post, Kirby's counsel on

11 considered some—this; but I do not see how this Court can

12 giving notice, Mr. Barber himself has an independent duty to

12 (inaudible) when he goes before the appeals court, the

13 monitor the docket.

13 appeals court could look just based on the record, that you

14

14 actually did deal with that motion.

In the Reeves case, which was cited to the Court,

15 the Utah Court of Appeals stated, a party to a lawsuit is on

15

THE COURT: Believe me, I'm—I'm not going to make

16 constructive notice of the contents of the court record and

1 6 a decision on these issues exercising any mental gymnastics

17 has a duty to be aware of what the trial court does. In the

17 on what I expect the—the Court of Appeals to look back on,

18 instant case, although he had not yet received notice of

18 1 can assure you of that. I could care less, quite frankly,

119 entry of judgment, Steinfeld was chargeable with such

19 in that regard.

20 notice.

20

MR. MOQUIN: Yeah, well, and—and real—

21

THE COURT: And I don't mean that in any personal

21

In some sense, it's a harsh rule, but it's one

22 that protects the finality of the judgments and on that

22 way, I just—

23 basis, we believe that the motion ought to be denied.

23

MR. MOQUIN: Yeah.

24

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

24

THE COURT: -want you to know that that—

25

MR. MOQUIN: Your Honor, can we have just a

25

MR. MOQUIN: Yeah. Yeah.

Page;
1 minute?
2

MR. BARBER: Okay. Go ahead.

3

MR. MOQUIN: Your Honor, I think part of the

Page 36
I 1

THE COURT: -that that's not persuasive for

2 rulings, I'm not going to—
3

MR. MOQUIN: Right.

4 confusion is we're labeling, the difference is opposing

4

THE COURT: rm not going to engage in that type

5 counsel would like to say that this is a Rule 59. We've

5 of thought process.

6 never said that this was a Rule 59, in our reply, we said

6

7 that that wasn't a 59. We didn't say the reply wasn't a

7 defendant—

8 Rule 59, we said this was not a Rule 59.

8

9

9 could care—if—if every one of my cases were appealed, that

We firmly believe that this, under case law is the

MR. MOQUIN: Okay. But Reagan vs. Bloundt, the
THE COURT: And let me just make it clear. I

10 Rule 59 motion. Now, that motion—

10 would be just fine with me. I mean, I—

11

THE COURT: No, I—I'm not confused about that.

11

12

MR. MOQUIN: Okay. Now—now, when they tried to

12 because I believe that if—if we would have filed this, the

113 say it's important to the time line, when they tried to say

MR. MOQUIN: Well, my argument is for fairness,

13 issue would have been raised on whether there was an

14 that—they tried to say in their—their briefs, that this is

14 outstanding Rule 59 and whether that made our—our—our

15 a—that this dealt with our Rule 59 motion, we don't believe

15 appeal effective and I think a court looking back on the

16 that at all.

16 record would say, no, your appeal was not effective because

17

17 there's nothing in—under the circumstances to suggest that

If—if the Court dealt with our Rule 59 motion, it

18 would have had to deal with our Rule 59 motion right here.

18 it was considered, just looking at the record.

19 Now, if it dealt with our Rule 59 motion right here, we're

19

20 well—we're within then the 90 days for the Rule 60(b).

20 fact that it was briefed?

21

21

We think the reply memorandum is a Rule 59 motion

THE COURT: What about the fact-what about the
MR. MOQUIN: Well, that's—that's a question too,

22 as a matter of law, based on Reagan, Reeves and DeBry

22 because if it was a motion, a Rule 59 motion and—

23 because intent is not dispositive, not only is it

23

24 dispositive, we don't even think it's relevant. Both DeBry

24 statement right now when you say "if it were a 59"--

25 and—and—and Reeves—and—both DeBry and Steinfeld both

25
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1

THE COURT You're—you're talking about the

1 courts—

2 reply, aren't you?
3

Page 39
\ 2

MR MOQUIN The reply It was a 59 motion, then

3

MR MOQUIN Right

THE COURT

wherein a party has stepped forward

4 there shouldn't have been—if it was being treated like

4 and said to the trial court, your Honor, this is not a Rule

5 that, there should have been a response by—by opposing

5 59 motion

6 counsel and there would have been a reply by us and when you

6

MR MOQUIN Right But—but we did not—

7 look at Reagan vs Bloundt, it actually looked to see

7

THE COURT And then you come back—

8 whether there was a hearing on the motion There was no

8

MR MOQUIN

9

THE COURT

9 hearing on this motion
10

|

say that—

then you come back on the back side

10 and say, oh, now, your Honor, it is a Rule 59 I'm not sure

And the other—other circumstances that they

11 looked at surrounding—

11 the appellate court has had that case

12

12

THE COURT It's not because you didn't even treat

MR MOQUIN Okay But—but once again, I will

13 it as a 59(a) motion at that point in time

13 say that we never said it, that this was not a Rule 59 We

14

MR MOQUIN Well, not—

14 said, in our reply that was filed, what was filed here was

15

THE COURT You're just—you're arguing to me that

15 not a Rule 59

16 it should be treated in that manner as a matter of law, not

16

17 that you treated it that way

17 contain that language?

118

19

MR MOQUIN

18

Oh—

THE COURT That's why there—that's why there was

THE COURT Well, are you sure your reply doesn't
MR MOQUIN It—it contains the language of

19 saying that our proposed order, our January 28th objections
20 were not a Rule 59

20 no hearing—
21

MR MOQUIN Right

21

THE COURT Okay Go ahead

22

THE COURT

22

MR MOQUIN And I think that the—the other thing

23

MR MOQUIN Well—

23 that's very important here just because of the time bne,

24

THE COURT

24 if—I mean, you're saying, if I understand the Court

m that traditional sense—
because you didn't treat it that

25 correctly, that you addressed—you couldn't have addressed

25 way

_____
1

MR MOQUIN No, we did not, but neither did—

2

THE COURT It's not like I denied your request

3 for a hearing in that regard and—
4

MR MOQUIN No No, you did not, your Honor, but

5 I think that if you look at DeBry and Reeves, they also did

Page 40
1 ourreplyhere—
2
THE COURT That's correct
I 3

MR MOQUIN

and so if you addressed our reply,

4 you had to address our reply here
5

THE COURT Correct

MR MOQUIN SO—SO we just want to make sure that

6 not think it was a Rule 59, they also did not treat it as a

6

7 Rule 59, but the court said, as a matter of public policy,

7 we have a Rule 60(b) motion out here also and that Rule

8 as a matter of law, we are going to treat it as a Rule 59

8 60(b) motion, if this is the correct time limit, when you

9 If you file something ten days after questioning the
10 findings of fact, conclusions of law, you're going to have
Ml to live with the fact that this court is going to treat that

9 address our objections, our Rule 59 objections, then we are10 -we have filed within the 90 days our Rule 60(b) motion and
11 that has to be addressed by this court today

12 as a Rule 59, regardless of your intent

12

THE COURT I understand your theory

13

13

MR MOQUIN And I'd also like to object- address

Your intent is—basically, your intent is

14 irrelevant because we're going to treat this as a Rule 59

14 the 58(a) because we think it ties in to the 60(b), we think

15 And that (inaudible) says, we would have been held to that

15 they're—they're related and they tie in, in that they say

16 standard by the appeals court, I think that—that it is a

16 that 58(a) would not automatically give us a relief in that,

17 Rule 59 at that point, regardless of what we thought at the

17 that's true, but the failure to give the required notice is

18 time I don't think that's important because I don't think

18 an important fact here in determining—determining the

19 that the appeals court thinks that's important

19 timeliness of post-judgment proceedings where an exact time

20

I think that this is-it' s -

20 limit is not prescribed

21

THE COURT Well, we don't—well, I don't want to

21

And we say that on—on when you make the decision

22 get into an argument—

22 on 60(b), it's not a prescribed time period on when you

23

MR MOQUIN Okay

23 figure it was excusable neglect We think it's very

24

THE COURT

24 important whether we had notice in terms of the equities

with you, as I don't know if we have

25 the case in, or have had the case in front of our appellate
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1

Opposing counsel, by—by saying—asking this Court

Page 43
1 of that apple that you could conceivably possibly get. I

2 to consider our motion at this stage, at this stage they—

2 mean, that's the way this case—and I'm not being personally

3 when they filed their response, they said you should treat

3 critical—

|

4 this as a Rule 59 motion. That's going to create a

4

MR.MOQUIN: Right. Right.

I

5 situation where—where it doesn't surprise us that the Court

5

THE COURT: - s o please don't take it that way.

6 is going to—to think about this and maybe take months to

6

MR. MOQUIN: Right.

7 decide whether it is indeed a Rule 59 motion because there's

7

THE COURT: I'm just making what, to me, is an—

8 not a lot of case law out there.

8 appears to be an obvious observation.

9

9

So, that, in and of itself, led us to believe—and

MR. MOQUIN: Right.

10 not to—not to expect a—a quick decision because they were

10

THE COURT: And this is not the first time that

11 making essentially the motion for you to treat our—our

11 the lawyers have been in front of me under the guise of 4-5-

12 decision as a Rule 59 motion. I think the fact combined—

12 -504-2-

13 combined with having no notice and the fact that Mr.

13

MR. MOQUIN: Right.

14 Bennett's father was suffering from tongue cancer and he

14

THE COURT: -filing an objection—

15 had—he had other things on his mind at the time, all put

15

MR.MOQUIN: Right.

16 together, makes an equitable argument as to why a Rule 60(b)

16

THE COURT: -and trying to get—argue issues

17 motion is appropriate in the case at bar.

17 beyond what I think that rule calls for and then also try

18

THE COURT: All right.

18 and get the second bite of the apple by—

19

MR.MOQUiN: Thank you.

19

MR. MOQUIN: Right.

20

THE COURT: Just a moment.

20

THE COURT: -either subsequently calling it a

21

MR. BARBER: Read those two sentences.

21 5 9 -

22

MR.MOQUIN: Stand corrected. Okay.

22

MR. MOQUIN: Yeah, and that's—

23

Essentially, that's what I just said.

23

THE COURT: -motion or—or otherwise; but—

24

THE COURT: Okay. But re—go ahead and re—

24

MR. MOQUIN: Yeah. Unfortunately, there's no case

25

MR. MOQUIN: Okay. Plaintiff's notice of

25 law prohibiting that. I mean, I think perhaps a remedy for

Page 44

Page 42
1 objections to a minute entry and proposed order is not a

1 that is—is a motion to strike if you go beyond what the 4-

2 Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure motion. That's our

2 502—what the court thinks is an appropriate discussion

3 original—

3 under Rule 4-502, but there isn't any case law prohibiting

4

MR. BARBER: That's the reply.

4 an attorney from making that—

5

MR. MOQUIN: -minute—minute entry.

6

THE COURT: That's in the reply.

6 about denying your—your motion and—and signing the

7

MR. MOQUIN: This is in the reply (inaudible)

7 judgment and let you deal with the consequences of

8

THE COURT: Yeah, I mean—

8 practicing in that manner? How does that—

9

MR.MOQUIN: Yeah.

9

10

THE COURT: From a practical standpoint, I'm—I'm-

I 5

THE COURT: How about—how about denying—how

MR. MOQUIN: Well, it would be appropriate if we

10 had some knowledge that you had indeed done that. I mean, I

11 -it gives me heartburn that (inaudible)

11 don't think we would have objected if you said—and we were

12

12 waiting for that type of ruling and you—if you would have

MR. MOQUIN: No, okay, but it's based on the fact

13 that a Rule 59 motion requires a final decision and post-

13 said and put out a—a motion and given us a minute entry

14 judgment motion, which is our understanding at the point

14 that actually said we deny this because we believe it, you

15 when we filed that. And that Swenson & Associates,

15 know, for—for the very reasons that you've just stated

16 Architects P.C. vs. State of Utah, no final order has been

16 there and—and because you—we think you're—the Court

17 entered against the defendants, Michael Kirby or Post, Kirby

17 believes that you're trying to take two bites of the apple,

18 and no post-judgment motion filed. You know, that was our

18 then I think we would have appealed from that and—and

19 understanding at the time and obviously, it wasn't—

19 accepted—accepted that ruling for—for what it said.

20

20

THE COURT: Are you through?

21 first put the question to Mr. Barber. I mean, if I—I

21

Because—because you've raised issues outside of

22 indicated I wasn't sure how significant this issue is, but

22 what Mr. Barber argued, I'm going to give Mr. Hoggard a

23 the practical reality is, is that you were—

23 brief opportunity to respond and then because you're the

24

MR.MOQUIN: Right.

24 moving party, I'm going to give you a very, very brief

25

THE COURT: -utilizing 4-504-2 to get every bite

25 opportunity to say something in rebuttal if you want to do

THE COURT: And—and that's what I said when I
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1 that.

Page 47
1 it was a neglect in checking on the docket.

2

Go ahead.

2

Now, Post, Kirby did in fact, although we did it

3

MR. HOGGARD: Just one issue, your Honor.

3 late, we did in fact go check on the docket, independently,

4

MR. BARBER: What?

4 without notice from the Court, and we found the judgments,

5

MR. HOGGARD: On whether the reply hrief itself to

5 faxed and hand-delivered the notice of judgment when they

6 be a new motion. Under 4-501, if you file a motion, you

6 still had a day to file a~a~an abbreviated Rule 60 relief.

7 have to file an accompanying memorandum. Now, the reply

7 They didn't do so, they waited a month until they filed

8 memo, by itself, didn't have a motion and accompanying

8 their relief later on.

9 memorandum so it didn't even comply with the rules.
10

9

Moreover, it's designated as a reply memorandum,

And so it was that defect which satisfies the due

10 process considerations.

11 raises the same issues which are dealt with in the moving

11

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hoggard.

12 objections and so it is a reply memorandum, not a separate

12

Do you want to say anything, Mr. Barber, or other

13 order. And so I mean, this issue as—is this a separate

13 counsel, very briefly in rebuttal?

14 motion as apart from the original notice? That—that didn't

14

15 give us any notice, we would never have known to file

15 he makes about this—the integrated nature of the objections

MR. BARBER: Yeah. Your Honor, the argument that

16 additional responses, briefing to the reply memo. That

16 and so forth would all be well and good, I think, except for

17 would have been absurd.

17 the language that counsel just read to you.

18

18

And that's really the only issue I wanted to

When we say the only reason that thisreplyand

19 address, is that the rules do not allow this reply to be

19 that's what it's part of, is not a Rule 59 motion, is that

20 considered as a Rule 59 motion, independent of the original

20 there has been no judgment entered; but in fact, there had

21 notice of objections.

21 been a judgment entered and we didn't know it. So, implicit

22

THE COURT: Well, it's—well, nevermind.

22 in that very language that counsel relies on is a far

23

Don't we have case law—isn't counsel accurate,

23 stronger argument to the contrary and that is, that since

24 though, in identifying the fact that there is case law

24 there was a judgment entered, this pleading ought to be

25 specifically referencing not paying attention to captions

25 deemed to be a Rule 59 motion.

Page 46

Page 48

1 and getting to the underlying merits of what the—the moving

1

2 documents are—are—the relief that they are seeking, in

2 this: I think the Court has jurisdiction under Subsection

I don't think we have anything further except

3 fact? I mean, I understand your 4-501 argument, but—

3 (6) of Rule 60(b) to grant relief here.

4

MR. HOGGARD: That is absolutely clear, your

4

THE COURT: That's the catchall phrase.

5 Honor, that you look at the substance, but the moving papers

5

MR. BARBER: That's the catchall phrase, and—and

6 in this motion were the—was the notice itself. That's

6 I'm not a big fan of that provision, particularly when I'm

7 where the arguments were raised. This is a reply brief and

7 on the other side; but the circumstances in this case are

8 so when you're looking at the substance, you look at—the

8 truly unique. I've never seen anything in my 30 years and I

9 issue if whether the motion is the first filing or the
10 second filing. The motion is both of them, because you've

9 doubt the Court has. They're just a combination of
10 circumstances that create a fundamental unfairness.

And the Court could do that in a lot of ways, you
11 got the motion, the memorandum which was the notice and then 11
12 wouldn't even have to set aside the judgment, just rule that
12 you have the reply memorandum. And so you can't play fine
13 games by saying, well, the original papers were a motion but

13 they are effective as of today, now we've got our ten days.

14 the reply brief was a motion.

14 And I~I think that's all it takes, I think something like

15

15 that is what the Court ought to do.

And they try to do that because you—you—the

16 Court did in fact rule on the first moving papers and

16

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Barber.

17 objections and so they want to say the reply was a second

17

What I want to do on this motion anyway, is to set

IIS motion or a second issue and it's not a second moving paper.
19

THE COURT: Can you articulate in 60 seconds or

18 a time this week that we can have a telephone conference
19 call wherein I'll—I'll rule on this matter and I'd like to

20 less why under these circumstances, it's not fundamentally

20 do that—I'd like to do that, if it's possible, this Friday

21 unfair that they be denied their right to an appeal?

21 morning, if all of you are going—are available for a

22

22 telephone conference call and I could put the telephone

MR. HOGGARD: Yes. It was the last thing that I

23 mentioned to the Court, which is, under these rules, the

23 conference call on the record. (Inaudible)

24 plaintiff has an independent duty to monitor the docket and

24

25 has constructive notice. And so if there is a neglect here,

25 you about in just a moment.
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1

(Inaudible discussion between the Court and

MR. STEPHENS: That is correct. I checked the

2 docket, the last time we checked the docket, there is no

2 clerk.)
3

THE COURT: 8:15.

I

3 order entered on those submissions.

4

MR. BARBER: 8:15?

|

4

5

THE COURT: And I'm going to rely on—on one of

THE COURT: Okay. Now, here's my question. In

5 the—there is a reference to a—a—what I construe to be a

6 you to initiate the telephone conference call and my

6 letter objection; does that sound familiar?

7 preference in doing that—there are times when I have my

7

8 clerk do it, but my preference is that I'm concerned that we

8 an objection by letter to my order that I submitted to him

9 may have counsel from out of state and I don't want the—the

MR. STEPHENS: Yes, your Honor, Mr. Barber sent me

9 pursuant to the rules before I submitted this to the Court.

10 State of Utah to have the long distance. I know that sounds

10 1 submitted my response to the objection, attached his

11 weird, but I get a—I get a monthly telephone bill, I don't

11 letter objection, I thought, and then submitted a notice to

12 have to pay, from the State, but it puts me on notice, the

12 submit—

13 long distance usage of my telephone line and so I'm trying

13

14 to reduce that monthly obligation, so I'm going to rely on—

14 want to clarify before I render a decision on this matter,

15 who's going to take that responsibility?

15 is that that letter objection is the only objection on file;

16

16 is that correct?

MR. BARBER: I could do it, your Honor; but can

THE COURT: And that's to—and—and the point I

17 you give me the number that we should dial to get you?

17

MR. BARBER: To my knowledge.

18

18

THE COURT: Okay. Then I need—a copy of that was

THE COURT: That should be (801) 238-7503; is that

19 not attached to your proposed submission and I don't believe

119 right?
20

MR. BARBER: 238-7503?

20 there's one—I looked through the docket text and could not

21

THE COURT: U h huh.

21 find one on the file.

22

MR. BARBER: Okay. I'll do it.

22

MR. BARBER: It's—it is not copied to the Court.

23

THE COURT: A l l right.

23

THE COURT: Okay. So, in—in order to resolve

24

Now, there's one other issue I want to take care

24 that issue, I need to see—

25 of and keep in mind, I have not reviewed the full file, even

25

MR. BARBER: No, we're not going-

Page 50

Page 5 2

1 though I have taken a look at the docket text, but I have in

1

2 front of me a notice to submit and request for a ruling and

2 withdraw your objection, I111 sign—I'll sign the order

THE COURT: If you want to with—if you want to

3 an order of dismissal. The notice to submit is dated

3 and-

4 September 7th.

4

MR. BARBER: May I come forward?

5

5

THE COURT: Y o u may.

6 documents? If not, step forward and take a look at them. I

6

So, this is something I can—can—can file; is

7 believe that Mr. Stephens—

7 that correct?

8

MR. BARBER: Is that yours, Brent?

8

MR. STEPHENS: Y e s , your Honor.

9

MR. STEPHENS: Y e s .

9

THE COURT: Okay. A l l right. Then I'll take a

Are all of you familiar with these—these

10

THE COURT: - i s probably very familiar with them.

10 look at this and resolve it on Friday also.

11

MR. STEPHENS: l a m .

11

MR. BARBER: Thank you, your Honor.

12

THE COURT: Just—just take a look at them and

12

THE COURT: We're in recess.

13 tell me if you are familiar with them?

13

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

14

MR. BARBER. Yeah, I've—

14

15

(Inaudible)

15

16

THE COURT: Okay. Now, did—did you want to see

16

17 them?

***

17

18

MR.MOQUIN: N o . I did.

18

19

THE COURT: Okay.

19

20

MR. STEPHENS: He's seen them, that's fine.

20

21

THE COURT: And just—just so that we're clear on

21

22 this point and I'm not trying to be cute here at all; there-

22

23 -there is no signed order in this file as of yet regarding

23

24 the issues that are the subject of this proposed order. Is

24

25 that correct?
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James S. Jardine (1647A)
Rick B. Hoggard (5088A)
Arthur B. Berger (6490A)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
Attorneys for Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat,
Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID D. BENNETT
Plaintiff,
v.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH etai.,
Defendants.

RULE 54(b) JUDGMENT
ON ALL CLAIMS AGAINST
DEFENDANTS POST, KIRBY, NOONAN
& SWEAT, LLP, MICHAEL L. KIRBY
A.P.C., AND MICHAEL L. KIRBY
INDIVIDUALLY
Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Civil No. 940908220

The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan &
Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, came on for oral argument
before the Court on October 25, 1999. James S. Jardine and Rick B. Hoggard of Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker appeared on behalf of these defendants, R. Priya Seshachari of Taft Securities Litigation, P.C,
and James N. Barber appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Having considered the argument of counsel
and the memoranda and supporting material submitted by each party, the Court notified the parties by

1

Minute Entry dated January 7, 2000, that it had granted the motion to dismiss based upon all of the
analytical points and authorities set forth in defendants' memoranda.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT,
1.

The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Post, Kirby,

Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, is granted on all
claims asserted against them.
2.

All claims asserted against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L.

Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, in the Fourth Amended Complaint are dismissed
because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over those parties.
3.

The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay of entry of judgment on the claims

against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby,
individually, because the jurisdictional basis for dismissal of the claims against these defendants is
wholly separate from the substantive claims asserted against the other defendants, and from the issues
raised by the other defendants' pending motions to dismiss those claims.
4.

The Court directs entry of this Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure.

ir,

DATED this <*^ day of

>^

4*^ .

2000.

BY THE COURT

Tnird Judicial District

c;ffB-b1?flpDh:3o

E

SALT LAKE COUNTY

ey.
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Rick B. Hoggard (5088A)
Arthur B. Berger (6490A)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801)532-1500

Deputy Clerk
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before the Court on October 25, 1999. James S. Jardine and Rick B. Hoggard of Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker appeared on behalf of these defendants, R. Priya Seshachari of Taft Securities Litigation, P.C,
and James N. Barber appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Having considered the argument of counsel
and the memoranda and supporting material submitted by each party, the Court notified the parties by

1

Minute Entry dated January 7, 2000, that it had granted the motion to dismiss based upon all of the
analytical points and authorities set forth in defendants' memoranda.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT,
1.

The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Post, Kirby,

Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, is granted on all
claims asserted against them.
2.

All claims asserted against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L.

Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, in the Fourth Amended Complaint are dismissed
because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over those parties.
3.

The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay of entry of judgment on the claims

against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby,
individually, because the jurisdictional basis for dismissal of the claims against these defendants is
wholly separate from the substantive claims asserted against the other defendants, and from the issues
raised by the other defendants' pending motions to dismiss those claims.
4.

The Court directs entry of this Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure.
DATED this ^r_

day of

WlAT^^

, 2000.
BY THE COURT
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James N. Barber, Esq. (USBN #0198)
Fourth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6500
Telecopier: (801) 364-3406
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Priya Seshachari, Esq. (USBN #6329)
TAFT SECURITIES LITIGATION, P.C.
1200 Clay Street, Suite Nl5
San Francisco. California 94108
Telephone: (415)776-4900
Telecopier: (415)922-1832

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

DAVID D. BENNETT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

THE LAW FIRM OF POST, KIRBY,
NOONAN AND SWEAT, LLC; AND
MICHAEL L. KIRBY, APC and
INDIVIDUALLY,
Defendants and Appellees.
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DOCKETING STATEMENT

Utah Supreme Court No. 20000518-SC

Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, plaintiff-appellant David D.
Bennett, submits this Docketing Statement in support of his Notice of Appeal of a supposed final
decision in the underlying case David D. Bennett v. the Law Firm of Jones Waldo Holbrook &
McDonough: Christopher L. Burton; Sidney G. Baucom; James S. Lowry; and the Law Firm of
Post Kirby Noonan & Sweat, LLC; and Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C. and Individually, Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 94-0908220. See,
Attachment "A". Rule 9 requests the following information in the order presented:
1. Date of Entry of Judgment Appealed From:
The entry date of judgment sought to be reviewed is February 28, 2000.' See.
Attachment "D". A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 9, 2000. thirty days after plaintiffappellant received notice of that judgment from the prevailing party, the Law Firm of Post Kirby
Noonan & Sweat, LLC and Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C. and individually (collectively "Post
Kirby"). Rule 58(A)(d), Utah Rules Civil Procedure. See, Attachments "B" and U C'\
The lower court's February 28, 2000 judgment was not received by plaintiff-appellant
until May 10, 2000.2 Id. Through an apparent ministerial error of the clerk of court, notice of
that decision was never mailed out to the parties by the lower court. In addition, the prevailing
party, defendant-appellee Post Kirby, in violation of Rule 58(A)(d) of the Utah Rules Civil
Procedure, failed to notice plaintiff of the February 28th ruling until May 10th, some 3 months
later also due to lack of any notice given to the prevailing party. The prevailing party, however,

1

That February 28, 2000 ruling is identical to a February 11, 2000 decision. See, Attachment
"F".
2

The February 11, 2000 decision was also not received by plaintiff until May 10, 2000. See,
Attachments "B" and "C".
2

also did not receive notice of the February 28th (or identical February 11th, 2000) ruling until on
or around May 10th, 2000. See, Attachment UC".
2. Nature of Post Judgment Motions and Date Filed:
On February 16, 2000, plaintiff-appellant David D. Bennett filed a Reply of Plaintiff in
Support of his Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and Proposed Order (hereinafter referred
to as the "Reply") which challenged the substance and conclusions of the lower court's February
11, 2000 judgment (See, Attachment "E") - - even though that ruling was not known about or
received until May 10, 2000; by operation of law, that reply should be deemed a "Rule 59
motion \ U.R.Civ.P.3 See, DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah App.
1992) (holding that a motion filed within ten days of the entry of a judgment that questions the
courts findings and conclusions is a post-judgment motion under Rule 52(b) or 59(e)).
Confusingly, the February 11, 2000 judgment was later re-entered on February 28, 2000; but by
its terms, the February 28, 2000 ruling appears to not take into account plaintiff-appellant's
February 16, 2000 "Rule 59" challenges to the February 11th ruling.4 See, Attachments "D" and
"F".
3. Date and Effect of Order Disposing of Post Judgment Motion and Order of Determination of
Final Judgment Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54fbV.
Frankly, it is not clear whether the "Rule 59" motion filed in the form of a Reply on
February 16, 2000 was ever disposed of by the underlying court. If it were, that final judgment
might be the order dated February 28, 2000; if the reply were not yet decided upon, there would

3

Plaintiff-appellant has recently moved the lower court to consider those objections a Rule 59
motion and to make a decision on that motion; the motion also sought that court to strike the
February 28th ruling.
Plaintiff-appellant maintains that that "Rule 59" motion filed by him on February 16, 2000 in
the form of the Reply has yet to be decided upon by the lower court. See, footnote 3.
3

yet to be any final judgment on that motion. Plaintiff-appellant believes that no decision has yet
been made on that Rule 59 motion, yet files this appeal under the alternative possibility.
4. Date of Filing of Notice of Appeal:
A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 9, 2000, thirty (30) days after plaintiff-appellant
received a May 10. 2000 notice of that judgment from the prevailing party, the Law Firm of Post
Kirby Noonan & Sweat, LLC and Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C. and individually (collectively uPost
Kirby"). Rule 58(A)(d), Utah Rules Civil Procedure. See, Attachment "A".
5. Jurisdiction:
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure as an appeal as of right.
6. Name of Trial Court or Agency:
This appeal is from a final judgment entered by the Third District Court, County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, filed on February 28, 2000.
7. Statement of Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant herein, David D. Bennett, was the lead named plaintiff in a corporate
derivative and securities class action lawsuit filed solely by him in Utah federal court against
Gen-Probe, Inc., a California corporation, its directors as well as Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., the
company that acquired Gen-Probe, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Gen-Probe case"). See.
David D. Bennett, et aL v. Gen-Probe. Inc.. et al.. United States District Court for the District of
Utah, Central Division, 2:89-C-1074 G. In the legal representation of plaintiff-client David
Bennett, and others over time, a joint venture partnership was created between Utah counsel
involving the law firm Jones, Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough, and California counsel and
defendant-appellants herein, Post Kirby. Throughout the representation of client David Bennett,
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After Post Kirby were no longer David Bennett's lawyers, a malicious campaign was
waged against Mr. Bennett through attempts designed to prevent Mr. Bennett from filing a
lawsuit against them for breaches of fiduciary duties and legal malpractice, etc. in the State of
Utah though a wrongful injunction (labeled a "bar order") served upon David Bennett at his
home in this state. That injunction was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. Severe mental and emotional distress was suffered by David Bennett requiring medical
care and medication in the State of Utah.
8. Issue for Review and Standard of Review:
The issues presented are: 1) whether the defendant-appellant Post Kirby made
minimum contacts in the State of Utah to satisfy the lower court's imposition of jurisdiction
under the Utah Long Arm Statute of the Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-24; and 2) if
jurisdiction is found by this Court, whether the claims pleaded against Post Kirby and Mr. Kirby
by plaintiff-appellee David Bennett can be maintained in the courts of the State of Utah on due
process grounds. "Due Process requires us to consider: '(I) whether the cause of action arises
out of or has a substantial connection with the activity; (2) the balancing of the convenience of
the parties and the interests of the State in assuming jurisdiction; and (3) the character of the
defendant's activity within the State." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 393 Utah
Adv. Rep. 23, 25, (April 20, 2000), citing Brown v. Carnes Corp.. 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah
1980).
The standard of review on "an issue of jurisdiction is one of law as applied to the facts as
properly determined", therefor, the court is free to "grant no deference to the conclusions of the
trial court". SH MegDiamond Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430 (Utah
1998). See, Kadmar & Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991) ("If there are no
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material disputes in the documentary evidence, the appellate court reviews the matter de novo to
determine whether as a matter of law jurisdiction exists.")
9. Determination of Case by Supreme Court:
Under the Utah Long-Arm Statute, plaintiff-appellant David Bennett seeks a de novo
review as of right of the e\ idence presented to the lower court used to show that defendantappellee Post Kirby made sufficient prima facie minimum contacts in the State of Utah to allow
Mr. Bennett to maintain his lawsuit in the lower court as against that party through to a trial on
the merits.
10.

Determinative Law:
a). Utah Long Arm Statute of the Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-24.
b). Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1, and the Due

Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7.
c). Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin. 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25, (April 20,
2000).
d). Starwavs v. Curry, 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (May 18, 1999).
e). SH MegDiamond Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp.. 969 P.2d 430 (Utah 1998).
f). Neways. Inc. v. McCausland. 950 P.2d 420. 422 (Utah 1997) (stating that "'plaintiff is
only required to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction'" and that '"any disputes in
the documentary evidence are resolved in the plaintiffs favor"') (quoting Anderson v. American
Soc'v of Plastic Surgeons. 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990)).
g). Reeves v. Steinfeldt 915 P.2d 1073,1077 (Utah App. 1996) (The time for filing a
notice of appeal is tolled until the trial court denied the "Rule 59 motion" which asks the court to
alter its findings and to amend its conclusions.).
h). PeBrv v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 520, 522-523 (Utah App. 1992)
("Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion filed within ten days of the entry of judgment that
questions the correctness of the court's findings and conclusions is properly treated as a postjudgment motion under either Rules 52(b) or 59(e). The substance of a motion, and not its
caption, is controlling.").
i). Kadmar & Co. v. Larav Co.. Inc.. 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991).
j). Anderson v. American Soc'v of Plastic Surgeons. 807 P.2d 825. 827 (Utah 1990V
7

k). Brown v. Carries Corp., 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980).
1). Anderson v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214, 12151216 ("[A] judgment cannot stand unless there are findings which will justify it").
m). Shaffer v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186, 218, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2587 (1977) (Due process is
satisfied if defendant had "fair warning the [his activities] may subject [him] to the jurisdiction of
the foreign sovereign.*')
11.

Related Appeals:
There are no related appeals at this time.

12.

Attachments:
A. Notice of Appeal, filed June 9, 2000.
B. Notice of Entry of Judgment, filed May 10, 2000.
C. Affidavit of Rick B. Hoggard in Support of Post Kirby's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 60 Motion, filed June 6, 2000.
D. Order, entered February 28, 2000. (This order is identical to Order entered
February 11. 2000)
E. Reply of Plaintiff in Support of his Notice of Objections to A Minute Entry and
Proposed Order, filed February 16, 2000. [This "Reply" should be deemed a
"Rule 59" motion which has not clearly been ruled upon].
F. Order, entered February 11, 2000.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of July, 2000

J^mes N. Barber
lite 100, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6500
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79 South Main Street
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Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

DAVID D. BENNETT

APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Docket No. 20000518-SC

THE LAW FIRM OF POST, KIRBY,
NOONAN AND SWEAT, LLC; AND
MICHAEL L. KIRBY, APC and
INDIVIDUALLY

Subject to Assignment to the Court of
Appeals

Defendants and Appellees.

Pursuant to Rule 10(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees Post
Kirby, Noonan and Sweat, LLC, Michael L. Kirby, and Michael L. Kirby APC (collectively
"Post Kirby") move for summary dismissal on the basis that this Court lacks jurisdiction on this
appeal.
On June 9, 2000, Appellant David D. Bennett ("Bennett") filed a notice of appeal from a
judgment entered either February 11, 2000, or February 28, 2000. Prior to that notice, Bennett

had filed what he contends was a Rule 59 motion. That motion is either still pending before the
district court, or was disposed of by the district court upon entry of the February 28, 2000
judgment.
If Bennett's motion was in fact a Rule 59 (or similar) motion, on which the district court
has yet to rule, then Bennett's notice of appeal would be premature and of no effect. Utah
R.App.P. 4(b) ("A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall
have no effect").
If Bennett's motion was not a Rule 59 (or similar) motion, or has already been disposed
of by the district court, then Bennett's notice of appeal would be untimely because it was filed
more than thirty days after the entry of the appealed judgment or the disposition of that motion.
Utah R.App.P. 4(a).
Under either theory, Bennett's notice of appeal is of no effect. Consequently, his appeal
must be dismissed.
DATED this 18th day of July, 2000.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

James S. Jardine
Rick B Hoggard

LJ

Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees

Certificate of Service
I, Rick B Hoggard, certify that on the 18th day of July, 2000,1 served a copy of the
foregoing motion upon the following counsel for appellant in this matter by mailing it to them by
first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses:
James N. Barber
Bank One Tower, Fourth Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Priya Seshachari
Taft Securities Litigation, P.C.
1200 Clay Street, Suite N15
San Francisco, California 94108
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James S. Jardine (A 1647)
Rick B Hoggard (A5088)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

DAVID D. BENNETT
Plaintiff and Appellant,

APPELLEES' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

v.
Docket No. 20000518-SC
THE LAW FIRM OF POST, KIRBY,
NOONAN AND SWEAT, LLC; AND
MICHAEL L. KIRBY, APC and
INDIVIDUALLY

Subject to Assignment to the Court of
Appeals

Defendants and Appellees.

Pursuant to Rule 10(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees
Post Kirby, Noonan and Sweat, LLC, Michael L. Kirby, and Michael L. Kirby A.P.C.
(collectively "Post Kirby") respectfully submit this memorandum in support of their
motion for summary dismissal of this appeal.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 9, 2000, Appellant David D. Bennett ("Bennett") filed a notice of
appeal from a judgment entered either February 11, 2000, or February 28, 2000 (the
"February 11th judgment" and "February 28th judgment" respectively). Prior to that
notice, Bennett had filed what he contends was a Rule 59 motion, but that motion either
is still pending before the district court or was disposed of by the Court by necessary
implication upon the entry of the February 28th judgment.
If Bennett's motion was in fact a Rule 59 (or similar) motion, on which the
district court has not yet ruled, then Bennett's notice of appeal would be premature and
of no effect. Utah R.App.P. 4(b) ("A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of
any of the above motions shall have no effect"). If Bennett's motion was not a Rule 59
(or similar) motion, or if the district court rejected that motion by entry of its February
28th judgment, then Bennett's notice of appeal would be untimely because it was filed
more than thirty days after the entry of the appealed judgment. Utah R.App.P. 4(a).
Under either theory, Bennett's notice of appeal is of no effect. Consequently, Bennett's
appeal must be dismissed.

1

STATEMENT OF FACT
1.

On January 7, 2000, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley issued a minute

entry granting Post Kirby's motion to dismiss Bennett's complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. (See Exhibit A.)
2.

Pursuant to the direction of the district court and Rule 4-504 of the Utah

Code of Judicial Administration, Post Kirby prepared and served on Bennett a proposed
Rule 54(b) Judgment on all Claims Against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat,
LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby Individually.1
3.

On January 28, 2000, Bennett filed his Notice of Plaintiffs Objections to

a Minute Entry and Proposed Order. (See Exhibit B.)
4.

On February 7, 2000, Post Kirby filed their Response to Bennett's Notice

of Objections to a Minute Entry and Proposed Order, together with a courtesy copy of
the proposed judgment. (See Exhibit C.)
5.

On February 11, 2000, the district court signed and entered the proposed

judgment, but no notice of entry was provided to either party. (See Exhibit D.)

1

The proposed judgment included a Rule 54(b) certification because Bennett had also
asserted various claims against a Utah law firm, Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough ("Jones Waldo"). The district court dismissed Bennett's claims against
Jones Waldo on non-jurisdictional grounds by Minute Entry dated February 11, 2000.
That ruling has yet to be memorialized by any judgment.
2

6.

On February 16, 2000, Bennett filed a "Reply of Plaintiff in Support of

his Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and Proposed Order. (See Exhibit E.) In
that reply, Bennett expressly argued that his "Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry
and Proposed Order is not a Rule 59, U.R.Civ.P. motion." (IcL at 4.)
7.

On February 17, 2000, Post Kirby filed a Notice to Submit for Signature

the Proposed Rule 54(b) Judgment on all Claims Against Defendants Post, Kirby,
Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby Individually,
which expressly referenced Bennett's objections and provided another courtesy copy of
the proposed judgment. (See Exhibit F.)
8.

On February 28, 2000, the district court again signed and entered the

proposed judgment, but no notice of entry was provided to either party. (See Exhibit
G.)
9.

On May 9, 2000, counsel for Post Kirby inquired of Judge Medley's clerk

as to the status of the case, and was informed that judgments had been entered on
February 11th and 28th. Copies of those judgments were obtained by Post Kirby, and a
Notice of Entry of Judgment was filed by Post Kirby on May 10, 2000. (See Exhibit
H.) The notice and copies of the judgments were hand-delivered and faxed to Bennett's
counsel in Utah and California, respectively, at around noon on May 10th.
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10.

On May 26,2000, Bennett filed a Motion to the Court under Rule 60 to

Strike a February [28], 2000 Ruling; and to Decide upon a Timely Filed Rule 59
Motion. (See Exhibit I.) Bennett argued that the February 11th judgment was the
operative judgment, but that his objection to the proposed judgment (in particular his
reply brief) was a Rule 59 motion upon which the Court had yet to rule.
11.

On June 6, 2000, Post Kirby opposed Bennett's motion and filed an

affidavit explaining the circumstances surrounding their filing of the notice of entry of
judgment. (See Exhibit J.) Post Kirby argued that Bennett's objection was not a
motion for new trial under Rule 59 and, in any event, the district court's reentry of the
judgment after the completion of briefing disposed of those objections by necessary
implication.
12.

On June 9, 2000, Bennett filed a Notice of Appeal of Final Order.

Bennett's notice stated that he was appealing from the February 28th judgment, and that
the appeal was timely because the "appeal falls within 30 days of the notice date."
13.

On June 23, 2000, Bennett filed a Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Motion

to the Court under Rule 60 to Strike a February [28], 2000 Ruling; and to Decide upon
a Timely Filed Rule 59 Motion. (See Exhibit K.) On that same date, Bennett filed a
Notice to Submit for Decision. (See Exhibit L.)
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14.

The district court has not yet ruled on Bennett's May 26th motion. (See

Exhibit M.)
15.

On July 6, 2000, Bennett filed a Docketing Statement in this appeal. In

particular, Bennett stated:
The entry date of judgment sought to be reviewed is February 28, 2000.
A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 9, 2000, thirty days after plaintiffappellant received notice of that judgment from the prevailing party . . . . Rule
58(A)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Docketing Statement at 2 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).) In addition, Bennett
stated:
Frankly, it is not clear whether the "Rule 59" motion filed in the form of
a Reply on February 16, 2000 was ever disposed of by the underlying court. If
it were, that final judgment might be the order dated February 28, 2000; if the
reply were not yet decided upon, there would yet to be any final judgment on
that motion. Plaintiff-appellant believes that no decision has yet been made on
that Rule 59 motion, yet files this appeal under the alternative possibility.
(IdL at 3-4.)
ARGUMENT
Under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Bennett's notice of
appeal must be "filed . . . within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from."" Utah R.App.P. 4(a). If, however, Bennett had timely filed a
motion under Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, then "the
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time for appeal" would "run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion." Utah R.App.P. 4(b).
Inasmuch as Bennett's notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the
entry of judgment, the timeliness of Bennett's notice of appeal depends on the status of
any motions under Rule 50, 52 or 59. As articulated by the parties in connection with
Bennett's pending May 26th motion, this case is in one of two postures: either
(1)

There is no currently unresolved, timely-filed Rule 59 motion,

either because Bennett's objection to the proposed form of judgment was not a
motion under Rule 59, or if the objection was a Rule 59 motion, then such
motion was necessarily disposed of by the district court no later than upon its
entry of the February 28th judgment, or
(2)

There is a currently pending, but undecided, timely Rule 59 motion

because Bennett's objection to the proposed form of judgment was in fact a
motion under Rule 59, but the district court has not yet disposed of that motion.
Under either scenario, Bennett's current notice of appeal is untimely.
A.

If There is No Unresolved Rule 59 Motion, Then Bennett's Notice of
Appeal Is Late.

Under the first scenario, either no timely under Rule 59 had been filed, or any
such motion was disposed of no later than by the district court's entry of the February

6

28th judgment. In either case, Bennett's notice of appeal would have had to have been
filed no more than 30 days after the entry of judgment (whether the February 11th or
February 28th judgment) and/or the district court's denial of his "Rule 59" motion (i.e.,
the February 28th judgment). Consequently, his appeal would have been untimely no
later than thirty days after February 28th. Utah R.App.P. 4.
Bennett suggests that the 30-day appeal period starts from the date of "notice" of
entry of judgment. (Notice of Appeal at 1-2; Docketing Statement at 2-3.) That
suggestion, however, is frivolous because Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure expressly states that the "time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by
the requirement of this provision." Utah R.Civ.P. 58A(d); see also Lincoln Ben. Life
Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Prop., 838 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Under
Utah law, Bennett cannot excuse his failure to timely file a notice of appeal due to Post
Kirby's allegedly failure to comply with Rule 58A2 because he had an independent
obligation to monitor the docket to determine the date of entry of the judgment. See
West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997); Reeves v. Stinfeldt, 915 P.2d
1073, 1077 n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
2

Non-compliance with Rule 58A may be a factor relevant to a request for relief from a
judgment under Rule 60(b). See Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749,
751 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, any Rule 60 request for relief should be first
directed to the district court.
7

B.

If There is a Pending Rule 59 Motion, Then Bennett's Appeal is
Premature.

Under the second scenario, Bennett's "Rule 59" motion has yet to be decided. If
that were the case (which Post Kirby denies), then Bennett's notice of appeal would
clearly be premature. Under Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a
"notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions [including a
Rule 59 motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment] shall have no effect.
A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the
future entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above."
Utah R.App.P. 4(b).
Thus, Bennett's current notice of appeal is untimely because there has been no
ruling within thirty days of that notice which could have given rise to an appeal.
Although Post Kirby contends that Bennett has already lost his right to appeal, the only
arguably remaining basis for appeal would have to arise out of or be related to the
district court's future disposition of the pending May 26th motion.3

3

Ironically, Bennett's filing of his notice of appeal may inhibit the district court from
ruling on the May 26th motion. See, e j ^ , 20 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal
Practice, § 303.32[1] - [2] at 303-71 to -74 (3d ed. 2000) (notice of appeal divests
district court of jurisdiction to reexamine or supplement order or judgment from which
the appeal is pending.)

8

CONCLUSION
Regardless of the district court's resolution of Bennett's pending May 26th
motion, Bennett's current notice of appeal is untimely. Whether his notice was
premature or tardy (which depends on the district court's raling), it is clear that the
notice is not timely. Thus, Bennett's appeal must be dismissed.
DATED this 18th day of July, 2000.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

James S. Jardine
Rick B Hoggard
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees
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the foregoing Appellee's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary
Disposition upon the following counsel for appellant in this matter by mailing it to them
by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses:
James N. Barber
Bank One Tower, Fourth Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Priya Seshachari
Taft Securities Litigation, P.C.
1200 Clay Street, Suite N15
San Francisco, California 94108

k-Ay>A uV^JC
543929

10

h> JCpt^O-

Tab 9

*m

WUJNNE

JUL 2 7 2000
& NESEJCEft

SOCKET
CONTRQ}
James N. Barber, Esq. (USBN #0198)
Fourth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6500
Telecopier: (801) 364-3406
R. Priya Seshachari, Esq. (USBN #6329)
TAFT SECURITIES LITIGATION, P.C.
1200 Clay Street, Suite 15
San Francisco, California 94108
Telephone: (415)776-4900
Telecopier: (415) 922-1832
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

DAVID D. BENNETT,
Plaintiff,

*
*

MOTION TO REMAND AND
VACATE BRIEFING SCHEDULE

vs.

THE LAW FIRM OF POST, KIRBY,
NOONAN & SWEET, L.L.C.; and
MICHAEL L. KIRBY, A.P.C. and
Individually.
Defendants.

[Hearing Requested]
*
*

Utah Supreme Court No. 20000518-SC

COMES NOW plaintiff-appellant David D. Bennett, through counsel James N.
Barber and R. Priya Seshachari, and pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure moves this High Court to remand the jurisdiction of this case back to the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah for the purpose of allowing that lower
court the jurisdiction to decide an outstanding motion relevant to this appeal. That finding is
necessary to clarify some issues now confusing this appeal. Pending that decision by the
trial court, plaintiff-appellant moves for vacation of the current briefing schedule.
DATED this ^S^iscy

of July 2000.

J^

/James N. 'Barber
Attorney for Plaintiff David D. Bennett
Plaintiff David D. Bennett
1189 South 2100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
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I hereby certify that on this

of July, 2000,

I caused to be sent, through the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing:

MOTION TO REMAND AND
VACATE BRIEFING
SCHEDULE
addressed to the following:
James Jardine, Esq.
Rick Hoggard, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

R. Brent Stephens, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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James N. Barber, Esq. (USBN #0198)
Fourth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6500
Telecopier: (801) 364-3406

& NEBEft;

R. Priya Seshachari, Esq. (USBN #6329)
TAFT SECURITIES LITIGATION, P.C.
1200 Clay Street, Suite 15
San Francisco, California 94108
Telephone: (415) 776-4900
Telecopier: (415)922-1832

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

DAVID D. BENNETT,
*
*
*
*

Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO REMAND AND
VACATE BRIEFING SCHEDULE

*

THE LAW FIRM OF POST, KIRBY,
NOONAN & SWEET, L.L.C.; and
MICHAEL L. KIRBY, A.P.C. and
Individually,

*
*
*
*

[Hearing Requested]
Utah Supreme Court No. 20000518-SC

*

Defendants.

*

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, plaintiff-appellant
David D. Bennett, through counsel James N. Barber and R. Priya Seshachari, files this
memorandum in support of an accompanying Motion to Remand and Vacate Briefing
Schedule.
L RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff-appellant seeks an order remanding this case back to the Third District Court

for Salt Lake County, State of Utah because the District Court has not yet ruled upon
plaintiff-appellant's "Reply of Plaintiff In Support of His Notice of Objections to a Minute
Entry and Proposed Order" which was filed on February 16, 2000 (within five days of the
entry of the February 11, 2000 judgment) and which must, on the basis of DeBrv v. Fidelity
National Title Insurance Company, 828 P.2d 250, 523 (Utah App. 1992) must be treated as a
motion for new trial under Rule 59(a), or a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule
59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, either of which would have the effect of staying the
effective date of the identical judgments entered by the Court on February 11 and February
28, 2000 so as to preserve plaintiff-appellant's right to appeal those judgments.
As a result of the District Court's failure to rule on this pending motion, the record on
appeal incomplete. The Court should therefore vacate the current briefing schedule until the
District Court has ruled on this critical motion.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On January 7, 2000 the District Court filed a minute entry indicating its intention

to entry a judgment of dismissal of all claims against the Post Kirby defendants for lack of
jurisdiction. Notice of this minute entry was transmitted by the Court to all parties to the
action.
2.

On January 28, 2000 plaintiff-appellant filed a "Notice of Plaintiffs Objections to

Minute Entry and Proposed Order" in which he set forth his arguments that the minute entry
was contrary to both the facts and the applicable law. The District Court has never filed an
order or minute entry disposing of this notice of objection.
3.

On February 8, 2000, the Post Kirby defendants filed their response to plaintiffs

January 28, 2000 Notice of Objection. The District Court has never ruled on this Response.
4. Rather than ruling on the pending pleadings, the District Court entered Judgment
dismissing the Post Kirby defendants from the action for lack of jurisdiction on February 11,
2000. No notice of the entry of this Judgment was provided to any of the parties to the
action.
- 2 -

4.

Because plaintiff-appellant was not advised that judgment had been entered, he

filed a "Reply of Plaintiff In Support of his Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and
Proposed Order" on February 16, 2000. The District Court has never directly ruled on this
Reply.
5.

For some reason which does not appear of record, the Court then entered a second

judgment on February 28, 2000 which is identical to the judgment entered on February 11,
2000, dismissing the Post Kirby defendants from the action. The Court failed to provide any
notice of entry of this second judgment to any of the parties to the action and, once again,
entered the same without ruling on the pending notice of objection to the January 7, 2000
minute entry.
6.

On May 26, 2000 plaintiff filed a "Motion to Strike a February 28, 2000 Ruling

and to Decide a Timely Rule 59 Motion" with a supporting memorandum of authorities.
Responsive pleadings were filed by the Post Kirby defendants on June 7, 2000, and plaintiffappellant filed a Reply in support of his May 26 motion on June 23, 2000. The District
Court has yet to rule on any of these pleadings.
7.

On June 23, 2000, plaintiff-appellant filed a Notice to Submit his May 26,2000

"Motion to the Court Under Rule 60 to Strike A February 28th, 2000 Ruling and to Decide a
Timely Rule 59 Motion" and requested a hearing thereon.
III. ARGUMENT
POINT 1: Plaintiff-Appellant Moves this Court to Remand this Appeal Back to the
Lower Court to Allow a Decision by that Court on a Pending Motion Relevant to the
Jurisdiction and Substance of this Appeal; Pending that Ruling, this Court's Briefing
Schedule Should be Vacated
Plaintiff-appellant moves this Highest Court to remand the above-captioned case back
to the lower Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah; a motion by plaintiffappellant remains as yet undecided before that trial court with jurisdictional and substantive

- 3 -

issues relevant to this appeal.
Divestiture of this Court's appellate jurisdiction is required. In White v. State of
Utah, 795 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1990), this Court stated:
The general rule has therefore been that an appeal divests the trial court of
jurisdiction and transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court, where it remains
until the appellate proceeding terminates and the trial court regains
jurisdiction.
As such, the trial court cannot finally decide the motion before it until remand is effective and
the jurisdiction of the case is back with the lower court.
In the motion filed with the lower court, plaintiff-appellant prays for that court to sort
out the confusion that still plagues the underlying case and thereby this appeal. The
confusion includes a failure of due process notice of a "final" order to the plaintiff-appellant
for almost three months; the status of a filing sought to be deemed a Rule 59 motion under
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; a decision upon that Rule 59 motion; and the status of
two identical judgments. See, Statement of Facts, above.
Until that confusion is sorted out, plaintiff-appellant moves this Court to vacate the
current briefing schedule. Judicial resources would be conserved by permitting the lower
court to decide the issues.

- 4 -

IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-appellant moves this High Court to remand this case back to the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County to allow that court to rule on an outstanding motion.
Relevant issues concerning the jurisdiction of this Court as well as the substantive issues on
appeal are yet to be decided. Pending that decision by the lower court, plaintiff-appellant
asks this Court to remand and vacate the current briefing schedule.
DATED this 25th day of July 2000.

Janies N. Barber
Attorney for Plaintiff David D. Bennett
Plaintiff David D. Bennett
1189 South 2100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
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day of July, 2000,

I caused to be sent, through the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing:
MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO REMAND AND
VACATE BRIEFING
SCHEDULE
addressed to the following:
James Jardine, Esq.
Rick Hoggard, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

R. Brent Stephens, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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James S. Jardine (A 1647)
Rick B Hoggard (A5088)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

DAVID D. BENNETT
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
THE LAW FIRM OF POST, KIRBY,
NOONAN AND SWEAT, LLC; AND
MICHAEL L. KIRBY, APC and
INDIVIDUALLY

APPELLEES' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND/OR
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO REMAND AND VACATE BRIEFING
SCHEDULE
Docket No. 20000518-SC
Subject to Assignment to the Court of
Appeals

Defendants and Appellees.
Appellees Post Kirby, Noonan and Sweat, LLC, Michael L. Kirby, and Michael L. Kirby
APC (collectively "Post ICirby") respectfully file this reply memorandum in support of their
motion for summary disposition and/or response to Appellant's motion to remand and vacate
briefing schedule.
On July 18,2000, Post Kirby filed a motion for summary disposition in this appeal. Post
Kirby argued that if Appellant had filed a Rule 59 (or similar) motion in January/February 2000,

on which the district court has yet to rule, then Appellant's notice of appeal would be premature
and of no effect. Alternatively, if the district court had ruled on that motion (by necessary
implication in February 2000), or if no such motion had been timely filed, then Appellant's
notice of appeal would be too late.1 Thus, regardless of any confusion at the district court level,
this current appeal is untimely and improper.
Rather than directly responding to Post Kirby's motion for summary disposition,
Appellant filed a motion to remand and vacate briefing schedule on July 25, 2000.2 Appellant
argues that this Court must "remand" this case so that the district court may "sort out the
confusion that still plagues the underlying case." Appellant recognizes that the district court is
divested of jurisdiction "until the [pending] appellate proceeding terminates and the trial court
regains jurisdiction." (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand and Vacate Briefing Schedule at 2
(quoting White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1990).) It is not clear from Appellant's
motion whether Appellant agrees that dismissal of the current appeal is the proper method of
terminating this appellate proceeding.
For the reasons set forth in Post Kirby's motion for summary disposition, and the
authorities set forth by Appellant in its motion to remand, this Court must dismiss or terminate

1

As noted previously, Appellant also filed a motion in May 2000, which motion is still pending before the district
court. That motion has no effect on the issues presently before this Court. The May motion was not "a timely
motion" under Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 59, which would independently toll the time for appeal. Utah R.App.P. 4(b).
Consequently, the timeliness of the current appeal depends solely upon the characterization and resolution of the
January/February motion. Any appeal arising out of the resolution of the May motion must await the district court's
future disposition of that motion.
2

No other timely response to Post Kirby's motion for summary disposition was filed by Appellant.

the pending appeal as untimely, so as to remand the case to the district court for resolution of any
pending motions.
DATED this 4th day of August, 2000.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

James S. Jardine
Rick B Hoggard

U

Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees

Certificate of Service
I, Rick B Hoggard, certify that on the 4th day of August, 2000,1 served a copy of the.
foregoing motion upon the following counsel for appellant in this matter by mailing it to them by
first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses:
James N. Barber
Bank One Tower, Fourth Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Priya Seshachari
Taft Securities Litigation, P.C.
1200 Clay Street, Suite N15
San Francisco, California 94108
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY

1

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PROCEEDINGS

2

-0O0-

3

DAVID BENNETT,

THE COURT: The record should reflect that this is

4 Case No. 940908220.
Plaintiff,

)

Case No. 940908220

5

Let's start by having counsel identify themselves

MOTION

6 for the record.
(Videotape Proceedings)

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK fc
M C D O N O U G H , et

7

ai.,

MR. MOQUIN: Daniel Moquin representing the

8 plaintiff, David Bennett.

Defendants.

9

-0O0-

10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st day of

MR. BARBER: James Barber for the plaintiff.
MR. HOGGARD: Rick Hoggard representing Post,

February 2001, commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the

11 Kirby.

above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the

12

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

HONORABLE TYRONE E- MEDLEY, sitting as Judge in the

13

Let's start with some procedural issues first.

above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that

14 This matter is set on the calendar for oral argument this

the following videotape proceedings were had.

15 morning and based upon my review of the history of this
16 case, Mr. Moquin, I address this issue to you first, it

-oOo-

17 appears to me that at this point, this Court has yet to sign

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

JAMES N. BARBER
Attorney at Law
50 West Broadway, #100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
DANIEL G. MOQUIN
Attorney at Law
443 East 2400 South
South Salt Lake, Utah

18 an order resulting from this Court's, I believe it's the
19 October 6th ruling of this Court wherein, by way of
20 telephone—telephone conference call on the record, I
21 rendered a decision.

84115

22

Since that date, I've noticed that what's been

23 filed are a notice of objections to that ruling and a
24 proposed order; there is a notice of the Utah Supreme Court
25 ruling purportedly contrary to this Court's October 6th

Page 385
Page 4
A P P E A R A N C E S (Continuing)
1 ruling; there's a—a request for a status conference looks
2 like filed on November 1st; a second request for status

For the Defendants:
RICK B. HOGGARD
Attorney at LawRay, Quinney & Nebeker
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-

3 conference, looks like it was filed on November 15th; and
4 there's also a motion filed by you, I believe, that-5 requesting that this Court act pursuant to order of the Utah
6 Supreme Court.
7

Those are the motions that I believe are the

8 subject of this morning's hearing. Do you agree or disagree
9 with that?
10

MR. MOQUIN: i agree with that, your Honor,

11 although I believe we considered the tele-conference
12 satisfied our requirement for a status conference and this
13 hearing is—is based on the October 25th hearing.
14

THE COURT: rm not—I'm not sure I caught that.

15 What satisfied the request for—
16

MR. MOQUIN: Well, when you had the tele-

17 conference—
18

THE COURT-. Okay.

19

MR. MOQUIN: -scheduling this hearing today,

20 because the status conference was after the decision was
21 made by the Utah Supreme Court and we thought that before wi
22 could proceed finalizing the order with Mr. Hoggard, that
23 this issue would have to be addressed first and what—what
24 affect the Utah Supreme Court's decision had on your order.
25

AI™ P smith rsT* rxon 266-0320

THE COURT: Mr. Hoggard, do you disagree that

Page 1 - Page l

Page 5
1 statement?

1 those are the matters before the Court this morning.
2

MR.HOGGARD: No, that's correct, your Honor. The
T

Page 7

1

2

MR.MOQUIN: That's true and--

THE COURT: And—and setting aside your advocacy I
| 3
4 role for a moment—

3 main issue is what s the effect of the Supreme Court s
4 order.

5

MR. MOQUIN: Okay.

MR.MOQUIN: Thank you very much,

6

THE COURT: - i f that's possible; hopefully, it's

THE COURT. And I should state to yon that I've

7 (inaudible)

5

THE COURT: You may go forward, Counsel.

6
7

8 reviewed all of the memoranda in support, opposition and in

8

MR. MOQUIN: Yeah. Yes, your Honor.

9 reply and so I'm not sure it's necessary that you simply

9

THE COURT: Are you suggesting to me that they

10 regurgitate everything that you've already set forth, but I

10 are—that an opposite opinion—that there are no—there can

11 want—want you to have a full opportunity to assert your

11 be no opposite reasonable interpretations of—of—of that

12 position.

12 order—

13

MR. MOQUIN: I will try not to be repetitive.

13

MR.MOQUIN: So long—

14

Your Honor, the Utah Supreme Court's October 25th,

14

THE COURT: - o f dismissal?

15 2000 decision that a Rule 59 motion was pending in this case

15

MR. MOQUIN: I think that there obviously could be

16 and thus, the appeal filed by David D. Bennett was

16 another opinion, but I think you have to go through a lot

17 premature, plaintiff, David D. Bennett requests the

17 o f -

18 following action from the Court: A finding that the Rule 59

18

THE COURT: Reas—reasonable opinion?

j 19 motion was before this Court, a hearing on the Rule 59

19

MR.MOQUIN: Reasonable? Well, I'm not sure it

! 20 motion and alternatively, an effective denial of that Rule

20 would be reasonable.

21 59 motion so David Bennett could proceed with his appeal

21

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MOQUIN: I mean, because I think that the

22 without the Supreme Court finding that an appeal was

22

23 premature.

23 Court w a s presented essentially with three options, two

24

24 options were presented by Mr. Hoggard, that cither it w a s

In his October 25th decision, Chief Justice

25 Richard C. Howe, acting for the Supreme Court, was in

25 premature because it w a s late, filed after 30 days had run

Page 6

Page 8

1 agreement with the arguments that counsel for Mr. Bennett

1 after the—the judgment; or it was premature because of the

2 made before this Court on October 2nd, 2000; in essence, the

2 existence of Rule 59; but I think the Court had a third

3 Utah Supreme Court necessarily decided that the pleading

3 option, I think the Court could merely have accepted Mr.

4 caption as a reply to defendants' response to plaintiffs

4 Hoggard1 s argument and said, well, this is either premature

5 objections of the minute entry and proposed order filed on

5 or it's late and we're not going to decide that issue right

6 February 16th, 2000, by Mr. Bennett was and is a Rule 59

6 now. I think that was the third option the Court could have

7 motion which not—which has not been decided.

7 taken at that point, so I think it had three options and I

8

8 think it made a conscious decision to choose one. And I

Plaintiff, Bennett, has provided this Court with

9 the Utah Supreme Court order in Attachment 8 of this

9 think Mr. Hoggard invited the Court to choose one and as I

10 document entitled Attachments to (inaudible) in support of

10 go on, I'll explain that.

11 plaintiff s motion—

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

THE COURT: U h huh.

12

MR. MOQUIN: This Supreme Court decision is in

13

MR. MOQUIN: -provided to all counsel.

13 complete agreement with existing case law. The reply was

14

The Court clearly stated that if defendants'

14 filed within ten days of the entry of the final judgment;

15 motion to dismiss this appeal is granted, plaintiff s notice
\16 of appeal filed by Rule 59 motion was pending at the

15 thus, under numerous controlling cases, for example, Reeves
\16 vs. Steinfeld, 915 P.2d 1073, DeBry vs. Fidelity National

17 District Court was premature and this Court lacks

17 Title Insurance, 828 P.2d 520-523, it should be ruled a Rule

18 jurisdiction.

18 59 motion. Moreover, under Reagan vs. Bloundt and

19

We don't believe that there were any

19 subsequent cases, it cannot be disposed of silently.

20 qualifications to that, we don't think that—that because

20

Defendants and this Court's reliance on Morgan v.

21 Mr. Bennett has alleged it was a Rule 59, we believe the

21 Morgan is~is misplaced. Morgan does not provide guidance

22 Court has actually looked and made a decision.

22 in a Rule 59 case. It—it controls the disposal of

23

At—at the time—

23 objections under local Rules 4-504, not Rule 59 motions.

24

THE COURT: But that—true, that is what you

24 There is no silent disposing of Rule 59 motions as there is

25 believe to be your reasonable interpretation; is that a fan-

Alan P. Smith, CSR (801) 266-0320

25 in a 4-504 objections.
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Page 9 J
1

1 dictum.

On the October 2nd hearing, this Court was very

2

2 candid and we appreciated that, that it stated that its

Similarly, since the entire order is based on the

3 normal procedure is to put a little notation whenever it

3 existence of a timely, unaddressed Rule 59 motion, it is

4 signs a Rule 59 motion in a case like this, when there is a

4 not—it is an unattenable position to argue that the Utah

5 Rule 59 motion and to say that itTs either to the objections

5 Supreme Court had—had not made a decision in this matter.

6 or to say itf s ruled on either the objections or a Rule 59

6

7 motion.

7 Utah Supreme Court's decision. Post, Kirby attempted to

8

8 avoid an appeal of your Honor's decision by preemptively

I think in the—in—when you're deciding

Defendant, Post, Kirby, simply does not like the

9 objections, that's optional. I think case law, Morgan v.

9 compelling the Utah Supreme Court to decide whether a Rule

10 Morgan stands for that, that that—that is optional; but on

10 59 motion existed. Post, Kirby received what he wanted in a

11 a Rule 59—in a Rule 59 situation, which we believe this is,

11 summary disposition.

12 under Reagan vs. Bloundt, that is not acceptable. There has

12

13 to—there has to be that notation, it's not optional to

13 premature or time barred, as the old adage goes, Be careful

14 write in, they're not (inaudible)

14 what you ask for. Fairness in Utah law dictates that Post,

15

15 Kirby now has to abide by the Utah Supreme Court's decision.

And while this Court, we believe, thought it—

A decision on whether Mr. Bennett's appeal was

16 believes it's considered the Rule 59 issues and—and decided

16 Post, Kirby has had its bite at the apple. Post, Kirby had

17 against them, it did not do it in an effective manner.

17 its chance to argue before the Utah Supreme Court that Mr.

18 There are certain procedures that have to be followed and

18 Bennett's reply was not a Rule 59 motion, defendant had its

19 this Court did not follow those procedures.

19 chance to—to appeal the decision.

20

20

Though it's quite evident under the Utah case law

It is now the Court's duty to decide the Rule 59

21 that Mr. Bennett did file a Rule 59 motion which has not

21 motion so this case can move forward. The record is clear

22 been properly addressed, the position is now, with all due

22 that Post, Kirby, in Attachment 3 of this document,

23 respect to this Court, no longer this Court's to make.

23 Paragraph 11 in the statement of facts, in its appellee's

24 Under the law of the case doctrine, particularly the

24 mo—memorandum in support of its motion for summary

25 mandated rule branch, this Court must follow the Utah

25 disposition, informed the Court that it was—it was its

!
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1 Supreme Court's decision in this matter.

1 position that either no Rule 59 motion had been filed or it

2

2 had been disposed of and this Court signed an identical

Defendant, Post, Kirby and Michael Kirby, hereby

3 referred to collectively as Post, Kirby, gave the Utah

3 order (inaudible) reply.

4 Supreme Court two alternative grounds to decide that

4

5 plaintiff had filed an appeal on time, (inaudible) all

5 all relevant filings outlining this position. Clearly, the

6 relevant pleadings to make such a decision. This is amply
7 demonstrated in a filing by Mr. Bennett before this Court

Additionally, Post, Kirby submitted to the Court

[ 6 Utah Supreme Court made a conscious choice between the two
7 scenarios; thus, Post, Kirby's argument that the Court did

8 entitled—and I won't repeat it again, I'll try to move this

8 not truly decide between the alternatives but somehow just

9 along.

9 accepted Mr. Bennett's argument is specious.

10

The Utah Supreme Court could have decided that no

11 Rule 59 motion existed; instead, Chief Justice Howe, for the

10

After the earlier hearing and this Court's candid

111 admissions, Mr. Bennett and his counsel, understand that

12 Court, decided that a Rule 59 motion was still outstanding

12 this Court wanted to rule on the Rule 59 issues;

13 on June 9th, 2000, which is contrary to this Court's

13 nevertheless, this Court failed to follow the proper

14 hearing—holding. Under the mandated rule as expressed in

14 procedures to dispose of a Rule 59 motion, thus, it failed

15 Thurston vs. Box Elder County, this Court is obligated

15 to dispose of the Rule 59 motion.

16 (inaudible) both the letter and the spirit of the mandate

16

17 from the Utah Supreme Court.

17 filings before it has now recognized the existence of a Rule

18

Post, Kirby, in his response to the plaintiffs

The Utah Supreme Court, having all pertinent

18 59 motion. The Supreme Court order is concise and clear and

19 motion that this Court act pursuant to the order of the Utah

19 once again, the order states, the defendants' motion to

20 Supreme Court entered October 25th, 2000, attempts to argue

20 dismiss this appeal is granted. Plaintiffs notice of

21 that the order falls within an exception to the mandated

21 appeal filed while Rule 59 motion was pending it the

22 rule either because it is dictum or no actual decision has

22 District Court was premature and this Court lacks

23 been made; however, this is clearly a specious argument.

23 jurisdiction. If this was a case of statutory construction

24 The determination of whether a Rule 59 motion existed was

24 and I realize it isn't, the plain language of this would

25 critical to the Supreme Court order, thus, it clearly is not

25 have to be followed.
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1

And I—I would argue that just following the plain

2 language of this—plain language of this order makes sense

Page 15 j
1

THE COURT.- Okay. All right.

2

MR. MOQUIN: Thank you. Thank you.

3 in this case because the issue of jurisdiction can always be

3

THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel.

4 raised. If we1 re given our Rule 50—if the Court recognizes

4

MR. HOGGARD: Good morning, your Honor.

5 the Rule 59 right, Rule 59 motion and we're allowed to file

5

The issue here is—is quite simple. We're looking

6 an appeal, Post, Kirby can raise this issue at the Supreme

6 at the application of the mandate rule to the October 25th

7 Court, this jurisdictional issue. And if this decision is

7 order of the Supreme Court. And the parties will disagree

8 wrong, it'll be corrected at that point but we will not have

8 on what the mandate order—rule is, where the Supreme Court

9 to go through the cost of appealing a Rule 59 issue and then

9 has actually ruled on an issue, then this Court must follow

10 if we're correct, having to file another appeal.

10 that decision; however, to determine what was actually

11

11 decided, you look at the opinion and the circumstances it

So, I think that when you weigh the equities to

12 just follow the court's decision and accept their language

12 embraces. And so it's not just, let's look at the language,

13 as meaning just what it states, it seems to me the fairest

13 we have to look at what the circumstances were to interpret

14 way to proceed.

14 what was really decided in the motion.

15

15

This Court should not be expected to read the mind

Now, when you go back and look at the

16 of Chief Justice Howe. This Court should just follow the

16 circumstances, it is clear that the rule—that the—the

17 plain language of the order.

17 substantive issue of whether there was a Rule 59 motion

18

18 pending was never addressed and never reached by the Supreme

In our filings, we tried to figure to what was

19 going on in your mind and I think we failed miserably when

19 Court.

j 20 we were trying to figure out, you know, which order you

20

Mr. Moquin cites various cases, talking about

21 meant to sign and I think when you start, it's a very

21 Reeves and Reagan and Morgan. The interesting thing, none

22 slippery slope to try to figure out that it—that Chief

22 of those cases were cited to the Utah Supreme Court. The

23 Justice Howe means something other than what he said or

23 only place that is found is in the attachments to Post,

24 there's some limitations. And I think it's just that the

24 Kirby's motion where they're reciting the history in the

25 cleanest way is to go with the language of Chief Justice

25 statement of fact and attaches for the purpose of just

Page 14
1 Howe.
2
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1 putting the record, we have the briefs attached to the

And finally, to wrap this up, this—this Court

2 motion. But nowhere in the argument section, nowhere in any

3 should treat the plaintiff's reply as a Rule 59 motion and

3 of the briefs that were actually—the memorandum that were

4 act accordingly. Mr. Bennett and his counsel believe the

4 actually submitted to the Supreme Court for decision on the

5 Court would benefit from a full briefing of the RuK

5 motions themselves or in opposition to the motions,

6 issues and particularly the Rule 54 aspects; however, we are

i 6 discussed any of the substantive issues. What is a Rule 59

7 primarily concerned with having our appeal rights

7 motion and whether this Court necessarily denied that motion

8 recognized. The issue of jurisdiction should be the subject

8 by implication when it signed the judgment. Those two

9 of appeal, not the issue of the timeliness of a Rule59
10 motion.
111

A decision by this Court contrary would only delay

12 the resolution of the case that has already con—consumed

9 issues are not in any of the arguments submitted to the Utah
10 Supreme Court.
11

All—you have to reach all the way to the briefs,

12 which are background information, to one paragraph giving

13 too much judicial resources.

13 the history, the procedural history of the case, to even get

14

Thank you, your Honor.

14 any mention of the merits.

15

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

15

16

This is really a minor point but I'm just curious.

16 filed by Mr. Bennett and Mr. Bennett said, It is our

17 When you filed the request for the status conferences in

So, what happened was, the docketing statement was

17 position that there is a Rule 59 motion still pending, but

18 November, were you aware of the fact that I was not in the

18 we filed this appeal under the alternate possibility that

19 State of Utah during those—

19 the Court did in fact rule upon the 59 motion in the

20

MR. MOQUTN: No, I wasn't, your Honor.

20 February judgments.

21

THE COURT: Okay.

21

22

MR. MOQUIN: i~i came in and I think the first

22 appeal was based upon the assumption there was no Rule 59

So, in the docketing statements, he says the

23 time I—I was aware of that was in—in January, when I was

23 motion pending. So, we filed the motions—Post, Kirby filed

24 in for another hearing and I found out that you wouldn't be

24 a motion to dismiss which said, under that basis, which is

25 available for—or in February.

25 based on the note—time for appeal starts under Rule 58(a)

Alan P. Smith. CSR C801) 266-0320

Page 13 - Page 16

Page 19

Page 17
1 due to the notice of judgment, we argued clearly Rule 58(a)

1 Rule 59 issue and both parties said—asked the Court, send

2 undermines that position because it says failure to give

2 it back to the District Court to decide it in the first

3 notice of entry of judgment doesn't toll the time for

3 instance, that's who ought to decide these issues. And

4 appeal.

4 that's exactly what the court did.

5

5

So that if there is no pending Rule 59 motion,

It then issued an order which simply says, motion

6 their appeal is clearly late. And then we say in the

6 is granted, filing an appeal where there's a pending Rule 59

7 alternative, if—even if you were to—even if there were a

7 motion is premature and it cites a generic case on the fact

8 motion pending, which they don't claim there is, based upon

8 that if you have a Rule 59 motion pending, you cannot

9 the appeal, then it's premature. Either way, it doesn't

9 appeal. The Utah Supreme Court doesn't cite the only case

10 matter, you don't even have to reach the issue, either way,

10 cited by Mr. Bennett on appeal on the merits, which is the

11 under either possible scenario of what the case is, the

11 DeBry case, the Supreme Court doesn't cite the Reeves or

12 status of the case is, it's untimely, you dismiss it.

12 Reagan or Morgan cases, which are central to resolution of

13

13 the underlying issue, it just cites a generic motion.

Then, instead of responding to that motion, Mr.

14 Bennett filed a motion to remand in which he abandoned his

14

15 position in the docketing statement which was, okay, well,

15 look at the circumstances, all the Supreme Court was doing

16 this appeal is based on the fact there is no Rule 59 motion

16 is saying, Mr. Bennett, you have to prove to us that there

17 pending. He then says in his motion to remand that the

17 is jurisdiction on this appeal. You have now come to the

18 Court, this Court has failed to rule on the Rule 59 motion,

18 Court and said there's a Rule 59 motion pending and you want

So, it is Post, Kirby's position that when you

19 therefore, the record is incomplete and the court, the

19 us to remand. No, we dismiss.

20 Supreme Court should remand the issue to this Court to

20

And Post, Kirby had already argued that if the

21 resolve the pending motions that were pending in May as to

21 other alternate possibility on which they initially asserted

122 whether or not there was a Rule 59 motion pending back in

22 was clearly meritorious and they had abandoned that and so

23 February.

23 it's nothing more than sending the case back because on the

24

24 asserted basis of jurisdiction that was asserted by Mr.

So that that motion to remand changed the issue.

25 The issue is now, okay, Mr. Bennett is asserting that there

25 Bennett, it was as a matter of law, absolutely certain that

Page 18

Page 20

1 is a Rule 59 motion pending; now, what do you do? Do you

1 their appeal was premature, was untimely.

2 remand or do you dismiss under those circumstances? Well,

2

3 it's absolutely clear under Utah Supreme Court precedent

3 they considered—considered the merits and the circumstances

4 that if you are contest—if you are basing your appeal on

4 suggest the only issue before the Court was whether it would

5 the contention that there is in fact a Rule 59 motion

5 remand to this Court or dismiss. And on that basis, we

6 pending, then your motion is pre—then your appeal is

6 believe that a mandate rule doesn't apply, the Court—this

7 premature.

7 Court should enter an order encompassing its ruling on

8

8 October 6 and to avoid additional economy problems, that in

So, the issue wasn't whether or not there's a Rule

9 59 motion pending. Bennett is now saying there is, that's

And so the Supreme Court—there's no indication

9 the order, it ought to say in the alternative, if the Utah

10 what he's basing his appeal on. The question is, what do

10 Supreme Court finds, or it meant to change it, then I've

11 you do? Do you appe—do you dismiss or do you remand?

11 denied it, because that's what this Court has already

12

12 indicated. It's considered the issues and has denied the

When we filed—when Mr.—when Post, Kirby filed

13 its reply memorandum, it recognized, it told the Supreme

13 Rule 59 arguments.

14 Court, look, they changed their position so now what you've

14

15 got to do is dismiss and we said, quote, This court must

15 primary issue, which is this Court has ruled there is no

16 dismiss or terminate the pending appeal as untimely so as to

16 Rule 59 motion, but there's the fall-back position that in

17 remand the case to the District Court for resolution of any

17 the event the Utah Supreme Court disagrees, we don't have to

18 pending motions. And that was the main motion that was

18 come back down and then go back up again, we can consider

That way we have—we're—we're going on the

19 pending at the time.

19 all those issues at the same time.

20

We never asked the Utah Supreme Court to reach the

20

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

21 issue. Both Mr. Bennett and Post, Kirby told the Supreme—

21

Mr. Moquin?

22 asked the Supreme Court, send the case back to the District

22

Mr. Barber?

23 Court to let the District Court decide whatever motions are

23

MR. BARBER: Your Honor, may I respond?

24 pending because that's the posture of the case that's

24

THE COURT: Go ahead.

25 required at this time. So, no one argued the merits of the

25

MR. BARBER: Your Honor, it occurs to me that,
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1 although, of course, a critical issue is the Supreme Court's

1 disagree—I can't disagree with you because the Supreme

2 order, but what is also important is the fundamental posture

2 Court could have made it easier for us had they made a

3 of the case on the record. And—and that is relevant in

3 specific finding as part of their order and said as a

4 deciding whether or not the reply that Mr. Bennett filed on

4 predicate to the order we're now making, we are deciding

5 February 16th to the response to the objection to the entry

5 that this is a Rule 59 motion that has to be dealt with.

6 of the minute entry granting judgment for the defendant—

6

7 defendants Kirby, was in fact a Rule 59 motion.

7 your Honor, is this: the notion that that is dictum or that

8

I think the error with counsel's argument, though,

8 it was just kind of a way to get rid of the case and get it

Because whether or not the Supreme Court's

9 back here for some undefined purpose is not well taken for

9 decision actually set forth a holding to that effect, we
10 believe that the record under the circumstances makes it

10 the reason that the Supreme Court could not have dismissed

11 clear that that filing was a Rule 59 motion under applicable

11 the case without finding whether it constitutes a holding of

12 case law, primarily Reagan vs. Bloundt, because it

12 the Court or not that it was a Rule 59 motion, they must

13 challenged the substance of the Court's findings which were

13 have found that to be the case or you have to take the

14 necessary to the entry of the judgment.

14 position that they decided the case upon an issue that is

15

15 irrelevant.

We essentially asked for a new trial or a new

16 judgment which is contemplated in the first paragraph of

16

17 Rule 59 amongst the relief that the Court can grant in

17 to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that they did. So, I

18 response to such a motion. What Mr. Bennett really asked

18 think that in the Supreme Court's order of dismissal,

19 the Court to do is to make a new judgment which was contrary

19 notwithstanding that it is not clear and concise and doesn't

20 to the one that the Court had indicated by minute entry that

20 tell us exactly what they were thinking, there is a

21 it intended to enter.

21 necessary finding that there was a Rule 59 motion pending

122

If this wasn't a Rule 59 motion, they had no basis

22 and I think that the Court's sending it back here on that

It is also clear that this Court could not have

23 ruled on that reply, whether or not a Rule 59 motion, when

23 basis essentially says it would help us when we are dealing

24 it signed the judgment in the first place because that reply

24 with this case if the District Court would make a ruling on

25 hadn't even been filed. The only time the Court could have

25 that motion so we'll have something substantive to decide on

Page 22
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1 impliedly denied the Rule 59 motion or whatever it was, was

1 that issue.

2 when it re-entered the judgment on the 28th of February; of

2

3 course, nobody knew that that had happened—well, of course,

3 Court, a specific dealing with the Rule 59 motion, which is

4 the Court did, but counsel didn't.

4 required under the rule, rather clearly,—

5

But as a result of that, we have kind of a flux

Without that hold—without a finding in this

5

THE COURT: But—

6 state of facts that—that makes it difficult to ascertain—

6

MR. BARBER: -that Court doesn't know what it's

7 makes it difficult for us to ascertain as counsel and

7 doing either.

8 perhaps the Supreme Court, exactly what had happened in this

8

9 Court to get the case where it was as it was presented to
10 the Supreme Court.
111

And I think their order is essentially an effort

THE COURT: i~i have made a ruling on that

9 particular motion. It's just not—it has not yet been
10 reduced to an order, I believe, that I have signed because
11 of the objections filed in October, subsequent to the

12 to short that out so that the records—

12 October 6th telephone conference call; isn't that correct?

13

13

THE COURT: Mr. Barber, it's—well, it's almost—

MR. BARBER: Yeah. And I don't have a problem,

14 sometimes it's a waste to me to put questions to counsel and

14 the only problem that I have with that is that without—and

15 I don't mean that in any negative way—

15 then what the Court did, as I recall it and please correct

16

MR. BARBER: N o , no, I—

16 me if I'm wrong, but I think what the Court said on the

17

THE COURT: -because what I'm usually going to

17 October 6th and the—and the 29th phone conference was,

18 get back is the advocative position.

18 look, I reviewed the record, I considered all the arguments,

19

MR. BARBER: Of COUTSe.

19 Bennett, that you made, and I rejected them. I intended to

20

THE COURT: Of course. But it's just been my

20 reject them and I do hereby again reject them.

21 experience that the Supreme Court is—is usually far more

21

22 explicit in circumstances of this nature than what they

22 effect, then we would have had a ruling on the 59 motion.

23 purport to be in the order dismissing the appeal. But

23 B u t -

24 there's no sense in me putting that question to you.

24

THE COURT: You mean after—

25

25

MR. BARBER.- - w e still don't have one.

MR. BARBER: Well, and—and-and I—I can't but
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1

THE COURT: You mean after the October 6th
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1 therefore, put at issue all of the underlying predicates to

2 telephone call?

2 the entry of that judgment and it therefore, must be deemed

3

MR. BARBER: Y e s .

3 a 59 motion.

4

THE COURT: Well, I--didn't I--I instruct counsel

4

But whether you specifically say, well, it's a 59

5 motion or it isn't, if you'll deny it, then we can go to the

5 to prepare an order, did I not?
6

MR. BARBER: I think SO.

6 Court and say, well, you're wrong about that. Or Mr.

7

THE COURT: You think so? You~you don't—

7 Hoggard can go up there and say you were damn right to do

8

MR. BARBER: Well, I ~

8 that. But without a specific ruling that comports with the

9

THE COURT: i-do you—are you—you don't

9 requirements of the case law, we still have a kind of a—an

10 remember?

10 unclear record where we don't know quite what the Supreme

11

11 Court was thinking when it re—when it dismissed the appeal

MR. BARBER: Well, I don't have a specific

12 recollection of that, but I'm sure the Court did that; but

12 and the Supreme Court itself may not know quite what you

13 if that's the case, we're—we're satisfied. But that order

13 intended to do, not on October 6th, but on February 11th and

14 ought to say at least whether or not this is a Rule 59

14 then once again on February 28th, when you re-entered the

15 motion, it's denied. Or whether or not it's a Rule59

15 same judgment.

16 motion, it's granted. And then the record before the

16

17 Supreme Court is clear.

17 effective, I—you know, I mean, that order is effective when

18

18 it's signed and frankly, that's going to help Bennett

I think that one could explain the Court's

So, all we're saying and I—when you make it

19 decision by simply saying, well, they had to make a finding

19 because we now have 30 days to appeal that judgment. And

120 about that in order to dismiss the appeal; otherwise, the—

20 really, if you get right down to it, that's all we've been

21 the ruling makes no sense whatsoever.

21 seeking since May 6th when we received notice of the entry

22

22 of the judgment, is an opportunity to appeal the underlying

You—you can't say, well, somebody has said this

23 is a Rule 59 motion, it's not but we're going to dismiss the

23 findings that the Court had to make in order to grant the

24 appeal on the basis that we don't have jurisdiction to

24 defendants' motion.

25 entertain an appeal when there's a 59 motion, if it isn't

25

And so it seems to me that it's fairly simple and
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1 one. There—there's no way they would have said that.

1 straightforward to do that, that it's more than warranted by

2

2 the case law and that a clear order dealing with the Rule 59

So, I think they made a finding that for purposes

3 of that appeal, the thing ought to be deemed to be a Rule 59

3 motion, assuming that that's what it is, is the easy way to

4 motion and I think they dismissed the appeal contemplating

4 get the matter in a resolve—get the matter resolved in a

5 that this Court, at some stage of the proceedings, would

5 manner that is consistent with an orderly record to present

6 make a specific minute entry denying or granting the Rule 59

6 to the Supreme Court. And that's what we'd ask the Court to

7 motion. If you—of course, if you grant the Rule 59 motion,

7 do.

8 it doesn't go back to the Supreme Court at this stage and we

8

9 can go ahead to trial; but if—if you deny the Rule 59

9

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Barber.
MR. BARBER: Thank you.

10 motion, then there is a clear record to take to the Supreme

10

11 Court, that that's what you've done, that you intended to do

11 going to do. I'm going to draft an order, myself, resulting

12 it and that you did do it in the manner that is required by

12 from this hearing and I'll have that order to you within one

13 the rules.

13 week from today.

114

And I think that's the problem. We just don't

14

THE COURT: Now, this is what I—this is what I'm

I can't recall if your—if you have fax numbers on

15 have a specific minute entry clearly required by the case

15 your pleadings or not, but I'll fax a copy to you as well as

16 law and the rules dealing with that motion. So, it seems to

16 mail a copy to you; of course, the original will be in the

17 me that—that the thing's gotten a little bit out of hand

17 file. If you don't have the fax numbers on your pleadings,

18 with—with all the—the paper and time that we've had to

18 make sure you give them to Tina so that she has those.

19 spend with it in trying to get it settled; but it seems to

19

Anything else at this point, Counsel?

20 me the sensible thing to do now is to simply enter an order

20

MR. HOGGARD: N o , VOUT Honor.

21 denying the Rule 59 motion, whether you do that with a

21

THE COURT-. Mr. Barber?

22 finding that it was a 59 motion or not, I don't know as

22

MR. BARBER: N o , VOUT Honor.

23 particularly relevant, the Supreme Court can decide that.

23

THE COURT: No? Okay. We'll recess at this

24 We think it clearly is 'cause it challenges the substance of

24 point.

25 what the Court found in its February 11th judgment and

25
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